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ABSTRACT
This thesis comprises three research papers about regulatory economics of U.S. natural
gas markets and midstream assets. Each research paper is a standalone chapter in this
document. An abstract for each chapter follows.
Chapter 1 develops four metrics to diagnose the adequate development of efficient-market
base-load natural gas storage capacity. These diagnostic metrics are developed using the
market equilibrium of base-load natural gas storage operations under perfect competition and
monopoly environments. The market-equilibrium solutions are obtained from intertemporal
choice models. The four diagnostic metrics are (1) market equilibrium of storage capacity
investment, (2) price fluctuation, (3) correlation between price and consumption, and (4)
correlation between price and inventories. The last two metrics complement the diagnosis
from the first two metrics. These metrics are adapted to address seasonal uncertainty, which
can be magnified by climate change. FERC can use these metrics to monitor potential and
unintended deterrent effects of their own regulatory policies on midstream infrastructure
development.
Chapter 2 shows that the cost-based approach of regulating capital-intensive services in
natural monopoly environments does not address the congestion originated by the delayed
investment of lumpy assets. Addressing this issue, this research evaluates the economic effi-
ciency of the cost-based approach to regulation and identifies an enhanced ratemaking policy
that can deliver greater economic efficiency. In particular, a deterministic asset investment
model is built to characterize a regulated pipeline company that chooses scale and timing of
a natural gas pipeline investment to maximize the return on the asset (ROA). In this model,
transportation rates can either be endogenous or exogenous to the firm decisions. The model
is used to contrast welfare under the cost-based approach against welfare under the enhanced
ratemaking policy. The research finds that the cost-based approach can achieve greater eco-
iii
nomic efficiency when the “fair” ROA requirement is relaxed. The enhanced ratemaking
policy builds up from the relaxed ROA requirement and introduces a transfer payment to
induce the regulated firm towards a Pareto improvement. Chapter 2 refers to a few results
from Chapter 3 and vice versa.
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive methodical analysis of the structural economic effects
on U.S. natural gas prices resulting from open access to pipelines. The analysis is motivated
by the changes introduced by Order 636 (the open-access rule) and the ensuing evolvement of
the U.S. natural gas industry. To conduct the analysis, the U.S. natural gas market structure
before and after Order 636 is contrasted using models formulated as linear complementarity
problems. Using my framework of analysis, I synthesize the literature encompassing econo-
metric and structural studies with a focus on the open-access rule. Assuming the effects of
a larger pool of suppliers dominate, the market impact on a region after open access can be
diagnosed based on observed changes in price and exchange categorization of the region.
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CHAPTER 1
DIAGNOSTIC METRICS FOR THE ADEQUATE DEVELOPMENT OF
EFFICIENT-MARKET BASE-LOAD NATURAL GAS STORAGE CAPACITY
This chapter develops four metrics to diagnose the adequate development of efficient-
market base-load natural gas storage capacity. These diagnostic metrics are developed using
the market equilibrium of base-load natural gas storage operations under perfect competition
and monopoly environments. The market-equilibrium solutions are obtained from intertem-
poral choice models. The four diagnostic metrics are (1) market equilibrium of storage
capacity investment, (2) price fluctuation, (3) correlation between price and consumption,
and (4) correlation between price and inventories. The last two metrics complement the
diagnosis from the first two metrics. These metrics are adapted to address seasonal uncer-
tainty, which can be magnified by climate change. FERC can use these metrics to monitor
potential and unintended deterrent effects of their own regulatory policies on midstream
infrastructure development.
1.1 Introduction
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) faces conflicting faculties granted
by the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and the Federal Power Act (FPA) concerning the develop-
ment of interstate natural gas midstream infrastructure – namely, pipelines, storage, and
LNG facilities. On one hand, under the NGA, FERC has jurisdiction over the siting and
abandonment of midstream infrastructure and reviews applications for its construction and
operation (FERC, 2016). In addition, FERC has authority over the ratemaking policies of
midstream services – namely, transport and storage – which are the sources of return on cap-
ital investment. On the other hand, under the FPA, FERC has the responsibility to promote
the development of robust, reliable, and secure midstream infrastructure as this is critical
to ensure that natural gas supply can reach market areas (FERC, 2014). These conflicting
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faculties require FERC to check that their own regulatory policies on midstream infrastruc-
ture development and rate schedules are not acting as potential deterrents of efficient-market
development. In particular, FERC has attempted to check on the adequate efficient-market
development1 of base-load natural gas storage,2 which helps moderate prices over the seasons.
As shown in Wright and Harvey (2006), FERC empirically evaluates seasonal storage
sufficiency based on historical trends of inventory levels, storage capacity, and marginal
benefit of base-load storage – the latter estimated as the difference between the natural gas
price averages realized during withdrawal and injection periods. However, these trends do
not provide enough evidence to assess storage capacity adequacy. The first two are empirical
trends that provide the reduction rate of available storage capacity, due to rising inventories,
and the growth rate of nominal storage capacity. To gain insights, FERC contrasts such rates
estimated domestically against those from European countries. This comparable analysis
approach, however, can be significantly affected by the heterogeneous nature of industry and
market environments at play in different countries. At a fundamental level, storage capacity
adequacy cannot be completely assessed without an identification of the drivers behind these
changing rates and the quantification of their effects. Regarding the third trend, although the
marginal benefit of seasonal storage has a fundamental basis, its estimate is not completely
accurate and works as a market signal proxy only.3 For a complete assessment, this metric
needs to be supplemented with long-term investment considerations – see Section 1.7.4.
To appropriately monitor the effect of FERC’s regulatory policies on storage develop-
ment, it is thus necessary to have diagnostic metrics based on economic fundamentals for
the assessment of storage capacity adequacy (or lack thereof). Unfortunately, such diagnos-
tic metrics are not currently found in the literature. Having them is essential as FERC’s
assessment is key to determine whether policy makers must incentivize billions of dollars
1 In this chapter, adequate or sufficient development is that anticipated in an efficient market.
2 Base-load storage is used to meet seasonal demands.
3 The proper estimate is shown in expression (1.41) and discussed in the paragraph immediately following
it.
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in storage capital investments over the years.4 Thus, this research looks to fill this gap by
finding economic diagnostic metrics that can be used to assess the adequate development of
efficient-market base-load natural gas storage capacity.
In this research, an intertemporal choice model is built taking an optimal control ap-
proach. The model solves for base-load natural gas storage operations handling seasonal
demand in one year under two market environments, i.e., perfect competition and monopoly,
and varying levels of binding storage capacity. The model output captures how natural gas
market prices, inventories, consumption, and storage flows, all as endogenous results, respond
to these changing scenarios. Diagnostic metrics are developed using the parametric results
from the theoretical storage operations. Diagnostic metrics include (1) market equilibrium
of storage capacity investment, (2) price fluctuation, (3) correlation between price and con-
sumption, and (4) correlation between price and inventories. These metrics are adapted to
address seasonal pattern uncertainty, which can be magnified by climate change.
In this chapter, Section 1.2 begins with the literature context of my research model.
Section 1.3 identifies the uses of natural gas storage. Section 1.4 introduces the base of my
intertemporal choice model. Section 1.5 applies my base model to the condition when there is
no storage operation. Appendices B and C expand upon my base model to solve the market
equilibrium under non-binding and binding storage capacity operations, respectively. Both
appendices use common results introduced in Appendix A. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 summarize
the main results and findings from Appendices B and C, respectively. Section 1.8 compares
qualitatively the market responses predicted by my model against those observed in the
market. Section 1.9 develops the four diagnostic metrics for adequate efficient-market de-
velopment. Section 1.10 introduces seasonal pattern uncertainty and adjusts the diagnostic
metrics accordingly. Last, Section 1.11 concludes.
4 According to FERC (2004), a typical 6-12 month cycle Gulf Coast salt cavern can cost upwards of $10
million per BCF of working gas capacity – this would be higher in other regions – while a typical 2-cycle
depleted reservoir field can cost between $5 and $6 million per BCF. Current working gas capacity in the
U.S. is approximately 4,600 BCF.
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1.2 Storage Models in the Literature
While there is no shortage of storage models in the literature, the model introduced
in this research assembles a unique set of attributes that stands apart from others. My
structural model is based on economic fundamentals and captures how market equilibrium
prices, inventories, consumption, and storage flows, all as endogenous results, respond to
base-load storage operations. These operations are evaluated under perfect competition and
monopoly environments and varying levels of binding storage capacity. My structural model
solves market-wide operations at the regional level of the natural gas market to achieve mar-
ket equilibrium. This first characteristic sets my model apart from inventory management
models found in the Operations Research literature, which are concerned with minimizing
operational costs at the company level.
The economic theory of commodity markets have been generally developed using struc-
tural, econometric, or financial modeling approaches. My model falls under the first category.
Williams and Wright (1991) is a good base reference on structural models of competitive
equilibrium for storers subject to random shocks. Pirrong (2010) expands this base work and
introduces multiple sources of uncertainty. Pirrong (2010) emphasizes that the nature of the
commodity needs to be properly captured in the model setup: “no one-size model can fit all
commodities, because commodities have a wide variety of dimensions.” Some commodities
like natural gas have continuous supply and seasonal demand. Others, like corn and most
agricultural commodities, have a seasonal supply and continuous demand. Commodities like
natural gas and corn are storable while others like electricity are not. These fundamental
differences lead to distinctive models. Pirrong (2010) focuses on storage to manage uncer-
tain supply or demand in the future. In contrast, my model focuses on base-load storage to
manage deterministic seasonal demand. While Pirrong (2010) addresses seasonally produced
commodities like corn, my model addresses seasonal natural gas demand.
Most of the literature found on natural gas storage addresses the subject of asset valuation
– see Boogert and De Jong (2008), Thompson (2016), and Schoppe (2010). In this literature,
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the price dynamics of natural gas are exogenous to the asset valuation models. In other
words, the storage effects on commodity price dynamics are not captured endogenously but
rather introduced exogenously in reduced form via the seasonality reflected in the forward
market. In contrast, price and inventory dynamics are endogenous in my model.
My model is an intertemporal model that takes an optimal control approach. Noticeably,
the literature on natural resource economics makes extensive use of optimal control theory to
uncover commodity price dynamics of renewable and non-renewable resources under a multi-
tude of model setups starting from pure depletion models for non-renewable resources to mod-
els capturing more realistic features including constrained production, backstop technologies,
and beyond – see Conrad and Clark (1995). Out of this literature, Schroder-Amundsen (1991)
addresses the price dynamics originating from seasonal demands and commodity storage.
Schroder-Amundsen (1991) develop a linearly integrated natural gas model including
capacity-constrained production, storage, and distribution where demand fluctuates season-
ally. His model determines the effects of storage facilities on market equilibrium prices (peak
and off-peak), both within the cycle of a year and over several years. The model integrates
three deterministic optimal control problems, one for each stage of the supply chain of in-
terest: production, storage, and distribution. However, having all three binding conditions
active across the supply chain masks the individual binding effects. Also, although the model
is setup as an optimal control problem, the model is solved numerically. The numerical re-
sults cannot be easily used to discern the effects of individual capacity constraints. Thus,
obtaining model insights is difficult. Schroder-Amundsen (1991) models fluctuating season-
ality with a discrete two stage change in demand from fall/winter (peak) to spring/summer
(shoulder). This approach, although seemingly simple, complicates the analytical derivation
of a parametric solution. In contrast, in my research, storage constitutes the sole capacity
constraint and seasonality is modeled using a sine function. These simplifications facilitate
the analytical derivation of a parametric solution.
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According to Pirrong (2010), there are two approaches to the theory of storage. The first
one uses the concept of convenience yield relating spot and futures prices and the costs of
holding inventories. In the literature, for instance, Pindyck (2001) builds a storage model
taking the convenience yield5 approach. Pindyck (2001) relates convenience yield (ψ), spot
prices (P), futures prices (F ), per-unit cost of physical storage (k), and risk-free interest
rate (r) through the free-arbitrage expression ψt,T = (1 + rT )Pt − Ft,T + kT where index t
is spot time and index T is future time. This expression is commonly used in the literature.
According to Pirrong (2010), one convenience yield approach that is quite popular and is the
base for one of the most widely used reduced-form commodity derivatives pricing models is
the linear factor model introduced by Schwartz (1997). The second approach to the theory
of storage uses dynamic programming incorporating inventory constraints. According to
Pirrong (2010), the second approach has more well-developed micro foundations. My model
takes this second approach. In my model, the dynamics of convenience yield and prices
respond endogenously to the storage operation and do not make use of the free-arbitrage
expression. Convenience yield in my model arises from the use of base-load storage under
certainty and capacity binding conditions, and not from the use of storage under uncertainty.
There are also hybrid dynamic programming models that embed convenience yield explic-
itly to provide flexibility and incorporate sophisticated modeling features. Pindyck (2004)
introduces an interesting hybrid dynamic programming model where convenience yield is
integrated as an econometric expression with exogenous and endogenous terms. Pindyck
(2004) examines the role of volatility in short-run commodity market dynamics and the de-
terminants of volatility itself. He uses a structural model of inventories, spot, and futures
prices accounting explicitly for volatility. In his model, firms choose production and inven-
tory levels to maximize the present value of the expected flow of profits – equal to revenues
5 It should be noted that what is traditionally known as user cost (or scarcity rent) of a resource stock in
natural resource economics is sometimes embedded in what is called “convenience yield” in certain natural
resource investment models – see the model setup in Brennan and Schwartz (1985). In my research, however,
convenience yield includes the shadow value of inventory only – and not the shadow value of resource stock
(or user cost). Section 1.6.1 clarifies the concept of convenience yield in my model.
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minus total cost (TC). Convenience yield (ψ) is introduced to the total cost function (TC),
as the derivative of total marketing cost with respect to inventory
(




cost is defined as the cost of production and delivery scheduling and stockout avoidance,
decreasing with the level of inventory N . Total cost comprises direct cost, capital cost, user
cost, and marketing cost. Convenience yield is found in the model using an econometric ex-
pression with prices (Pt), seasonal factors (bj), and price volatility (σ
2
t ) as exogenous terms
of the optimization model and inventories (Nt) as the one endogenous term. In this way,
convenience yield is not completely endogenous to the model.
Although Pindyck (2004)’s model uses a convenience yield approach, his hybrid dynamic
programming model can still be contrasted against my research model at the structural
level. Both models introduce decisions on storage. However, Pindyck’s model incorporates
decisions on production and operational costs while my model does not. Both models can
solve for spot prices, inventories, and convenience yields. Because my model is determinis-
tic for short-term operations,6 convenience yield is greater than zero when storage capacity
binds only. On the other hand, Pindyck’s model incorporates uncertainty in the form of
unobserved shocks to cost (η) and demand (εt). Thus, in his model, convenience yield can
be greater than zero even when storage capacity is not binding. Pindyck uses seasonal fac-
tors, inventory levels, spot prices, and futures prices to calibrate convenience yield. This
calibration changes from one region to the next, obscuring the inference of general insights.
In contrast, my analytical model does not require extensive calibration. Pindyck assumes a
mean-reverting price process, which is captured by the user cost ωt. Hence, the user cost
ωt is a function of the mean-reverting price process parameters, the risk-free rate (rf ), and
the commodity’s risk-adjusted expected return (ρ). In my model, seasonal market equilib-
rium price is an endogenous result and does not require a pre-determined pattern. Pindyck
finds that volatility can be viewed as exogenous from price, inventories, and convenience
yield (the market variables). While my model is setup as deterministic for short-term op-
6 However, my model incorporates seasonal pattern uncertainty in long-term investment decisions.
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erations and does not address price volatility, my model can accommodate uncertainty in
long-term investment decisions driven by changes in seasonal patterns – which can be mag-
nified by climate change. While Pindyck introduces a time trend in addition to seasonality
in consumption, consumption is an endogenous result in my model.
Stewart (2008) develops an intertemporal choice model that has a structure similar to
that used in my model. Stewart develops a daily deterministic structural model of the U.S.
natural gas market. In his model, weather temperature affecting demand is the single source
of variability. The storer is the single optimizing agent. The model is solved by maximizing
the profits of the storer over the course of a year. The daily decision of this agent is the
amount of natural gas to inject or to withdraw from storage while meeting daily demand
given a fixed daily supply. Convenience yield is an endogenous result, i.e., the shadow value of
inventory. Stewart models consumption using heating and cooling degree-days and income
and substitution effects associated with price changes. In my model, consumption is an
endogenous result responding to the market equilibrium realized by the storage operations.
Stewart setups his model in a numerical optimization framework, from which is hard to infer
insights. My model is setup as an optimal control model with tractable parametric solutions.
1.3 Natural Gas Storage
Storage is generally required for two main reasons: (1) to enhance reliability of sup-
plies and (2) to match deliveries with fluctuating seasonal, daily, or hourly demand. In an
economic context, storage allows the market to “move” the natural gas supply over time –
just as pipelines “move” the supply across geographic markets. After deregulation in 1992,
storage opened the possibility of cash-and-carry arbitrage in forward and futures markets.
Storage can be either base-load or peak shaving.7 Base-load storage provides a large
volume for a long steady injection period (typically 5-7 months), followed by a shorter release
7 Storage can also reduce the pipeline capacity requirement to convey peak flows. This use of storage is
engineered to optimize the network system capacity from an operational standpoint. This use of storage and
redundant storage address engineering requirements and should be accounted separately from the storage
capacity requirement of interest in this chapter, which is driven by seasonal economic demand.
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period (typically 3-5 months).8 Peak shaving storage is designed to provide large quantities
of gas over a short time frame of hours or days in response to short-term price stochastics
(Kidnay et al., 2011). Natural gas generally requires voluminous storage unless pressurized
or liquefied.9 Large quantities of gas for base-load cannot be stored in simple and inexpensive
aboveground facilities. Base-load storage makes use of underground facilities that operate at
elevated pressures. Most of these facilities are constructed in depleted oil and gas fields, salt
caverns, and aquifers. According to EIA (2008), there are about 400 underground storage
facilities in the U.S.: 326 depleted natural gas or oil fields, 43 aquifers, and 31 salt caverns.
Because base-load (underground) storage drives the bulk of investments in storage capacity,
this type of storage is the one of interest in this research.
1.4 Model Introduction
In my model, an economic agent operates natural gas storage over time with a goal that
is specific to the economic environment embodied by the agent. Under perfect competition,
the agent is a social planner whose goal is to maximize social welfare.10 Under monopoly,
the agent is a monopolist whose goal is to maximize profits. The agent (or storage operator)
simply chooses how much flow of natural gas to inject to or to withdraw from storage over
time to meet the corresponding goal. Given the intertemporal choices faced by the agent in
this dynamic optimization, the model is formulated as an optimal control problem where the
choice variable is storage flow u, the state variable is natural gas inventory N , and the goal
changes with the nature of the agent (or market environment). Storage flow u is positive
when purchased natural gas is injected to storage and negative when sold natural gas is
withdrawn from storage.
8 Natural gas is primarily used for heating and power generation. Greatest demand is seen during the peak
of winter, when heating demand is highest. Demand can also be significant in the summer when natural
gas acts as a fuel for power production.
9 The energy content of natural gas is low at ambient temperature and pressure (standard conditions). For
instance, to provide the same energy content of one gallon of gasoline, one thousand times this volume (or
133.7 cubic feet) would be required from natural gas under standard conditions (Kidnay et al., 2011).
10 First and second welfare theorems imply that a competitive equilibrium is a social optimum and vice versa.
Also, according to Williams and Wright (1991), rational competitive storers are collectively equivalent to
a benevolent planner.
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The planning horizon for intertemporal choices is one year, which captures one complete
seasonal cycle. Over the course of the year, the agent uses base-load storage to modulate
supply to the seasonal demand. Producers supply the market with a constant flow Q0. This
means that supply flow is perfectly inelastic and constant, which is a fair assumption of pro-
ducer behavior over the one-year period evaluated. Arguments supporting this assumption
are later introduced in Section 1.4.2. No inventory is carried over from one year to the next.
Therefore, each cycle is completely independent from all others. Because seasonal demand is
anticipated in the short term, the model is deterministic for operational purposes. However,
Section 1.10 incorporates seasonal pattern uncertainty in long-term investment decisions.
1.4.1 Seasonal Demand
Seasonal (inverse) demand is represented by the linear form,
Pt(Q
D
t ) = A · St − B ·Q
D
t . (1.1)
where t is a continuous time index of planning horizon T . For instance, t can be the month
index (0 through 12) over the course of a year (T = 12 months). Time index t and planning
horizon T must be expressed in the same time units. St is the seasonality factor. St is a
T -periodic function that oscillates around 1.0 over one complete 2π-cycle spanning planning
horizon T . A is the reservation price when St = 1. Reservation price (A · St) changes over
the seasonal cycle and shifts the demand curve up and down. B is a constant (inverse)
demand slope. Seasonality factor St is represented by the sinusoidal form
St = 1− a · sin bt. (1.2)
Amplitude a determines the magnitude of the seasonal peak and trough factors, (1 + a) and
(1− a), respectively. For instance, if a = 0.5 then the seasonal peak and trough factors
are 1.50 and 0.5, respectively. a ∈ [0, 1] implies St ∈ [0, 2]. b is the factor normalizing the






For example, a seasonal demand with a change of up to 50% over/under the annual average











. Figure 1.1 illustrates the seasonality factor (St) for this numerical example.
Figure 1.1 also illustrates factor (1− St), or (a · sin bt), which is the deviation from one unit.
Because the constant (first term) in St is one, the planning-horizon average of St is also





St dt = 1. The sine term (a · sin bt) is subtracted from one in order to start the
model with a low-demand season that allows the initial buildup of natural gas inventory
from zero via natural gas injection – see first half of Figure 1.1. Past half of the planning
horizon, the sine term effectively adds to the unit constant leading to a high-demand season
that can make use of built up inventory via natural gas withdrawal – see second half of
Figure 1.1. Modeling seasonality using a sine function facilitates the analytical derivation of
a parametric solution. Appendix A introduces six integrals related to seasonality factor St
(1.2) that are used in Appendices B and C.
11
1.4.2 Constant Supply
On the supply side, natural gas in the U.S. is mainly produced either as dry gas or
associated natural gas. Dry gas is a main product from dry plays. On the other hand,
associated natural gas is a by-product of producing oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs) in
wet plays. Associated natural gas production has been about 50 percent of all natural gas
produced in the U.S. in recent years. This percent obviously varies significantly on a regional
basis. Thus, the degree to which natural gas supply shifts due to oil markets varies upon
region. Oil and/or natural gas production from wells in place generally do not react to short-
term price changes because production is set to optimize ultimate hydrocarbon recovery.
Deviating from the optimally technical production path can be detrimental to the formation
and to ultimate hydrocarbon recovery. Anderson et al. (2014) show empirically that “crude
oil production from existing wells in Texas does not respond to current or expected oil
prices.” Given these arguments, natural gas supply can be assumed to be perfectly inelastic
over the short-term horizon of the model (one year).
Generally, reservoir production peaks soon after startup and later declines over time.
Nonetheless, individual production profiles vary with the nature of the reservoir (i.e., con-
ventional vs. unconventional), the drive mechanism (i.e., solution-gas, gas-cap, and water
drives), stimulation treatments, recovery processes, and technologies used. Natural gas pro-
duction for most mature wells is approximately steady. Therefore, if new wells added to a
region over the course of a year represent a small fraction relative to mature wells already in
place then regional production can be assumed to be steady in a year. Under this condition,
natural gas supply can be assumed to be not just perfectly inelastic but also equal to a con-
stant Q0 over the planning horizon. This constant and perfectly inelastic supply assumption
is used in the model to ease the analytical derivations that follows.
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1.4.3 Supply and Demand Equilibrium
Figure 1.2 illustrates the supply and demand diagram over the course of the dynamic
optimization faced by the storage operator (or economic agent). As indicated before, natural
gas supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic and equal to constant Q0 over time. Supply
is represented by the vertical bar in the diagram. On the other hand, natural gas demand is
assumed to be linear, downward sloping, and sinusoidally shifting (cyclically varying) over
time. Equation (1.2) implies that the peak and through values of seasonality factor St are
(1 + a) and (1− a), respectively. As illustrated by the four-arrow sequence in Figure 1.2,
reservation price decreases from A down to (1− a) · A over the first quarter of the time
horizon, increases back to A over the second quarter, further increases to (1 + a) ·A over the
third quarter, and decreases back to A over the fourth quarter. Over the seasonal cycle, the
agent can inject a fraction of Q0 to storage or withdraw from storage and add to Q0. Storage
flow u is positive when injected to storage and negative when withdrawn from storage. To
fulfill market clearing, quantity demanded QDt is simply equal to the difference between
constant supply Q0 and storage flow u. This expression is also known as the accounting
identity.
QDt = Q0 − u (1.4)
Figure 1.2 shows storage flow u as injected (I) during the low-demand season and withdrawn
(W) during the high-demand season. In Figure 1.2, storage flow u can be observed graphically
as a deviation from constant supply Q0 because u = Q0 − Q
D
t . Market equilibrium price





= Pt (Q0 − u) = A · St − B · (Q0 − u) . (1.5)
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Figure 1.2: Seasonal demand, perfectly inelastic supply, and storage flow.
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1.4.4 Profit and Welfare
Ignoring costs of injection and withdrawal, costs of storage, and interest rates,11 the profit
at instant t for the operating agent is




= −u · Pt (Q0 − u) . (1.6)







−u · Pt (Q0 − u)dt. (1.7)
Welfare at instant t is reflected by the consumer benefit at instant t measured by the area















· [A · St + Pt (Q0 − u)] .




· [A · St + A · St − B · (Q0 − u)] .




· [2A · St − B · (Q0 − u)] .
After re-arranging, welfare is expressed as a function of (Q0 − u).
Wt = A · St · (Q0 − u)−
B
2
· (Q0 − u)
2 (1.9)





11 Interest rates are ignored in this model (assumed to be zero) given the short time horizon of the one-year
operation. Consequently, the discount factor is simply one over the course of a year.
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After this model introduction, Section 1.5 applies the base model to no storage conditions.
Following in progressive complexity, Appendices B and C setup the deterministic optimal
control problem for non-binding and binding storage capacity operations, respectively. Each
appendix solves the storage operations under both monopoly and perfect competition. Sec-
tions 1.6 and 1.7 recap and describe the main results from Appendices B and C, respectively.
This brings the total number of models presented in this chapter up to five. The paramet-
ric solutions from these five models include market equilibrium price, consumption, profit,
welfare, storage flow, inventories, and minimum non-binding storage capacity – as appli-
cable. These five parametric-solution sets provide the grounds to develop the sought-after
diagnostic metrics.
1.5 No Storage Operation
When there is no storage operation (NSO), quantity demanded QDt is simply equal to
constant supply Q0 and market equilibrium price P
NSO
t is
PNSOt = Pt (Q0) (1.11)
where
Pt (Q0) = A · St − B ·Q0. (1.12)
Because there is no storage operation, there can neither be inventories (Nt = 0 ∀t) nor profits
(πt = 0 ∀t). Welfare at instant t is simply the area underneath the demand curve as it
fluctuates over time bound on the right hand side by constant supply Q0. Total welfare
under no storage operation WNSO can be found after replacing Q
D















[2A · St − B ·Q0] dt
Integrating it and substituting (A.1) from Appendix A,









1.6 Non-binding Storage Capacity Operations
The optimal control problem setup and solution for storage operations when storage
capacity is not binding can be found in Appendix B. This section recaps and describes
the main results from Appendix B. Section 1.6.1 describes convenience yield in the context
of my model setup. Section 1.6.2 introduces a numerical example to illustrate the results
graphically. To begin, Table 1.1 shows the main parametric results under the two market
environments evaluated, i.e., monopoly and perfect competition,12 numbered from (1.14)
through (1.27). Descriptions of the results in Table 1.1 are now in order. In the first line,
Q0 bounds must be met to ensure interior solutions. Qb is a constant referred to as the
base flow for optimal monopoly storage. The bounds for Q0 can be observed graphically
along the x-axis in Figure 1.2. Storage flow u∗ (1.14) checks the intuition that flow would












→ St > 1 and u
∗ < 0
)
. When supply is perfectly inelastic,
as assumed in my model, u∗ depends on demand only13 because demand is the driver of
changes in market equilibrium over time.14 These changes are the source of revenue for
storage operation, as well as of welfare increase from it. Market equilibrium storage flow
under perfect competition u∗∗ doubles its monopoly counterpart u∗ as shown in (1.15). For
price, a new term called neutral price P0 is introduced. P0 is the initial price reached before
any seasonal fluctuation begins. The equation for P0 is restated from (B.6) as (1.28) below.
P0 (Q0) = A− BQ0 (1.28)
In theory, introducing monopoly storage operations to the market reduces price fluctuation
by a half – as shown by contrast of (B.18) against (B.16). On the other hand, introducing
perfectly competitive storage operations flattens out price completely to a constant – see
12 One star and two stars as superscripts of the variables denote market equilibrium results under monopoly
and perfect competition environments, respectively. When the superscript is omitted, the variable becomes
a placeholder for both environments – still under market equilibrium.
13 Demand is captured by parameters A and B and seasonal amplitude a
14 On the other hand, when supply is not perfectly inelastic, u∗ becomes also dependent on supply.
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Storage flow u∗ = Qb · (sin bt) (1.14) u
∗∗ = 2u∗ (1.15)
Quantity
demanded
QD∗t = Q0 − u
∗ (1.16) QD∗∗t = Q0 − u
∗∗ (1.17)
Price P ∗t = P0 (Q0)− B · u
















(1− cos bt) (1.22) N∗∗t =
SC∗∗
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T (1.24) πs = 0 (1.25)
Welfare WM = WNSO +
3
4
BT ·Q2b (1.26) W
∗∗





P0 (Q0) = A− B ·Q0 from (1.28) and








(1.19). For inventory, both N∗t (1.22) and N
∗∗
t (1.23) reach a maximum when t = T/2.
These maximum levels are called the minimum non-binding storage capacities, denoted as
SC∗ under monopoly and SC∗∗ under perfect competition. Both SC∗ (1.20) and SC∗∗
(1.21) are proportional to seasonal variation (SC ∝ a) and reservation price (SC ∝ A) and





. The minimum non-
binding storage capacity under perfect competition SC∗∗ doubles its monopoly counterpart
SC∗ as shown in (1.21). Comparing economic profits generated from storage operations,
those achieved by a monopolist are shown in π∗ (1.24). On the other hand, as anticipated,
no economic profits are achieved under perfect competition as shown in πs (1.25).
The welfare increase from no-storage operation to non-binding monopoly storage opera-





Analogously, the welfare increase from no-storage operation to perfectly competitive storage
operation can be estimated as the difference (W ∗∗s −WNSO), or (1.27) minus (1.13).
W ∗∗s −WNSO = BT ·Q
2
b (1.30)
Comparing (1.29) and (1.30) shows that the welfare increase from no-storage operation to
monopoly operation (1.29) is three quarters of that realized from no-storage operation to




(W ∗∗s −WNSO) . (1.31)
Equations (1.30) and (1.24) are later re-introduced in Sections 1.7.3 and 1.10.4.
1.6.1 Convenience Yield
In the literature, convenience yield is generally defined as the shadow value of inventory.
In my deterministic optimal control model, convenience yield is zero as long as storage
capacity is not binding. This result is anticipated because the economic agent, whether
social planner (perfect competition) or monopolist (monopoly), optimizes storage operations
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until the shadow value of inventory is minimized – down to zero when storage capacity is not
binding and there are no storage costs. In my model, however, the economic agent is in fact
not only a storer but also a producer. Thus, my model yields the shadow value of a “stock”
comprising not only storer’s inventory but also producer’s reserves. To obtain the (effective)
shadow value of inventory, the model outputs under fixed terminal point (FTP) and free
terminal condition (FTC) must be contrasted and interpreted – as shown in Section B.1.3
(Appendix B). Under FTP, the economic agent is a storer that is bound from becoming a
producer because only inventory is available. In this case, the shadow value of “stock” is
greater than zero as it captures the shadow value of producer’s reserves – which cannot be
produced. Under FTC, the role of the storer is relaxed and expanded to one of a producer
with access to infinite reserves. In this case, the shadow value of “stock” goes down to zero.
After interpreting the FTP and FTC results from Table B.1 in Section B.1.3 (Appendix B),
it is concluded that the (effective) shadow value of inventory in my model setup is zero.
1.6.2 Numerical Example I
To visualize the results of Table 1.1, a numerical example is solved using the model input
values shown in Table 1.2.15 The numerical solutions to the natural gas storage operations
under monopoly and perfect competition are shown in Table 1.3. Interior solutions under
both market environments are checked in the first line of Table 1.3. Figure 1.3 illustrates
the results for (a) price, (b) inventory, (c) storage flow, and (d) quantity demanded for
three storage conditions: (1) when there is no storage, (2) when storage is operated by the
monopolist, and (3) when storage is operated by the social planner (perfect competition).
Absent of perfect competition, Figure 1.3(a) and Figure 1.3(b) show that inventory in-
creases (decreases) when prices are below (above) their neutral level P0 (Q0) – or, equiva-
lently, the annual average price. However, there is no specific co-movement of prices and
inventories: prices can increase or decrease whether inventory increases or decreases. Thus,
absent of perfect competition, 3-month prices can move in the same or the opposite direction











Time horizon, T 12 Months
Seasonal amplitude, a 0.5 Unitless
Reservation price, A 20 Dollars per natural gas unit
Demand slope, B 2 Price unit over flow unit
Constant supply, Q0 5 Natural gas flow unit
Initial inventory, N (0) 0 Natural gas volume








Q0 bounds for interior
solution
2.5 ≤ (Q0 = 5) ≤ 7.5
where Qb = 2.5
5 ≤ (Q0 = 5) ≤ 10
where Qb = 2.5







Quantity demanded QD∗t = 5− u
∗ QD∗∗t = 5− u
∗∗
Price P ∗t = 10− 2 · u
∗ P ∗∗t = P0 (Q0 = 5) = 10
Minimum non-binding
storage capacity
SC∗ = 9.55 SC∗∗ = 19.10
















Profit π∗ = $75 πs = 0
Welfare
WM = $900 + $112.5 =
$1, 012.50





Figure 1.3: Non-binding storage-capacity operation profiles under perfect competition and
monopoly.
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of inventories. It is the price level (above/below annual average), and not how prices change,
which relates to the injection or withdrawal of inventory. Under monopoly, correlation be-
tween prices and inventories can be positive or negative in different stages. Under perfect
competition, annual prices are steady as storage buffers the seasonal demand variation com-
pletely and, thus, the correlation between prices and inventories is zero.
Under monopoly, Figure 1.3(a) and Figure 1.3(d) show that quantity demanded moves
in the same direction as prices, i.e., quantity demanded increases as price increases. Under
monopoly, the correlation between quantity demanded and prices is positive. On the other
hand, under perfect competition, the correlation between quantity demanded and prices is
zero. Under no storage operation, quantity demanded is steady as prices buffer the seasonal
demand variation completely. Figure 1.3(b) shows that inventory is lowest (zero) at the start
of the low-demand season and highest at the start of the high-demand season. Figure 1.3(c)





around their corresponding horizontal axis – under any market environment.
These observations on co-movements across endogenous variables under different oper-
ational scenarios are the basis of correlation metrics later developed in Section 1.9.3 to
determine the relative degree of market power that might be present in different regions,
which might prevent efficient-market development. Recognizing that binding storage capac-
ity operations can be observed in the market, they are introduced next to provide the full
context from which these correlation metrics are developed as well as other metrics.
1.7 Binding Storage Capacity Operations
Appendix C presents the optimal control problem setup and solution for storage oper-
ations when storage capacity is binding. This section recaps and re-assembles the main
results from Appendix C. Section 1.7.1 outlines a solution procedure. Section 1.7.2 intro-
duces a numerical example to illustrate the results graphically. Section 1.7.3 describes an
applied procedure to find the marginal benefit of storage capacity (MBSC). Last, Section
1.7.4 illustrates the long-term market equilibrium of storage capacity investment.
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To begin, four stages are identified over the planning horizon for both perfectly com-
petitive and monopoly operations when storage capacity is binding. They are (A) stage of
injection, (B) stage of binding storage capacity, (C) stage of withdrawal, and (D) stage of
stockout. These four stages apply not only to binding storage capacity operations but also to
no-storage and non-binding storage capacity operations – see Sections 1.5 and 1.6. Without
storage, stages B and D are the only two stages present at the limit. At the other end, when
storage capacity is not binding, stages A and C are the only two stages present (See Fig-
ure 1.3). Between these two ends, when storage capacity is binding, all four stages are present.
Four time delimiters, τ1 through τ4, define the bounds of each stage. Each time delimiter τi
falls within the ith quarter of the planning horizon T , or (i− 1) T
4
≤ τi ≤ i
T
4
∀i ∈ [1, 4]. In
addition, each pair of consecutive time delimiters (τi, τi+1) ∀i ∈ [1, 3] is symmetric around
the common quarter mark of its constituents, or iT
4
− τi = τi+1 − i
T
4
∀i ∈ [1, 3].
Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 show the equilibrium solutions by stage found for endogenous
price P , storage flow u (choice variable), inventory N (state variable), and shadow value
of inventory θUt . To apply these solutions, the four unknowns (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) need to be
solved first. As shown later in Section 1.7.1, they can be solved on the basis of normalized
storage capacity NSC (≡ N/SC), which is simply nominal storage capacity N normalized
by the minimum non-binding storage capacity SC.16 Because they are a function of NSC,
time delimiters (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) turn out to be the same under both perfect competition and
monopoly when normalized storage capacities are the same, i.e., when NSC∗ = NSC∗∗.
When NSC∗ = NSC∗∗, price in stages B and D are the same – equal to Pt (Q0) – under
both operational environments – See Table 1.4 and Table 1.5. Pt (Q0) is the price realized
as if there were no storage operation – See (1.11). On the other hand, in stages A and C,
while price becomes flat under perfect competition
(
P I , PW
)
, price changes with storage
flow as Pt (Q0 − u
∗) under monopoly. Furthermore, price under monopoly is the average
of price under perfect competition and price under no storage operation Pt (Q0). For both
16 NSC is defined as NSC∗ ≡ N/SC∗ under monopoly and as NSC∗∗ ≡ N/SC∗∗ under perfect competition
– See Equation (1.33). SC∗ and SC∗∗ are defined in (1.20) and (1.21), respectively.
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Table 1.4: Binding operation solutions by stage under perfect competition.
Variable Stage A Stage B Stage C Stage D
t τ1 < t < τ2 τ2 ≤ t ≤ τ3 τ3 < t < τ4
τ4 ≤ t ≤ T
0 ≤ t ≤ τ1




P I − Pt (Q0)
]
> 0 0 1
B
[
PW − Pt (Q0)
]
< 0 0
N∗∗ f (τ1, t) N N + f (τ3, t) 0
θU∗∗t 0 Ṗ (Q0) ≥ 0 0 0
Table 1.5: Binding operation solutions by stage under monopoly.
Variable Stage A Stage B Stage C Stage D
t τ1 < t < τ2 τ2 ≤ t ≤ τ3 τ3 < t < τ4
τ4 ≤ t ≤ T
0 ≤ t ≤ τ1
P ∗





[Pτ1 (Q0) + Pt (Q0)]
Pt (Q0)









[Pτ1 (Q0)− Pt (Q0)] 0
1
2B
[Pτ3 (Q0)− Pt (Q0)] 0
N∗ 1
2
f (τ1, t) N N +
1
2
f (τ3, t) 0
θU∗t 0 Ṗ (Q0) ≥ 0 0 0
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operations, there is no storage flow (u∗ = 0 and u∗∗ = 0) in stages B and D. On the other
hand, in stages A and C, storage flow under monopoly is half of storage flow under perfect
competition (u∗ = u∗∗/2). For both operations, there is no inventory in stage D (ND = 0)




. Also, the shadow value of storage capacity
θUt is equal to the rate of change in price realized when there is no storage operation,
Ṗ (Q0) = −aAb cos bt, (1.32)
and is only present in stage B. When NSC∗ = NSC∗∗, the shadow values of storage capacity








To apply the solutions shown in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5, the four unknowns (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4)
need to be solved first. To begin, normalize the nominal storage capacity N using
NSC ≡ N/SC (1.33)
where SC is equal to SC∗ (1.20) under monopoly and SC∗∗ (1.21) under perfect competition.
Time delimiter τ1 (∈ [0,
T
4
]) can then be solved iteratively from
g (τ1) = NSC (1.34)
where

















τ4 = T − τ1 (1.38)
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, quantity demanded QDt , and the shadow value of storage capacity θ
U
t ,
respectively. To solve inventories, use the inventory cumulative function f (τi, t),
f (τi, t) ≡ −
aA
bB
[b (t− τi) (sin bτi ) + (cos bt− cos bτi )] . (1.39)
The relationship between prices in stages A and C for both environments is given by
P0 (Q0)− Pτ1 (Q0) = Pτ3 (Q0)− P0 (Q0) . (1.40)
For both operations, the marginal benefit of storage capacity (MBSC) can be solved as the
price difference,
MBSC = Pτ3 (Q0)− Pτ2 (Q0) , (1.41)
or as a function of τ1,
MBSC (τ1) = 2aA · sin bτ1 . (1.42)
MBSC, expressed as the price difference (1.41), supports the intuition that a social
planner would arbitrage any price difference away through storage operations as long as
storage capacity is not binding. Consequently, under perfect competition and non-binding
storage capacity, price becomes flat as illustrated in Figure 1.3(a). It should be noted that
FERC estimates MBSC as the difference between the natural gas price averages realized
during withdrawal and injection periods. Although this empirical estimate has a fundamental
basis, it does not quite capture price difference (1.41). Thus, the empirical estimate may be
used as a market signal proxy but not as an accurate estimate of MBSC.
1.7.2 Numerical Example II
Using the parameters introduced in Table 1.2 as input, the procedure just described is
used to solve the storage operations when normalized storage capacity is 25% (NSC = 25%).
The results of the simulation are illustrated in Figure 1.4 for perfect competition and Fig-
ure 1.5 for monopoly. Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 show the resulting profiles for (a) price, (b)
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inventory, (c) storage flow, and (d) shadow value of storage capacity. These profiles (25%
NSC) are contrasted against those obtained when there is no storage (0% NSC) and when
storage capacity is not binding (100% NSC). The four vertical dashed lines are time de-
limiters (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) separating stages A, B, C, and D. The qualitative description given
before for the solutions in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 can be visually validated in Figure 1.4




, which is not shown
in these figures, is simply an upside-down mirror image of storage flow profile (c) where the
horizontal axis is Qo rather than zero – as Q
D
t = Q0 − u.
As a reference, Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7 illustrate how the market equilibrium profiles
change with NSC (100%, 75%, 50%, 25%, 5%, and 0%) under perfect competition and
monopoly operations, respectively. Table 1.6 show the time delimiters (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) and
reference prices P I = Pτ2 and PW = Pτ3 for different levels of NSC applying to both
operations. As shown in Table 1.6, as storage capacity binds more and more, stages A
(τ1, τ2) and C (τ3, τ4) contract while stages B (τ2, τ3) and D (τ4, T : 0, τ1) expand. The
opposite occurs when storage capacity increases while still binding.
Table 1.6: Time delimiters and reference prices for different levels of NSC.
NSC (percent) 100% 75% 50% 25% 5% 0%
τ1 (month) 0.00 0.32 0.66 1.18 1.96 3.00
τ2 (month) 6.00 5.68 5.34 4.82 4.04 3.00
τ3 (month) 6.00 6.32 6.66 7.18 7.96 9.00
τ4 (month) 12.00 11.68 11.34 10.82 10.04 9.00
P I = Pτ2 ($) 10.00 8.32 6.59 4.19 1.45 0.00
PW = Pτ3 ($) 10.00 11.68 13.41 15.81 18.55 20.00
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Figure 1.4: Storage operation profiles with 25% NSC under perfect competition.
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Figure 1.5: Storage operation profiles with 25% NSC under monopoly.
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Figure 1.6: Storage operation profiles with 100%, 75%, 50%, 25%, 5%, and 0% NSC under
perfect competition.
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Figure 1.7: Storage operation profiles with 100%, 75%, 50%, 25%, 5%, and 0% NSC under
monopoly.
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1.7.3 Finding the Marginal Benefit of Storage Capacity (MBSC)
As shown in Figure 1.6(d) and Figure 1.7(d), the profile of the shadow value of capacity
θUt is the same under both perfect competition and monopoly given the same level of NSC.
Thus, the MBSC for different levels of NSC can be found as the area underneath the
profiles of θUt from either perfect competition or monopoly environments. Alternatively, a
rating table for τ1 can be setup for discrete intervals in the domain τ1 ∈ [0,
T
4
] as shown in
Table 1.7. In this case, NSC and MBSC are calculated for each τ1 using (1.33) and (1.42),




= NSC · SC∗ (1.43)
and under perfect competition as
N
S
= NSC · SC∗∗, (1.44)
where SC∗ and SC∗∗ are defined in (1.20) and (1.21), respectively.
Table 1.7: Marginal benefit of storage capacity (MBSC) under perfect competition and
monopoly.
τ1 (months) NSC (fraction) MBSC($/NG)





0.0 1.00 0.0 19.10 9.55
0.5 0.63 5.2 11.98 5.99
1.0 0.34 10.0 6.54 3.27
1.5 0.15 14.1 2.90 1.45
2.0 0.05 17.3 0.89 0.44
2.5 0.01 19.3 0.11 0.06
3.0 0.00 20.0 0.00 0.00
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Table 1.7 shows the results while Figure 1.8 illustrates theMBSC curves for both storage
operations. The area underneath the MBSC curve for social planner is the welfare added
by storage operations under perfect competition. Accordingly, this area can be calculated as
W ∗∗s −WNSO = $150 using (1.30). On the other hand, the area underneath theMBSC curve
for monopolist is the profit generated by storage operations under monopoly. Accordingly,
this area can be calculated as π∗ = $75 using (1.24). Later in Section 1.10.4, these two
results are referred to as the Value of Storage Operations (VSO) with non-binding storage
capacity.
Figure 1.8: Marginal benefit of storage capacity (MBSC) under perfect competition and
monopoly.
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1.7.4 Market Equilibrium of Storage Capacity Investment
In a static investment model, the intersect of the (annual) marginal benefit of storage
capacity (MBSC) and the (annual) marginal cost of storage capacity (MCSC) would deter-
mine the market equilibrium storage capacities under both operational environments. For
instance, assuming a constant MCSC equal to 2 in Figure 1.8 results in market equilib-
rium storage capacities of approximately 8 and 16 NG units under monopoly and perfect
competition, respectively: SC∗EQ = 8 and SC
∗∗
EQ = 16.
MCSC can decrease with storage capacity due to economies of scale available on an
individual site basis. However, the right geological conditions are not always available for
natural gas storage and there can be sites more suitable for storage than others. On this basis,
MCSC can increase with storage capacity as the best sites for storage are built up first. As
MCSC can increase and decrease due to these factors, assumingMCSC to be flat (constant)
on average is within the realm of possibilities and, thus, a fair initial qualitative assumption.
In this case, when MCSC is constant, the market equilibrium storage capacities are related
by the expression SC∗∗EQ = 2 · SC
∗
EQ just as minimum non-binding storage capacities are
related by the analogous expression SC∗∗ = 2 · SC∗.
1.8 Comparing Predicted and Observed Market Responses
This section compares qualitatively the shapes of the market responses predicted by my
intertemporal choice model against those observed in the U.S. market. Inventories and prices
are chosen as the responses of interest because they are at the core of the diagnostic metrics
to be developed. Beginning with inventories, Figure 1.917 shows the U.S. working gas in
underground storage over the two years prior to February 2017 contrasted with the 5-year
maximum and minimum. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes this
chart online as part of the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report.
17 Source: EIA Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report for the week ending February 10, 2017,
http://ir.eia.gov/ngs/ngs.html.
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Figure 1.9: U.S. working gas in underground storage (2015-2016).
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Figure 1.9 illustrates a bell shape for inventories, which is consistent with that illustrated
in Figure 1.4(b) under perfect competition and Figure 1.5(b) under monopoly. Without
additional information, shape alone does not indicate the degree of market competitiveness.
One shape feature, however, that can hypothetically provide information is the top of the bell.
In theory, a flat top flags storage capacity constraints regardless of competitive environment
– see stage B in Figure 1.4(b) and Figure 1.5(b). Nonetheless, the examination of a flat top
may be justified at a regional level but not at a national level. Case in point, a round top
in Figure 1.9 should not be misinterpreted as the absence of storage capacity constraints
because nationwide inventory levels will not necessarily show possible regional constraints.
Figure 1.9 shows a very consistent pattern of U.S. inventory levels with almost identical
peaks and troughs in 2015 and 2016. This is presumably the result of an also consistent
seasonal pattern in natural gas demand. To validate this hypothesis, Figure 1.1018 shows
the U.S. cooling and heating degree days (CDDs and HDDs) per month in 2015 and 2016.
CDD (HDD) is the number of degrees that a day’s average temperature is above (below) a
base temperature of 65 F. As a reference, Figure 1.10 also shows the minimum, maximum,
and average Fahrenheit temperatures per month in the U.S. CDDs and HDDs measure the
energy demand for cooling in warm days and heating in cold days, respectively. CDDs and
HDDs are the main drivers of the natural gas demand seasonal pattern. Figure 1.10 shows
that these seasonal drivers have been consistent in 2015 and 2016. Thus, the seasonal pattern
of natural gas demand did not change significantly from 2015 to 2016. This is consistent
with the regular pattern observed in Figure 1.9 for U.S. inventory levels in the same two
years.
Continuing with prices, Figure 1.1119 illustrates two forward curves for Henry Hub gas
starting at two different times. The first one captures the moment when oil was at its most
recent prominent peak (6/20/2014) when WTI was $107.26. The second one captures the
subsequent dramatic fall off ending at a trough (2/14/2015) when WTI was $48.48. Forward
18 Source: NOAA Satellite and Information Service.
19 Source: FERC Staff Report.
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Figure 1.10: U.S. cooling and heating degree days, CDDs and HDDs (2015-2016).
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prices rather than spot prices are illustrated to remove stochastic noise from the chart.
Forward prices are the expected spot prices in the future under risk-neutral probability. The
two curves show a clear growth trend and a seasonal component fluctuating around it. The
historical WTI timing of the two curves highlights that while forward price levels for natural
gas can change substantially over time their growth trend and seasonal components do not
necessarily change because of it. This means that the diagnostic metric to be formulated
on seasonal price fluctuation (in Section 1.9.2) is not influenced by changes in levels, which
makes it more reliable and robust.
Figure 1.11: Henry Hub forward curve at a recent peak and trough of oil price.
After the growth trend is removed, the shape of the remaining seasonal component can
be evaluated in two sections. As illustrated in Figure 1.11, the first section contains stages
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D, A, and B while the second section contains stage C. The first section resembles the first
half of the price profile illustrated for a competitive environment with some degree of storage
capacity constraint (25% NSC) in Figure 1.4(a). The second section resembles the second
half of the price profile illustrated for a competitive environment completely constrained
(100% NSC) in the same figure. These two sections are different not only in shape but also
in length. The first section is longer than the second one. Both differences in shape and
length can be explained by the actual asymmetry of the seasonal pattern: the pace of demand
change is not the same for every season. As low-demand months outnumber high-demand
months, injection stage A is widespread allowing a continuous injection that modulates and
flattens an otherwise natural gas price drop. On the other hand, peak-demand (or release)
stage C is short and intense, which puts significant stress on the overall system capacity
beyond storage. During release stage C, other system components beyond storage, i.e.,
transmission, could constrain the system and prevent the anticipated price modulation. The
low injection and high release rates of the seasonal cycle are consistent with the magnitude
of the upward and downward slopes illustrated in Figure 3-10, respectively. The effects of
asymmetric seasonal patterns could be evaluated, as follow-up research, by feeding the actual
seasonal patterns to a numerical model of the Henry Hub region and others of interest while
introducing capacity limits for other system elements besides storage. Although numerical
models are necessary to address market nuances, the brief qualitative analysis introduced
shows the significant probing power of the seasonal shapes predicted by my model.
1.8.1 Contrasting the Structure of Empirical Models on Futures Prices
In my model, market equilibrium price is an endogenous result given in four stages (A,
B, C, and D). Under perfect competition with some degree of storage capacity constraints,
this endogenous result has the shape of a sine function that is truncated by flat bottoms and
flat tops. This price structure is comparable to that of the deterministic seasonal component
proposed by Gardner (2006) to model the forward term structure of natural gas prices.
Gardner (2006) makes use of cosine function α · cos(bt) to capture seasonality, where α is the
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amplitude of the season, b is the periodic parameter, and t is the time index. Recognizing the
asymmetric pattern of seasonal forward price and the flat summer months (or flat bottoms),
Gardner (2006) splits the year into six stages. Gardner (2006) changes the periodic parameter
b of the cosine function across the five non-summer months, namely, November, December,
January, February, and March. During flat summer months, Gardner (2006) assigns a value
of zero to the seasonal component. In this way, the approach used by Gardner (2006) to
capture seasonality in forward curves reflects the structure of my endogenous result for price.
1.8.2 How to Incorporate Realistic Seasonal Patterns of Demand
My model setup stylizes the seasonal patterns of demand using a sine function to arrive
at simple parametric solutions. More realistic seasonal patterns can be incorporated in two
ways. The first approach is to use harmonic analysis that approximates the arbitrary periodic
pattern of interest to a Fourier series – comprising the sum of sine and cosine terms. The
Fourier coefficients can be found using Simpson’s rule by numerically integrating the actual
periodic pattern. The Fourier series approximation can then replace the sine function in the
model setup. This approach may lead to more elaborate parametric solutions than those
presented in this chapter though. The second approach is to setup the model numerically
using mathematical programming in software like GAMS. However, this second approach will
not provide parametric solutions. Consequently, accounting for realistic seasonal patterns
can defeat the development of tractable parametric solutions.
1.9 Diagnostic Metrics for Adequate Efficient-Market Development
Four diagnostic metrics are now developed using the parametric results found for the
theoretical non-binding and binding storage capacity operations under monopoly and perfect
competition. The four-diagnostic metrics are (1) market equilibrium of storage capacity
investment, (2) price fluctuation, (3) correlation between price and consumption, and (4)
correlation between price and inventories. The first metric addresses directly the level of
adequate development. The second metric reads the response from the market in the form
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of price to indirectly determine whether adequate development is in effect. Metrics (3) and
(4) complement the results from metrics (1) and (2). Metrics (3) and (4) are used to quantify
the relative degree of market power that might be present in different regions.
The use of these diagnostic metrics requires that the model assumptions introduced in
Section 1.4 be valid. In addition, when the natural gas supply Q0 in the region of interest
is constant and inelastic throughout the year, Q0 must meet the bounds for an interior
solution indicated in Table 1.1. In the U.S., regional demand parameters A and B can
be derived from the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) maintained by the Energy
Information Administration (EIA). Marginal cost of storage capacity (MCSC) can be found
from regional engineering records. If seasonal demand amplitude a is not available directly
from demand models, it can be initially approximated to the seasonal amplitude of the sum
of CDDs and HDDs in the region or be more accurately derived using econometric models.
1.9.1 Market Equilibrium of Storage Capacity
The first diagnostic metric is based on the theoretical market equilibrium of storage
capacity (SCEQ) itself. Actual storage capacity (ASC)
20 can be compared against the SC∗∗EQ
under perfect competition and SC∗EQ under monopoly. These two can be determined as
a function of the marginal cost of storage capacity (MCSC) using the capital investment
model introduced in Section 1.7.4. If ASC < SC∗EQ then ASC is theoretically insufficient
and further investigation of potential physical constraints in the natural gas infrastructure or
regulatory deterrents would be required. This level of storage adequacy can be qualified with
a red flag. If SC∗EQ ≤ ASC < SC
∗∗
EQ then ASC theoretically falls in a gray area between
monopoly and perfect competition. In this case, further investigation of the nature of the
market may be required to determine whether market power is a factor holding up storage
capacity. This level can be qualified with a yellow flag. Last, if SC∗∗EQ ≤ ASC then ASC is
theoretically sufficient. This level can be qualified with a green flag. Table 1.8 summarizes
20 In a region with self-contained operations, the identification of actual storage capacity is straightforward
as it is all enclosed within the region. On the other hand, an interconnected region would require storage
allocation. A given region could be served partially by local storage and partially by other regions’ storage.
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the evaluation criteria of the first diagnostic metric.






ASC < SC∗EQ Insufficient (Red flag)
Physical constraints in the
natural gas infrastructure or
regulatory deterrents.
SC∗EQ ≤ ASC ≤ SC
∗∗
EQ
May be subject to market
power (Yellow flag)
Market power or any of the
above.
SC∗∗EQ < ASC Sufficient (Green flag)
Excessive investment that
may not be recovered.
1.9.2 Price Fluctuation
The second diagnostic metric is based on price fluctuation. The benchmarks for this
metric are based on the Theoretical Maximum Price Fluctuations (TMPFs) under (1) no
storage operation, (2) perfect competition, and (3) monopoly. The steps to obtain these three
TMPFs are now described. First, time delimiter τ1 is estimated as half of the time span when
storage capacity is binding.21 Next, MBSC (τ1) is estimated using (1.42) with τ1 as input.
According to (1.41), MBSC is the TMPF anticipated under perfect competition. MBSC is
the lower benchmark. The TMPF under no storage operation is 2aA.22 By averaging the first
two results, the TMPF under monopoly is (MBSC (τ1) + 2aA) /2 = aA (1 + sin bτ1). This
average is the upper benchmark. The actual annual price spread (APS) can be calculated
as the difference between the maximum and minimum weekly-running average prices in a
year. If MBSC (τ1) < APS < aA (1 + sin bτ1) then the actual level falls in a gray area
where storage capacity may be limited by market power. The closer APS is to MBSC (τ1)
from above the more competitive the market environment is. If APS > aA (1 + sin bτ1)
21 In theory, storage capacity binds in stage B. The time span of stage B is defined by (τ3 − τ2). In turn,
(τ3 − τ2) = 2τ1 and consequently τ1 = (τ3 − τ2) /2.
22 No storage operation TMPF is maxPt (Q0)−minPt (Q0) = [A (1 + a)−BQ0]− [A (1− a)−BQ0] = 2aA.
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then storage capacity may be held back by potential physical constraints in the natural gas
infrastructure or regulatory deterrents. Table 1.9 summarizes the evaluation criteria.
Table 1.9: Comparing actual versus theoretical price fluctuations as diagnostic metric.
Where actual annual




APS > aA (1 + sin bτ1) Insufficient (Red flag)
Physical constraints in the
natural gas infrastructure or
regulatory deterrents.
MBSC (τ1) ≤ APS ≤
aA (1 + sin bτ1)
May be subject to market
power (Yellow flag)
Market power or any of the
above.
APS < MBSC (τ1) N.A. Inconsistent estimates.
1.9.3 Correlation Metrics
The two diagnostic metrics that follows can only be used to assess the degree of market
power in storage operations. The third diagnostic metric is based on the correlation in the
short term (one year) between price and natural gas consumption. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.4(a) and (c),23 price is flat when quantity demanded changes and vice versa. Thus,











. On the other hand, as seen in Figure 1.5(a) and (c), price
and quantity demanded change simultaneously in stages A and C. Thus, under monopoly,











The fourth diagnostic metric is based on the correlation in the short term (one year)
between price and inventories. As illustrated in Figure 1.4(a) and (b), price is flat when
inventory changes and vice versa. Thus, under perfect competition, the correlation between
price and inventories is theoretically zero [corr (Pt, Nt) = 0]. On the other hand, as seen in
Figure 1.5(a) and (b), price and inventory change simultaneously in stages A and C. Thus,
under monopoly, the same correlation is theoretically different from zero [|corr (Pt, Nt)| > 0].
23 Note that quantity demanded is simply an upside-down mirror image of the storage flow profile.
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and [|corr (Pt, Nt)| > 0], respectively. Out of the four metrics, the first
one provides the most complete diagnosis of storage capacity adequacy. The second metric
follows in order. Unlike the first two, the third and fourth metrics are used only to assess the
degree of market power in storage operations. Thus, the last two metrics complement the
results from the first two. The potential increase in welfare achieved by improving market
efficiency can be measured using welfare expressions (1.29) and (1.30).
1.10 Introducing Seasonal Pattern Uncertainty
Until now the model has been completely deterministic. Nonetheless, it must be recog-
nized that seasonal pattern uncertainty can significantly introduce risk to the investment
decision. Natural gas storage is a long-term investment that can experience various levels
of realized seasonal amplitude. When storage capacity is overdesigned, the operating in-
come from storage operations may not be sufficient to recover the cost of idle excess capital.
On the other hand, when storage capacity is under designed, capital investment would fall
short of economically exploiting the full extent of the realized seasonal amplitude. In this
section, seasonal pattern uncertainty is introduced to the market equilibrium of the capital
investment model and accordingly adjusted in the diagnostic metrics.
1.10.1 MBSC as a Function of Realized and Design Seasonal Amplitude Pa-
rameters a and a
Seasonal pattern uncertainty, which could be magnified by climate change, is introduced
via the seasonal amplitude parameter a of Equation 1.2. In this section, parameter a is a
random variable with physical probability distribution P (ω) where ω is the climate state
outcome. With a changing, the marginal benefit of storage capacity (MBSC) becomes a
function of parameter a in two ways, direct and indirect. Parameter a is a direct input to
MBSC (1.42), which is restated in this section using a and τ1 as input parameters in (1.45).
MBSC (a, τ1) = 2aA · sin bτ1. (1.45)
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Parameter a also enters (1.45) indirectly via τ1 as shown by the nested function
24
τ1 (NSC (a)) . (1.46)





binding storage capacity (SC). Analogous to denominator SC, see (1.20) and (1.21), nu-



















(1.48) by SC∗ (1.20), common terms (A, B, and b) cancel out and normalized
design storage capacity can be defined for both market environments as




In this way, NSC normalizes design parameter a with respect to realized parameter a. By










In turn, by substituting (1.50) back in (1.45), MBSC also becomes a function of a and a,






















24 Parameter τ1 is solved from implicit function g (τ1) = NSC where g is defined in (1.35). Thus, τ1 is
a function of NSC, or τ1(NSC) = g
−1(NSC). In turn, parameter a is an input to SC, which is the
denominator of NSC ≡ NSC – See NSC (1.33), SC
∗ (1.20), and SC∗∗ (1.21). Thus, NSC is a function of
a, or NSC(a).
25 a is an ex-ante design parameter that determines the storage capacity size.
46
Design parameter a is chosen by the storage developer prior to the realization of parameter
a. Parameter a is not defined as the expected value of a but can be made equal to it by
design considerations. It is assumed that once storage is in place (built) the storage operator
knows the value of a to be realized for short-term operations. When a is realized, if a < a
then storage capacity is binding and MBSC (a, a) > 0. If a ≥ a then storage capacity is
not binding and MBSC (a, a) = 0. In this case, there is excess idle storage capacity with
associated capital costs and no benefits.
1.10.2 Numerical Example III
Using the parameters introduced in Table 1.2 as input, Figure 1.12 illustrates the marginal




as a function of a (∈ [0, 1]) and NSC (∈ [0, 1]).
Both inputs range from zero to one. In Figure 1.12, a surface contains all the marginal
benefits MBSC (a, a) obtained from all combinations of a and a where a ≤ a and, thus,
MBSC (a, a) ≥ 0. The maximum MBSC value achieved is 2A = 40, when a = 1.0. In
Figure 1.12, the 3D box can be normalized to a unit box where all three dimensions range
from zero to one. This normalization is attained by dividing the MBSC results by 2A.
Alternatively, the z-axis ranging from zero to 40 can be replaced with a z-axis ranging from
zero to one. The unit box would contain all the MBSC results in a normalized form.
1.10.3 Obtaining MBSC as a function of NSC and as a function of a




curve for a given value of a can be obtained as the
intersect of the surface and a plane perpendicular to the a axis placed at the given value of a.
In turn, this curve can be transformed into an MBSC (a|a) curve by multiplying the NSC
axis values and the given value of a, because a = a ·NSC from (1.49). Figure 1.13 illustrates
MBSC (a|a) curves as a function of a for a set of ten a values. To show how to interpret
Figure 1.13, a storage capacity (design) size of a = 0.5 is arbitrarily chosen and illustrated
by a vertical dashed line. Given a = 0.5, MBSC = 0 when a ≤ 0.5 and MBSC ≈ 15 when
a = 1. Thus, given a = 0.5, the uncertain range of MBSC is [0, 15].
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Figure 1.13: MBSC as a function of a for different levels of a, or MBSC (a|a).
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1.10.4 Value of Storage Operations (VSO)
The value of storage operations (V SO) is added welfare under perfect competition and
optimized profit under monopoly, both gained from storage operations. Using these defi-
nitions, V SO can be estimated when storage capacity is not binding (NB) under perfect
competition as
V SONBS = BT ·Q
2
b (1.53)





using the result (π∗) from (1.24). These two expressions were first introduced at the back
end of Section 1.7.3. On the other hand, when storage capacity is binding, V SO requires







MBSC (α|a = ã) dα (1.55)


















(1.56) and (1.57) are based on (1.47) and (1.48), respectively. (1.55) is simply the area
underneath the MBSC (a|a) curve (where a = ã) bound to the right by min (ã, a), see
Figure 1.13, adjusted by factor N(a)
a
. To illustrate, V SO is now found when ã = 0.5 and
storage capacity is not binding (a ≥ ã), or min (ã, a) = ã. First, the MBSC (a|a) curve
labeled as a = 0.5 in Figure 1.13 is selected. The a-axis (horizontal axis) is transformed into
an N -axis after multiplying it by factor 2 A
bB
(≈ 38.20) under perfect competition and factor
A
bB
(≈ 19.10) under monopoly. The two curves illustrated in Figure 1.8 are the result of this
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transformation. Based on the results from Table 1.3, the areas underneath the two curves
in Figure 1.8 are W ∗∗s −WNSO (= BT ·Q
2









V SONBS = $150 and V SO
NB
M = $75.
When storage capacity is binding (a < ã), or min (ã, a) = a, V SO can be found using
three approaches. The first one is to solve expression (1.55), which depicts the same area
described under non-binding conditions but truncated on the right-hand side by a. The
second one is to solve by stage (A, B, C, and D) the integrals ofW ∗∗t under perfect competition
and π∗t under monopoly using the expressions in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5, respectively. These
first two approaches can lead to elaborate formulas. The third approach solves (1.55) by
approximating the MBSC (a|a) curves in Figure 1.13 to straight lines. In this way, the
V SO under binding storage capacity can be calculated as a simple fraction of the V SO
under non-binding storage capacity (V SONB). Such fraction can be derived from simple








. Using these results, the V SO (ã, a) for both binding
(ã > a) and non-binding (ã ≤ a) storage capacity is found under perfect competition as













where α = min (ã, a) (1.58)
and under monopoly as
V SOM (ã, a) ≈
1
2
V SOS (ã, a) . (1.59)
1.10.5 Nominal Return on Storage Investment (NROI)
Nominal return on storage investment (NROI) for both operational environments can
be found as









is the annual capital cost of nominal storage capacity in place. Assuming







Substituting (1.47) and (1.48), annual capital cost CK can be expressed as a function of
design parameter a under perfect competition as




and under monopoly as




Based on these results, when MCSC is constant, CSK (a) = 2 · C
M
K (a). In turn, NROI can
be expressed as a function of design parameter a and realized seasonal amplitude ã under
perfect competition as
NROIS (ã, a) = V SOS (ã, a)− C
S
K (a) (1.64)
and under monopoly as
NROIM (ã, a) =
1
2
NROIS (ã, a) . (1.65)
1.10.6 Optimum design parameter a∗
Assuming risk neutrality, the expected value and distribution of NROI can be found
for every level of design parameter a by running Monte Carlo simulations using seasonal
parameter a as a random variable mapping climate state ω to realized outcome ã with
physical probability distribution P (ω). Using the Monte Carlo results for NROI (a, a), the
storage operator would choose the design parameter a∗ delivering the maximum expected
return on investment, or
a∗ = arg
a
{maxE [NROI (a, a)]}. (1.66)
Because the minimum function in (1.58) introduces non-linearity to NROI, the chosen
optimum design parameter a∗ will likely be different from expected seasonal amplitude â.
Given the relationship between NROIM and NROIS shown in (1.65), the chosen optimum
design parameter a∗ can be anticipated to be the same under both market environments
when facing the same seasonal pattern uncertainty. Thus, even after accounting for seasonal
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uncertainty, the nominal storage capacity under perfect competition can be anticipated to
double that under monopoly (assuming constant marginal cost of capital).
1.10.7 Adjusting Diagnostic Metrics for Seasonal Pattern Uncertainty
The diagnostic metrics introduced in Section 1.9 can be adjusted to incorporate seasonal
pattern uncertainty. First, the chosen optimum design parameter a∗ (1.66) found using
Monte Carlo simulations (described in Section 1.10.6) would be used to compute the bench-
marks SC∗EQ and SC
∗∗
EQ of the first diagnostic metrics using (1.48) and (1.47), respectively.
Note that the optimally chosen a∗ will be the same under both market environments. Second,
the expected seasonal amplitude â would be used to compute the benchmarks of the second
diagnostic metric addressing price fluctuation. The third and fourth diagnostic metrics do
not require adjustments.
1.11 Conclusions
This chapter developed four diagnostic metrics to evaluate the adequate efficient-market
development of natural gas base-load storage capacity based on economic fundamentals. The
four diagnostic metrics are (1) market equilibrium of storage capacity investment, (2) price
fluctuation, (3) correlation between price and consumption, and (4) correlation between price
and inventories. The first metric addresses directly the level of adequate development. The
second metric reads the response from the market in the form of price to indirectly determine
whether adequate development is in effect. The last two metrics complement the results from
the first two metrics. The last two metrics are used to quantify the relative degree of market
power that might be present in different regions, which might be preventing efficient-market
development. Seasonal pattern uncertainty, which can be magnified by climate change, was
addressed via the market equilibrium of capital investment and accordingly adjusted in the
diagnostic metrics. Benchmarks were formulated for each metric using theoretical parametric
solutions by market environment, i.e., perfect competition and monopoly, and varying levels
of binding storage capacity. Actual values must be contrasted against these theoretical
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benchmarks. These diagnostic metrics can be used by FERC to monitor potential and
unintended deterrent effects of their own regulatory policies on midstream infrastructure
development. The parameterization of seasonality in my model would require empirical
calibration against the main regional drivers of the natural gas demand seasonal pattern,
e.g., CDDs and HDDs.
Based on the price profile predicted by my model, the Henry Hub forward curve displays
two sections in one seasonal cycle (one year). The first section (April - October) resembles an
upside-down mesa, which qualitatively matches the price profile of an injection stage under
competitive environment with some degree of storage capacity constraint. The second section
(November - March) resembles a round-top hill, which qualitatively matches the price profile
of a withdrawal stage under a competitive environment completely constrained. The two
sections are not only different in shape but also different in length: the count of low-demand
months in the first section outnumbers the count of high-demand months in the second sec-
tion. The differences between the two sections are attributed to the actual asymmetry of the
seasonal pattern in which the rise of demand is more intense and pronounced over a shorter
period of time than the subsequent slowdown. Based on my model insights, I posit that the
rise of demand captured by Henry Hub is constrained not by storage but by subsequent sys-
tems downstream of storage like transmission. Consequently, transmission constraints would
explain the asymmetric shape of the Henry Hub forward curve. Future research can test this
hypothesis by calibrating my model numerically in GAMS while accounting for storage and
transmission capacities. Future research can also adjust my proposed diagnostic metrics to
account for the effects of asymmetry of the seasonal patterns.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFICIENT RATEMAKING POLICY FOR REGULATED LUMPY ASSET
INVESTMENTS – ADDRESSING CONGESTION CAUSED BY DELAYED
INVESTMENTS
This chapter shows that the cost-based approach of regulating capital-intensive services
in natural monopoly environments does not address the congestion originated by the delayed
investment of lumpy assets. Addressing this issue, this research evaluates the economic effi-
ciency of the cost-based approach to regulation and identifies an enhanced ratemaking policy
that can deliver greater economic efficiency. In particular, a deterministic asset investment
model is built to characterize a regulated pipeline company that chooses scale and timing of
a natural gas pipeline investment to maximize the return on the asset (ROA). In this model,
transportation rates can either be endogenous or exogenous to the firm decisions. The model
is used to contrast welfare under the cost-based approach against welfare under the enhanced
ratemaking policy. The research finds that the cost-based approach can achieve greater eco-
nomic efficiency when the “fair” ROA requirement is relaxed. The enhanced ratemaking
policy builds up from the relaxed ROA requirement and introduces a transfer payment to
induce the regulated firm towards a Pareto improvement.
2.1 Introduction
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over the ratemak-
ing policies of natural gas midstream transport and storage services. FERC reviews proposed
rate schedules and generally approves cost-based, negotiated, or market-based rates.26 Ac-
cording to FERC (2015), most rates are based on cost of service. Such rates contain both
reservation and usage components for firm service and usage component alone for inter-
26 To approve market-based rates, FERC must determine the applicant does not have an ability to exercise
market power.
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ruptible service. The cost-based approach is intended to protect consumers from natural
monopoly conditions by preventing monopoly rents, while providing an opportunity to reg-
ulated midstream companies to earn a “fair” return on the asset (ROA). This traditional
cost-based approach intends to reproduce what a long-run equilibrium would be if there
were a competitive market. This research argues, however, that the cost-based approach can
achieve greater economic efficiency when the “fair” ROA requirement is relaxed. The selec-
tion of a “fair” ROA may prevent the regulated company from exploiting economies of scale
to the detriment of not only private profits but also of social welfare. The cause of the latter
is that consumers can be exposed to undue congestion introduced by delayed investments.
Thus, congestion is an externality that does not get addressed by the cost-based approach.
Guthrie (2006) indicates that delayed investments can have enormous welfare costs.
My research answers the question of how congestion originated by delayed investment
of regulated lumpy assets can be addressed by an enhanced ratemaking policy. An asset
investment model is built to solve this research question. In this model, a regulated pipeline
company chooses the scale and timing of a natural gas pipeline investment to maximize ROA.
The regulated rate schedule is simplified to a single transport charge, which is treated both
endogenously and exogenously in order to identify optimum results for both pipeline company
and regulator, respectively. These results are used to analyze the effect of regulating lumpy
assets on welfare and the investment behavior of the regulated firm.27 The contribution of my
research to the literature is the development of an enhanced ratemaking policy for regulated
lumpy assets that can improve economic efficiency over that achieved by the traditional
cost-based approach.
In this chapter, Section 2.2 begins with an introduction to the concepts of lumpy assets,
congestion, and value to delaying investment. The interrelationships of these concepts is also
presented. Section 2.3 reviews the literature on natural monopoly regulation of natural gas
27 Unlike typical commodity-based asset valuation models, the asset investment in my research leads to the
provision of a service (transport) where rates are regulated – rather than to the production (or extraction)
of a commodity where prices are typically assumed to be competitive and to follow some form of continuous
stochastic process.
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transmission: the focus is on the framework and models introduced by this literature, which
are briefly described and contrasted against my own approach (as applicable). Section 2.4
reviews the literature on economies of scale of natural gas transmission. Sections 2.5, 2.6, and
2.7 build up the dynamic asset investment model and its solution. Section 2.8 provides an
economic interpretation for each of the optimization conditions found in the model solution.
Section 2.9 coins the concept of economies of scale in asset investment. Section 2.10 uses
a numerical example to illustrate my dynamic investment model. Sections 2.11 and 2.12
analyze the effect of economies of scale on the investment behavior of the regulated firm
using the results of the numerical example. Section 2.13 contrasts welfare under regulation
against the welfare optimum achieved by a social planner and introduces a regulatory policy
alternative. Section 2.14 analyzes the effect of transport charge cTP on both private value
and social value based on Sections 2.10 through 2.13. Section 3.12 concludes.
2.2 Lumpy Assets, Congestion, and Value to Delaying Investment
Natural gas midstream assets, which are primarily pipelines and storage, are lumpy
assets.28 In this research, the regulated lumpy assets of interest are natural gas pipelines.
Pipeline capacity can limit the supply that can be delivered to any given region and is,
therefore, a key factor in regional prices. Nonetheless, the findings from this research are
applicable to other lumpy regulated assets such as natural gas storage.
Over the long run, lumpy assets periodically cycle between excess capacity and full ca-
pacity utilization. The latter stage leads to congestion. In this stage, according to Griffin
(2006), a congestion markup arises to efficiently ration limited capacity. During times of
excess capacity, the congestion markup is zero. Unlike user cost, which tends to strictly
increase over time, congestion markup goes up and down following the alternating asset-
capacity utilization cycle – see Griffin (2006) and Dandy et al. (1985).
28 Lumpy assets are assets that cannot be acquired in small increments but rather in large, discrete units
(Thomson, 2017).
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Cairns and Davis (2007) show there is value to delaying investment of lumpy assets even
under certainty. The investment delay in turn introduces congestion. In natural gas markets,
congestion is a result of midstream investment lagging transport demand growth. Dynamic
models are required to address delayed investments inducing congestion. To endogenize
congestion, it is necessary to capture the nature of lumpy asset investments, their inherent
economies of scale, transport demand growth, and investment timing decisions. These fea-
tures are the sources of recurring congestion in lumpy asset investments. By introducing
these features in a customized asset investment model, my research captures congestion as a
result of the option to delay investment of lumpy assets (or real option to wait) exercised by
capital investors.29 The next section provides a literature review on natural monopoly reg-
ulation of natural gas transmission with a focus on static and dynamic investment-planning
models. Static models cannot address congestion but are still covered as a reference.
2.3 Literature on natural monopoly regulation of natural gas transmission
In this section, the literature on natural monopoly30 regulation of natural gas transmission
is reviewed. The focus is on the framework and models introduced by this literature, which
are briefly described and contrasted against my own approach (as applicable). This section
begins with the studies developed by Callen31 et al. from 1976 through 1981, which focused
on the Averch-Johnson (A-J) effect: finding the optimal regulated rate of return under the A-
J framework in 1976, testing the static A-J effect in 1978, and testing the dynamic A-J effect
in 1981.32 The section continues with the presentation of the Chenery-Manne-Srinivasan
(CMS) model used by Aivazian and Callen (1981). The section ends with current literature
addressing dynamic investment-planning models.
29 Cairns and Davis (2007) define lumpy investment as “a capital expenditure that extinguishes the option
to invest at a later date for either economic or technical reasons.”
30 Natural monopoly is present when a cost function is subadditive (Viscusi et al., 2005).
31 Jeffrey Callen is an early pioneer of the literature presented in this section.
32 Although the existence of the A-J effect has been questioned recently by Law (2014), the studies developed
by Jeffrey Callen are still reviewed as a point of reference in the literature.
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2.3.1 Static framework developed to evaluate the A-J Effect
The traditional method for regulating natural monopoly is the rate of return (ROR)
regulation. Averch and Johnson (1962) published an analysis of this method, which became
a seminal work for the development of a large body of theoretical and empirical research. The
static A-J framework of analysis consists of a firm maximizing profit (π) by employing two
factors, namely, labor (L) and capital (K), subject to an ROR constraint. Mathematically,
the objective of the regulated firm is to maximize profits
π = P (Q) ·Q− w · L− r ·K (2.1)
subject to
sK = P (Q) ·Q− w · L (2.2)
where P (Q) is the inverse demand function, Q (L,K) is the firm’s production function, w
is the wage rate of labor, r is the rental cost of capital, and s is the allowed ROR. To be
















where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier.33 Based on (2.3), the analysis concludes that the
firm subject to ROR would tend to substitute more capital for other factors than it would
otherwise as an unregulated monopoly. In theory, the firm acts this way because the cost
of capital effectively becomes cheaper (by an amount α) under ROR regulation. Hence, the
ROR method introduces regulatory bias to the behavior of the firm. This result is well known
33 When λ = 0, the ROR constraint does not bind and α = 0 from (2.4). By substituting α = 0 in (2.3),
the classic result in microeconomic theory about the optimized use of input factors is found, i.e., at the
optimum, the cost of an additional unit of output obtained by increasing an individual input at the margin
is the same for all inputs.
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in the literature as the Averch–Johnson (A-J) effect. Callen (1978) tests empirically the A-J
hypothesis in the U.S. interstate natural gas transmission industry using optimization models
based on the A-J framework. Callen (1978) models the pipeline production technology
(transmission service) using the Cobb-Douglas function
Q = AH0.27K0.9 (2.5)
where A is an scale constant, Q is output in billion cubic feet (BCF), H is horsepower,
and K is the pipeline capacity measured in thousands of tons of steel.34 By contrasting
the predictive power of modeling the industry with and without the ROR constraint, Callen
(1978) finds that the optimization model with the ROR constraint was the best overall.
2.3.2 Adjusting the Static A-J Framework to Find the Optimal Regulated ROR
Callen et al. (1976) adjust the A-J static framework to determine the optimal ROR level
to be set by the regulator. They adjust it by expressing labor as a function of production
and capital, or L (Q,K), i.e., inverting the production function Q (L,K). In this way, the
two choice variables L and K under the A-J static framework change to Q and K under the
adjusted framework,
π = R (Q)− w · L (Q, K)− r ·K (2.6)
subject to
sK = R (Q)− w · L (Q,K) (2.7)
where R (Q) is the revenue derived from selling Q units of product. The optimization
condition found under the adjusted framework is
R′ (Q) = wLQ (Q,K) (2.8)
where R′ is marginal revenue and wLQ is the regulated “pseudomarginal” cost. Callen et al.
(1976) define the latter as the cost of the variable inputs required to produce an additional
34 The production function for natural gas transmission was initially developed by Callen (1978) and consis-
tently used and refined by Callen in subsequent related work. The version presented in (2.5) is that found
in Aivazian and Callen (1981).
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unit of output whenK is set at the level required to satisfy the ROR constraint. Optimization
condition (2.8) is re-arranged in (2.9)35 to contrast it against optimization condition (2.3).
w
QL (Q, K)
= R′ (Q) (2.9)
In the range s ∈ [r, sUM ], (2.7) and (2.8) are solved in undefined form as a system of two
equations and two unknowns to obtain both the monopoly’s optimal level of production Q∗
and optimal level of capitalK∗ as a function of s and w: Q∗ = Q∗ (s, w) andK∗ = K∗ (s, w).




P (q) dq − wL (Q∗, K∗)− rK∗. (2.10)




s = [r + wLK ]K
∗
s . (2.11)
Solving s from FOC (2.11) would yield the optimal level of regulated ROR, or s∗∗. According
to Callen et al. (1976), based on FOC (2.11), reducing s below sUM would increase the
measure of social welfare. In other words, regardless of the specific natures of production and
demand functions, the optimum allowable ROR (s∗∗) is less than that which an unregulated





effects are observed in the context of my dynamic investment model.
2.3.3 The Dynamic A-J Framework
Progressing from the standard static A-J framework, Aivazian and Callen (1981) evaluate
how regulation alters the relationship between the growth in output and the input combi-
nations needed to provide that output over time, i.e., the dynamic analog of the Averch-
Johnson effect. Specifically, Aivazian and Callen (1981) study the postwar expansion of the
U.S. interstate natural-gas pipeline industry. They find that regulation affected not only
each firm’s optimal input combinations but also the rate of capacity expansion. To develop




the study, Aivazian and Callen (1981) introduced variants to what is known as the Chenery-
Manne-Srinivasan (CMS) model. The CMS model is briefly reviewed next as the incipient of
dynamic investment planning models in the literature of regulated natural gas transmission.
2.3.4 Early development of dynamic investment planning models
Chenery (1952) formulates the seed of the CMS model out of his studies of the natural
gas transmission industry – a sector he acknowledged to be characterized by rapid growth
at the time and substantial economies of scale in pipeline construction and operation. The
case of linear consumption growth was first analyzed geometrically by Chenery (1952) and
later algebraically by Manne (1961). Manne also analyzed the case of uncertain growth.
Srinivasan (1967) later extended the model to the geometric growth case. The CMS model
handles both linear and geometric (exogenous) consumption growth over an infinite time
horizon. In particular, Aivazian and Callen (1981) use the version of the model developed
by Manne (1961) with deterministic and linear consumption growth36 and no backlogs.37
This version of the model is now described. In this model, the economic agent is a firm
minimizing the cost of a sequence of equally sized capacity expansions that stay right above
a linearly increasing consumption requirement. Once capacity is installed, it stays forever
operational, i.e., there is no asset depreciation. In a diagram of required consumption and
capacity vs. time, linear consumption shows as a straight upward-sloping line from the
origin while installed capacity shows as a sequence of equally sized steps right above the
consumption line: a sawtooth above a diagonal line. Whenever demand catches up with
existing capacity, x units of new capacity are installed. For convenience, the physical unit
of capacity (and of demand) is set equal to one year’s growth in consumption. In this way,
the timespan between expansions is also x. The development cost of x units of capacity is
36 According to Aivazian and Callen (1981), the CMS model under linear consumption growth is one of the
few mathematically tractable intertemporal models. I came to the same conclusion while developing my
own research model.
37 Backlogs imply negative excess capacity. Thus, “no backlogs” imply positive excess capacity. Manne
(1961) also extended the model to incorporate backlogs.
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given by the power function
kxa (2.12)
where both a and k are constants and k > 0 and 0 < a < 1. The latter condition reflects
economies of scale. The sum of all discounted development costs over the infinite horizon is
expressed as the recursive function
C (x) = kxa + e−rx · C (x) (2.13)
where C (x) is the sum of all discounted investment costs in subsequent cycles, kxa is the
current cost of investment, e−rx is the discount factor for one cycle, and r is the discount





By differentiating the logarithm of (2.14) with respect to x and setting the result equal to





from which the optimal size of recurrent capacity expansions (x∗) can be solved. Aivazian
and Callen (1981) adjust this version of the CMS model to account for the relative flexibility
of horsepower capacity as compared to pipeline capacity. Because horsepower capacity can
be added fairly continuously to the pipeline in the ground, Aivazian and Callen (1981) argue
that pipeline capacity and horsepower capacity can be treated as fixed and variable inputs,
respectively. Accordingly, Aivazian and Callen (1981) replace the simple power function
(2.12) with a more complex form that accounts for the installation costs of pipeline capacity
and horsepower capacity separately using (2.5) as the base of the individual cost functions:
horsepower capacity is added proportionally to output as H ∝ Q1/0.27.
Although the CMS model adjusted by Aivazian and Callen (1981) worked well to model
input distortion, that is, substitution of capital for other factors over time, the adjusted
model imposes two strong assumptions. First, it assumes away the firm’s investment timing
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decision.38 Second, the CMS model itself at its core assumes consumption to be exogenous
and, therefore, consumption does not depend on the capacity size plan. These two assump-
tions get addressed in the model developed by Demichelis and Tarola (2006). Demichelis’
model and others recently developed are introduced next.39
2.3.5 Recent development of dynamic investment planning models
Demichelis and Tarola (2006) address what they called the “plant-size problem.” They
depart from the common cost-minimizing approach (introduced by the CMS model) and used
a profit-maximizing one instead. Their model determines pricing and investment planning
simultaneously as they recognize that the price policy of the firm affects consumption40 while
demand increases linearly and exogenously over time. The base model setup described so far
is incidentally the same I use and detail in my model section. Past this base, there are two
fundamental differences between the two models. First, the economic agent in their model is
a monopoly while that in my model is a regulated monopoly.41 Second, they fix one choice
variable at a time to solve the model: fix investment planning first and solve for pricing,
and vice versa. In my model, the two choice variables are truly solved simultaneously. The
dynamic investment planning model that is introduced next, developed by Guthrie (2006),
addresses a regulated monopoly.
Guthrie (2006) recognized that the level of regulated prices is potentially an important
determinant of a regulated firm’s investment activity. According to Guthrie (2006), however,
the existing literature on the link between regulation and investment is largely silent on the
effect of economies of scale. Evans and Guthrie (2012) develop an intertemporal model of a
regulated monopolist that chooses the scale and timing of its investment program and faces
38 To incorporate this decision, the model must be based on profit maximization and not just cost minimiza-
tion. The CMS model is based on the latter.
39 As the literature on regulated monopoly started to move away from A-J analyses, the models introduced
next do not include a component to address input substitution.
40 According to Demichelis and Tarola (2006), not even literature on pricing strategies had addressed this
issue.
41 Demichelis and Tarola (2006) find that price manipulation induces the monopoly to postpone capacity
investments.
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uncertain future demand and capital prices. In my model, the regulated monopolist faces
the same choice variables but under a deterministic setting. In Evans and Guthrie’s model,
the regulated monopolist is simultaneously subject to an upper bound on the output price
the firm can charge (price cap) and a lower bound on the proportion of demand that the firm
must meet (quantity regulation). In my model, the regulated monopolist is just subject to
a regulated single price. Evans and Guthrie use their model to contrast welfare under regu-
lation against the welfare optimum achieved by a social planner. In this way, they analyze
the effect of economies of scale on welfare-maximizing regulation and the investment behav-
ior of the regulated firms. I use a similar approach to develop my own modeling analysis.
Evans and Guthrie find that, when economies of scale do not exist, the investment behavior
of regulated firms maximizes social welfare. In other words, private interest matches social
interest. In contrast, when economies of scale exist, regulated firms take less advantage of
scale economies than a planner would, investing in smaller, more frequent increments. This
distortion increases with the degree of economies of scale. Because Evans and Guthrie’s
model incorporates uncertainty in demand and capital prices, they must simplify the model
formulation in other fronts and assume there is no excess capacity over time, i.e., infras-
tructure capacity expansions are fully utilized immediately as deployed over time. Thus,
the investment is not lumpy. This is a strong assumption in the context of my research.
Under growing demand, lumpy assets introduce excess capacity that is idle and needs to
be accounted for to enhance the modeling of the timing of investment. Thus, the use of
a deterministic setting in my model is better suited than that of an stochastic setting to
capture the congestion caused by delayed investments.
2.4 Literature on Economies of Scale of Natural Gas Transmission
In the past, economies of scale of natural gas transmission have been generally accepted.
In the early 1960s, Manne (1961) acknowledged substantial economies of scale in pipeline
construction and operation. In the late 1980s, Aivazian et al. (1987) indicated that an upper
bound factor of 2.07 for economies of scale in transmission capacity and throughput had been
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used in studies dating as far back as 1972. Aivazian et al. indicated that this scale factor was
derived from laboratory experiments on pipeline design and used in engineering throughput
analyses of natural gas transmission. To clarify, I express mathematically economies of scale
in transmission throughput and capacity next. Letting operational cost of transmission be
C (Q,K), where Q is transmission throughput and K is transmission capacity, economies of
scale in transmission throughput Q exist when
∂C/∂Q < C/Q. (2.16)
Letting investment cost of transmission be I (K), economies of scale in transmission capacity
K exist when
I ′ (K) < I (K) /K. (2.17)
Oliver (2015) departs from the generally accepted assertion of economies of scale in
natural gas transmission capacity for a particular subset of pipelines. Specifically, Oliver finds
that long-distance trunklines (or high-capacity pipelines spanning long distances) exhibit
diseconomies of scale. This finding arises from a trans-log estimation of 254 U.S. natural gas
pipeline projects based on a Cobb-Douglas form of pipeline investment cost I,42
I = I (K, L, H) = A ·KαK · (LαL)γ1 · (HαH )γ2 · eµ (2.18)
where A is a constant parameter, K is capacity in MMcf/day, L is length in miles, H
is compression horsepower, α exponents are the cost elasticities of each input factor,43 γ
exponents are binary indicators of whether incremental capacity on an existing line is realized
by adding a new parallel line or not (γ1) and/or adding new compression horsepower or not
(γ2), and µ is a random variable related to the variation in costs across cost projects. By
introducing length L as an explanatory variable to the trans-log estimation, Oliver introduces
a spatial dimension complementing the analyses of economies of scale in capacity K in the
form of economies of scope. Oliver defines economies of scope realized by individual pipeline
42 For document consistency, I changed the C notation used by Oliver (2015) to my I notation.
43In the Cobb-Douglas form of (2.18), economies of scale in transmission capacity exist when
(∂ ln I/∂ lnK = αK) < 1.
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expansions as the wider economic benefits spread out by releasing capacity or alleviating
congestion in other sections of the network. Based on cost elasticities α, Oliver determines
the degree of economies of scale and economies of scope: “If 0 < αK < 1, pipeline project
costs are concave in capacity, implying economies of scale. If 0 < αL < 1, then project costs
are concave in length, implying economies of scope” (Oliver, 2015).
Oliver recognizes the impact that long-distance trunklines have on the economies of scope
in a network. Accordingly, Oliver further indicates that diseconomies of scale also apply to
network expansions. Oliver argues that these diseconomies of scale in turn lead to costs
of capacity that are convex on transportation rates. Given this convexity, Oliver deduces
that risk-averse pipeline customers facing uncertain use of transport services would be less
willing to commit to long-term contracts along long-distance trunklines. Oliver concludes
that “cost-of-service pricing may inhibit network expansion, exacerbating congestion issues.”
Oliver made a significant contribution to the literature by adding a spatial dimension
complementing the assessment of economies of scale in capacity. However, I argue that his
final assertion about the behavior of risk-averse pipeline customers in the face of convexity
of capital costs on network expansions is myopic on two fronts. First, he missed to account
for the time dimension inherent to the dynamics of lumpy asset investments. And second,
he evaluated the concavity of the “cost” of capacity rather than the concavity of the “service
value” realized by capacity.44 If a time dimension is introduced and service value (rather
than cost) of capacity is evaluated, a regular concavity of service value on transport rates
may still occur for network expansions in a dynamic setting – even if long-distance trunklines
have static diseconomies of scale in capacity. In conclusion, to obtain a definite assertion,
the effects of uncertainty of transport services on customer behavior should be evaluated
using a dynamic-value setting rather than a static-cost setting. In this regard, Section 2.9
makes a distinction about economies of scale in asset capacity versus economies of scale in
asset investment. The latter is a concept coined in this research.




This section introduces the deterministic asset investment model. In this model, a reg-
ulated pipeline company chooses the scale and timing of a natural gas pipeline investment
and subsequent expansions to maximize a return on the asset (ROA). Assuming natural
monopoly conditions, FERC regulates the rate schedule as cost based using average cost
pricing45 to ensure the firm’s recovery of capital costs plus some fair return. Short-run oper-
ational cost is assumed to be zero or, alternatively, not significant relative to the annualized
cost of capital investments. In this way, the regulated rate schedule consists of a single
transport charge (cTP ) per unit of service that is enforced over time, i.e., a steady single
transport charge.46 Two specific environments are evaluated in the model. Under the first
environment, the regulated firm chooses the level of the steady rate. Although the firm is
regulated to charge a steady rate, the level of the rate itself is unregulated. This environment
is referred to as the “unregulated (steady) rate” case. In this case, cTP is a choice variable to
the profit-maximizing firm and, thus, an endogenous result of the model. Under the second
environment, the regulator chooses the level of the steady rate. This environment is referred
to as the “regulated (steady) rate” case. In this case, cTP is exogenous to the decisions of
the regulated firm and, thus, cTP is exogenous to the model.
My asset investment model is both dynamic and deterministic. The model is dynamic
to introduce timing decisions influenced by the irreversible nature of the asset investment.47
45 According to Kahn (1995), average cost pricing provides a rate stability that is pragmatically favorable
over other approaches where rates change with the investment cycle. Rate stability makes it easier for
customers to make the type of long-run commitment that capital-intensive utilities require.
46 According to Kahn (1995), because regulated rates determine the magnitude of profits, regulated rates are
the most contested aspect of regulation consuming by far the greatest amount of time of both commissions
and courts.
47 Natural gas pipelines are typically designed to have a useful life of about 50 years. Safe working lifetime is
limited by corrosion and stress of continuous high-pressure operation. At the end of its lifetime, a pipeline
is either replaced or abandoned. Expansions typically occur alongside the existing pipeline where rights-
of-way are already cleared (Transco, 2016). Thus, irreversible investment of the pipeline is a reasonable
assumption in my model. This may change for other infrastructure where the reversibility setups proposed
by Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Abel and Eberly (1995), and Davis and Cairns (2016) may be considered.
Partial reversibility would only favor the value of the investment through what would be the equivalent of
a put option in finance.
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The model is deterministic to better accommodate the characterization of a lumpy asset
investment. My model is built using constrained optimization and the theory of invest-
ments laid down by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Specifically, my model captures a regulated
pipeline company that maximizes the value (F ) of a recurrent irreversible pipeline invest-
ment opportunity by choosing the time to asset investment (τ), the operational time under
excess-capacity (T ), the scale of transport capacity expansion (K), and the regulated level
of transport charge (cTP ). Operational time T extends from τ until full asset capacity is
reached by quantity demanded (Qt).
48 When the level of cTP is unregulated, cTP is endoge-
nous to find the level maximizing value to the pipeline company. Once the model is built,
adjustments are made to treat cTP as exogenous. Given the long-term horizon of the pipeline
investment, transport demand growth is addressed in the model.49 Peak and off-peak pe-
riods as well as seasonality are ignored assuming they are handled by natural gas storage.
Over time, the regulated pipeline company faces linear demand growth delivering identical
expansion conditions in every investment cycle. Thus, the model setup for one investment
cycle is representative of all.
2.5.1 Dynamics of the Asset Investment Cycle
Figure 2.1 illustrates both the dynamics of the asset investment cycle and the underlying
partial equilibrium model for natural gas transport. To begin, the inverse demand for natural
gas transport has the linear form Pt = At−B ·Qt where Pt is the price of transport, At is the
reservation price, B is the constant downward slope of inverse demand, and Qt is the quantity
demanded of transport from the current investment cycle. Reservation price At changes
overtime by a constant amount A, i.e., At = A · t, shifting demand in an upward/rightward
direction as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Arithmetic growth is assumed in order to have identical
48 Qt is the quantity demanded for natural gas flow shipping at time t. In particular, Qτ is flow at operational
start time (t = τ) and Qτ+T is flow when full asset capacity is reached (t = τ + T ).
49 Empirically, transport demand between two regional markets can be derived from regional natural gas
supplies and demands. These in turn can be obtained from energy-economy models such as the National
Energy Modeling System (NEMS) in the U.S. In a competitive market, the market-clearing price of trans-
port demand (Pt) would be the price difference between regional markets – also known as the market
basis.
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growth conditions in every investment cycle. Nonetheless, geometric growth can be adopted
by using the constant-elasticity form of demand Pt = AtQ
−B where At = e
A·t and applying
a log-log transformation to get the linear form lnPt = lnAt −B · lnQt where lnAt = A · t.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the supply of natural gas transport has two sections. The first
section is perfectly elastic stretching until full capacity is reached (Qτ+T = K). The second
section is perfectly inelastic when full capacity is reached.
Figure 2.1: Asset investment model dynamics.
Along the perfectly elastic section of supply, market equilibrium price is constant and
equal to the regulated transport charge (Pt = cTP ) while market equilibrium quantity de-
manded Qt grows linearly over time as demand shifts (Qt < K ∀ t ∈ [τ, τ + T ]). Along the
perfectly inelastic section of supply, the market clears under congestion: market equilibrium
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quantity demanded is limited by capacity (Qt = K ∀ t > τ + T ) while market equilibrium
price increases linearly over time as demand increases (Pt > cTP ). However, because trans-
port charge cTP is regulated, pipeline companies do not receive the congestion premium
(Pt − cTP ). Instead, marketers do – as the congestion premium moves up the transport ser-
vice chain.50 Thus, congestion markups do not influence the decisions of regulated pipeline
companies. Under market equilibrium, cTP is the value to society of gas transportation.
The model timeline is indexed in absolute (ta) and relative (t) terms. At the start of




. As time goes
by, reservation price At increases from zero until it reaches the regulated level of transport
charge cTP . When Ataci = cTP , the first investment cycle is initiated. At this time, the
absolute and relative time indices are at
taci = cTP/A (2.19)
and t = 0, respectively. Figure 2.1 illustrates three linear demands, each at a distinctive
relative time of the investment cycle: the first one at start time t = 0 (bottom), the second
one at investment time τ (middle), and the third one at terminal time τ + T (top). The
middle and top linear demands clear at quantitiesQτ (> 0) andQτ+T (> 0), respectively. The
linear demand at the bottom does not clear with the anticipated asset expansion because
the latter is not existent. Table C.1 summarizes the market equilibrium price and quantity
demanded by stage of investment cycle. Appendix D shows the corresponding mathematical
derivation.
50 As shown in Chapter 3, natural gas marketers (traders), and not pipeline companies, capture congestion
markups when pipeline companies are subject to a regulated rate setting other than market based. This is
evident in recent years when numerous industrial consumers feeding off the natural gas interstate network
have complained to FERC about high price markups in natural gas shipping even as pipeline company
rates are regulated. Consequently, congestion markup does not feed back to the regulated company. This
is a key feature captured in my model.
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Table 2.1: Partial equilibrium price and quantity demanded by stage of investment cycle.
Cycle stage Time frame Price*
Quantity
demanded
Waiting to invest 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
Not applicable as
there is no new
capacity expansion.
Not applicable as
there is no new
capacity expansion.






t ≥ τ + T
Pt =




* Under congestion, because the price received by the pipeline company is limited to
cTP (by regulation), the marketer receives the congestion premium A · (t− τ + T ).
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2.6 Model Formulation
To maximize the value of the investment opportunity F , the regulated pipeline com-
pany chooses the scale of the asset K and waits until time τ to execute the investment.51
Assuming investment is instantaneous, i.e., there is no construction time, Qτ is the first
operational transport flow of the asset. Moreover, asset revenues start simultaneously at
time τ . The scale of the pipeline expansion (K) chosen by the pipeline company determines
the operational time T before capacity is reached by quantity demanded Qτ+T . Thus, the
span of an investment cycle is equal to the sum τ + T . Although the introduction of K as
a choice variable is redundant, given that K can be determined from the sum (τ + T ), K is
still introduced to capture the shadow value of capacity. When expanded capacity is reached
at time τ + T , a new investment cycle begins. At the start of every investment cycle, both
relative time t and quantity demanded Qt are reset to zero. For investment cycles subsequent
to the first one, transport congestion arises while the regulated pipeline company waits until
time τ to expand capacity. During periods of congestion (0 < t < τ), consumers pay more
for transport (Pt > cTP ) as market clearing occurs along the perfectly inelastic section of
transport supply. However, the regulated charge cTP collected by the pipeline company does
not change during these periods of congestion. As indicated before, the congestion markup is
collected by the marketer. In this way, the conditions of every investment cycle are identical
for the economic environment of the pipeline company. The initial model is setup assuming
the level of cTP is unregulated. This means that cTP is endogenous to find the level max-
imizing value to the pipeline company. Once the model is built, adjustments are made to
treat cTP as exogenous.
Thus, the objective of the regulated pipeline company is to maximize the value (F )
generated from recurrent pipeline investments using the four choice variables τ, T, K, and
cTP subject to transport capacity constraints. The maximization problem for the regulated
51 According to Evans and Guthrie (2012), accounting for scale and timing of investment is rare in the
literature.
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pipeline company can be formulated as
max
(τ, T, K, cTP )
F (τ, T,K, cTP ) s.t. Qτ+T ≤ K. (2.21)
F is calculated as the product of discount factor J and the profits per investment cycle π as
F (τ, T,K, cTP ) = J (τ, T, cTP ) · π (τ, T, K, cTP ) (2.22)
where







π = V (τ, T, cTP )− e
−ρτI (K) . (2.24)
As shown in (2.24), profits per investment cycle π are the present value (at the start of the
cycle) of asset revenues (V ) minus capital investment cost [e−ρτI (K)]. Because the model is
deterministic, a risk-free continuous-discount rate ρ is used. Discount factor J converts the
profits per investment cycle π into the present value of all recurrent profits at absolute time
zero (ta0 = 0). Appendix D contains the derivation of discount factor J .
2.6.1 Asset Revenues
An expression for asset revenues (V ) can be found by adding the discounted asset revenues
from the two stages of the asset capacity utilization cycle, i.e., excess capacity and full
capacity. Asset revenues under excess capacity (VEC) are estimated as
VEC (τ, T, cTP ) =
∫ τ+T
τ
e−ρt · (cTP ·Qt) dt. (2.25)
Asset revenues after full capacity is reached (VFC) are estimated as
VFC (τ, T, cTP ) =
∫ ∞
τ+T
e−ρt · (cTP ·Qτ+T ) dt. (2.26)
Correspondingly, total asset revenues (V ) are the sum of (2.25) and (2.26), or
V (τ, T, cTP ) = VEC + VFC . (2.27)
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In VEC (2.25) and VFC (2.26), asset revenues generated over time are captured by the term
in parenthesis (cTP ·Qt), which is simply the product of regulated transport charge cTP and
quantity demanded Qt. Thus, VEC (2.25) is simply the discounted value of the stream of
revenues generated over the period of operation where t ∈ [τ, τ + T ]. As a terminal value,
VFC (2.26) is the discounted value of an endless stream of revenues that is constant and equal
to the revenues realized at full capacity (cTP ·Qτ+T ). Appendix D shows that the present
value of asset revenues at the start of every investment cycle (V ) is







(ρτ + 1)− e−ρT
]
. (2.28)
2.6.2 Capital Investment Cost
Pipeline costs are generally determined by pipe size, compression pressure, and inter-
station distances. The optimal combination of these design factors would minimize costs
subject to desired flexibility and expandability objectives (EIA, 2008). Pipelines can take
months or years to build while compressors and horsepower capacity can be added more
frequently (Aivazian and Callen, 1981). Thus, with respect to transport capacity, pipe size
is a short-term fixed input and compression pressure is a short-term variable input. In effect,
new trunklines are built with excess capacity in pipe size while compressors and horsepower
are added more frequently over time to meet load pressure requirements (EIA, 2008). In
this model, pipe size is implicitly a variable input in the long-term selection of transport
capacity K. Thus, transport capacity K implies the selection of (a) long-term pipe size, (b)
planning program of compressor and horsepower short-term capacity expansions, and (c)
inter-station distances that minimize the corresponding capital investment cost of transport
capacity I(K).
Capital investment cost I (K) in (2.24) includes not only the upfront cost of the asset but
also the perpetuity of pipeline maintenance and replacement. In this way, I (K) covers all
costs for the pipeline to stay forever operational. Asset development (design, construction,
startup, etc.) is assumed to be instantaneous. Hence, the pipeline is operational instantly
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at time τ . Regarding the asset development technology, I (K) increases with K [I ′ (K) > 0]
and exhibits economies of scale [I ′′ (K) < 0] first and diseconomies of scale [I ′′ (K) > 0] past
a certain level of K. Economies of scale come about as the cost of a pipeline is proportional
to its diameter (cross-sectional perimeter) whereas capacity is proportional to the square
of the same diameter (cross-sectional area). Economies of scale tapper off quickly once the
largest pipe available is used. Because long-distance trunklines make use of the largest pipe
sizes available, they exhibit diseconomies of scale - as confirmed empirically by Oliver (2015).
Technical progress is assumed away.52 To capture the transition from economies of scale to
diseconomies of scale, a cubic investment-cost function is used.53
I (K) = aK3 + bK2 + cK + d (2.29)
To obtain a valid investment-cost function, parameters a, b, c, and d must meet the
requirements introduced by Chiang (2005): a > 0 is required to sustain a U-shape marginal
cost, b < 0 is required to set the law of diminishing returns at a positive output level, and
b2 < 3ac is required to guarantee a positive marginal cost minimizing capacity (K∗). The
marginal cost of investment is
I ′ (K) = 3aK2 + 2bK + c. (2.30)
2.7 Model Solution
In this model, τ, T, K, and cTP are the four choice variables. The constrained opti-
mization is solved using the Lagrangian method in Appendix D. The result is the system of
five equations in five unknowns (τ ∗, T ∗, K∗c∗TP , γ
∗) shown in Table C.2. The fifth added
52 Albeit not as radical as may be in other industries, technical progress in the U.S. natural gas transmission
industry is present. For instance, Aivazian et al. (1987) found that technical progress increased the usage
of larger diameter pipelines throughout 1950-1980. According to Aivazian et al. (1987), advances in
metallurgy and welding allowed larger diameter pipes to withstand greater pressure and, thus, yield higher
conductivity – increasing capital productivity. In addition, advances in information technology allowed the
development of automated compressor stations that required little or no manpower to operate – increasing
labor productivity. Aivazian et al. (1987) also found that technical progress explained as much and often
more of productivity growth as did scale economies throughout 1950-1980.
53 Other forms of capital investment cost can be used. For instance, the exponential form introduced by
Evans and Guthrie (2012), i.e., I (K) = a ·Kδ, could be used as long as the model solution is anticipated
to fall in the region of economies of scale.
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variable is the Lagrangian multiplier γ∗, which is the shadow value of capacity. Each equa-
tion is the result of the Lagrangian’s first-order condition (FOC) with respect to each of
the corresponding variables shown in the first column of Table C.2. Note that the optimum
scale of expansion K∗ (2.31) is an explicit function of τ ∗ and T ∗. In turn, the corresponding
shadow value of capacity γ∗ (2.32) is an explicit function of the remaining four unknowns
(τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, c∗TP ). Thus, as a solution procedure, the sub-system of three equations in three
unknowns (τ ∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) comprised of equations (2.33), (2.34), and (2.35) can be solved first.
Subsequently, the results (τ ∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) from the 3× 3 sub-system can be used to solve K
∗
(2.31) first and γ∗ (2.32) second.
In Table C.2, the terms π∗, Qτ∗ , J , I (K
∗), and I ′ (K∗) are defined by the expressions
found after substituting the four optimized choice variables (τ ∗, T ∗, c∗TP , K
∗) in (2.24),
(2.20), (2.23), (2.29), and (2.30), respectively. c∗TP is endogenous in the 5 × 5 system of
equations shown in Table C.2. In this case, the pipeline company gets to choose the opti-
mum cTP as a natural monopoly. To analyze the regulated monopoly case, cTP is treated
exogenously by simply removing (2.35) out of the 5× 5 system of equations – because (2.35)
is the FOC with respect to cTP and (2.35) is not substituted in any of the other conditions.
This reduces the 5× 5 system to a 4× 4 system where the unknowns are τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, and γ∗.
Section 2.8 provides an economic interpretation for each of the FOCs shown in Table C.2.
Because there is no explicit solution for unknowns τ ∗, T ∗, and c∗TP , Section 2.10 illustrates
a numerical example to help visualize the implicit solutions.
2.7.1 Social Welfare
To measure the benefit to society generated from recurrent pipeline investments, a social
value (G) is calculated as the product of discount factor J and the welfare per investment
cycle W ,
G (τ ∗, T ∗, cTP ) = J (τ
∗, T ∗, cTP ) ·W (τ
∗, T ∗, cTP ) (2.36)
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Table 2.2: Asset investment model as a system of five equations and five unknowns.
FOC
w.r.t.
Result of Lagrangian’s FOC





(τ ∗ + T ∗)
]
(2.31)
K γ∗ (τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, c∗TP ) = J (τ
∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) · e
−ρτ∗ · I ′ (K∗) (2.32)
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∗
· I (K∗) (2.35)
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[ρ (τ + T ) + 1]
]
.
W (2.37) is derived in Appendix D. It should be noted that the inputs to G (τ ∗, T ∗, cTP ) are
times τ ∗ and T ∗, resulting from the pipeline company investment optimization, and transport
charge cTP . When the latter (cTP ) is exogenous, times τ
∗ and T ∗ are endogenous results of
the 2 × 2 sub-system of equations comprising (2.33) and (2.34). On the other hand, when
cTP is endogenous, all three τ
∗, T ∗, and c∗TP are endogenous results of the 3× 3 sub-system
of equations comprising (2.33), (2.34), and (2.35). In this case the pipeline company not
only chooses time to investment τ ∗ and scale K∗ for optimization but also transport charge
c∗TP . Hence, when cTP is endogenous, the associated welfare W (τ
∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) is unique to
the c∗TP chosen by the pipeline company. When cTP is exogenous, a range of welfare values
W (τ ∗, T ∗, cTP ) is obtained as a function of the cTP domain.
2.8 Optimization Conditions
This section provides an economic interpretation for each of the FOCs shown in Table C.2.
First, (2.31) just shows
Optimization Condition #1 (OC#1): The optimum scale of expansion K∗ is big enough
to cover its own investment cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗) under conditions of excess capacity.
This result is not a surprise. If it were othewise, the definition of choice variable T would
be contradicted. Although the result in (2.31) may seem redundant, the introduction of K
as a separate choice variable allows to obtain the shadow value of capacity γ∗ (2.32) as the
FOC with respect to K. In turn, (2.31) is the FOC with respect to Lagrange multiplier γ.
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Next, (2.32) shows
Optimization Condition #2 (OC#2): The shadow value of expansion capacity must be
equal to the present value of all recurrent marginal costs of investment.
This is a result commonly found in the literature. For instance, Kamien and Schwartz (2012)
showed a similar result in the context of intertemporal optimization of continuous capital
stock investments with constant decay. Next, the result in (2.33) is analyzed. As (2.33) is
the FOC with respect to τ , (2.33) shows
Optimization Condition #3 (OC#3): At optimum start time τ ∗, the initial asset revenue
(c∗TP ·Qτ∗) must be equal to interest on investment [ρ · I (Qτ∗+T ∗)].
This result can be found in the literature in other forms. For instance, Cairns and Davis
(2007) formulated an optimal stopping rule that captures the same incentive to wait under
certainty to invest in a lumpy project until the project’s value is maximized. Using the
framework of the optimal stopping rule, (2.33) would be expressed as
c∗TP ·Qτ∗/I (K
∗) = ρ. (2.38)
In this context, the second-order condition for a maximum would require that
[c∗TP ·Qt /I (K
∗)] > ρ
just before reaching time τ ∗ and
[c∗TP ·Qt/I (K
∗)] < ρ
right after reaching time τ ∗. This condition means that the value of the investment would
be rising faster than the force of interest ρ before optimum start time τ ∗ is reached and,
subsequently, rising slower thereafter.
The review of the next two FOCs is not as straightforward as those introduced so far
because they require term substitution and, in the case of (2.34), a term-by-term analysis.
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Beginning with (2.34), the left hand side (LHS) is identified as the present value at cycle
initiation (taci) of all profits recurring every cycle. Because objective function F (2.22) has
the same definition but with present value calculated at absolute time zero (ta0), the LHS of
(2.34) can be related to F by the expression
eρ·
cTP




eρ(τ∗+T ∗) − 1
)
π∗. (2.39)
The exponent factor cTP
A
in (2.39) is simply taci, see (2.19). Thus, factor e
ρ·
cTP
A in (2.39) is
just shifting the time value of F from ta0 to t
a
ci. Continuing with the right hand side (RHS)
of (2.34), the term
c∗TP
ρ







in order to ease interpretation. Thus, by substituting (2.39) and (2.40) in (2.34), an equiva-
lent form of (2.34) is obtained in (2.41).
eρ·
cTP










− I ′ (K∗)
)
(2.41)
Each term on the RHS of (2.41) is now analyzed. First, the term in parenthesis (·) is the
difference between the average cost of capital expansion per unit of output at the time of
investment τ ∗ and the marginal cost of capital expansion. If the term Qτ∗ in (·) was K
∗
instead, the difference in (·) would measure the marginal decrease in cost of capital expansion
with respect to scale.54 Although substituting Qτ∗ back in (·) does not quite deliver the same
result, the difference in (·) still serves as a pseudo-measure of the same concept. Presumably,
the switch of Qτ∗ by K
∗ [= Qτ∗+T ∗ ] reflects the dynamic investment setting. Multiplying the
pseudo-measure in (·) by e−ρτ
∗
discounts it back to the time of cycle initiation taci, which is








. In this context, A/B is the increase in consumption by unit of time







is the discounted value of
54 Defining total-cost C (Q) as a function of output Q, the average cost is AC ≡ C (Q) /Q and marginal cost
is MC ≡ C ′ (Q). Defining [Q ·AC ′ (Q)] as a measure of marginal change of total-cost, such measure can
be expressed as a function of MC and AC as [Q ·AC ′ (Q)] = MC −AC. Because the term in parenthesis
in (2.41) is [AC −MC], the difference in (·) is referred to as the marginal decrease measure.
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the rate of consumption growth over time. After multiplying the inverse of this factor and
the two sides of (2.41), FOC (2.34) can be interpreted as
Optimization Condition #4 (OC#4): After accounting for time value, the value
of investment opportunity delivered on average by the rate of consumption growth is
equal to the marginal decrease in investment cost delivered by economies of scale.
OC#4 implies that increasing the scale of investment beyond that of condition (2.34) would
not increase the value of investment. This finding is unique to my customized model setup.





can be shown to be the inverse of elasticity of discount factor J∗ (τ ∗, T ∗, cTP ) with




, after substituting (D.19) from
Appendix D, or ∂J
∗
∂cTP
/J∗ = − ρ
A
. By defining the return on asset (ROA) per investment
cycle as ROA∗ = V
∗
e−ρτ∗ ·I(K∗)




1 + εJ∗, cTP
. (2.42)
Because (2.35) is the FOC with respect to transport charge cTP , (2.42) shows
Optimization Condition #5 (OC#5): The return on capacity expansion that max-
imizes the overall value of investment opportunity F is a function of the elasticity of
discount factor J∗ with respect to transport charge cTP .
This finding is also unique to my customized model setup.
55 (2.42) resembles the expression found by Nicholson and Snyder (2008) for the markup of price (p) over












2.9 Economies of Scale in Asset Investment
In this section, I coin the concept of economies of scale in asset investment. I begin by
introducing the prevailing definition of economies of scale in asset capacity. In a conventional
setting, economies of scale in asset capacity K exist as long as the average cost of capacity
AC (K) is greater than the marginal cost of capacity MC (K), or
AC (K) > MC (K) . (2.43)
This condition can be expressed using the terms of my model as
I (K∗)
K∗
> I ′ (K∗) . (2.44)
In turn, the following alike condition is implied by (2.41),56
I (K∗)
Qτ∗
> I ′ (K∗) . (2.45)
The distinction between (2.44) and (2.45) is the substitution of K∗ by Q∗τ in the denominator
of the fraction on the left hand side. Thus, unlike condition (2.44), condition (2.45) accounts
for the optimal timing of investment τ ∗. By analogy to (2.44), condition (2.45) construes
the concept of economies of scale in asset investment. In a conventional setting,
Economies of scale in asset capacity imply that at the margin an additional unit of asset
capacity reduces the average cost of the asset by unit of asset capacity.
On the other hand, based on Optimization Condition OC#4,
Economies of scale in asset investment imply that at the margin an additional unit of
asset capacity increases the value of investment opportunity delivered on average by the
rate of consumption growth.
56 Because the value of investment opportunity F must be positive, otherwise there wouldn’t be an invest-
ment, the term in parenthesis (·) in (2.41) must also be positive .
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Economies of scale in asset investment can be present even if economies of scale in asset










− I ′ (K∗)
]
. (2.46)
This means that optimum levels of asset investment can occur under both economies and dis-
economies of scale in asset capacity. This assertion, coupled with the concavity of the value of
investment opportunity F illustrated in Figure 2.6, supports the argument I provided in Sec-
tion 2.4: “a regular concavity of service value on transport rates may still occur for network
expansions in a dynamic setting – even if long-distance trunklines have static diseconomies of
scale in capacity.” This argument countered the statement made by Oliver (2015) indicated
in Section 2.4: “risk-averse pipeline customers facing uncertain use of transport services
would be less willing to commit to long-term contracts along long-distance trunklines.”
2.10 Illustrative Numerical Example
With transport charge cTP set exogenously, the 2×2 sub-system of equations comprising
(2.33) and (2.34) is solved numerically for the optimal timing of investment τ ∗ and the
optimal time of operation under excess capacity T ∗ using the following parameter values.
Demand parameters : A = 0.4 B = 1







Riskfree, discount rate : ρ = 10%
In this model, cTP ∈ (0, 10]. Appendix E includes the Matlab code solving τ
∗ and T ∗ using
the 2 × 2 sub-system of equations. Other results are obtained as a function of τ ∗, T ∗, and
cTP . Figure 2.2 illustrates the model output, τ
∗ and T ∗, and the span of investment cycle
(τ ∗ + T ∗) against cTP . The qualitative aspect of the results, rather than the actual numbers,
are of interest in this section. Because K∗ (2.31) is directly proportional to (τ ∗ + T ∗), both

















K∗ holds and, thus, (2.46) holds as well.
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Figure 2.2: Time to asset investment (τ) and operational time under excess capacity (T ).
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In Figure 2.2, as cTP increases from a lower limit (above zero)
58 to about one, τ ∗ decreases
rapidly while T ∗ increases at a similar rate. Past the first few units of cTP , optimal times τ
∗
and T ∗ continue their trends at a much slower rate, asymptotically reaching a plateau. The
mirror symmetry of the two curves overall suggests that the rates of change of τ ∗ and T ∗ with










. Past the first few units







symmetry makes the intersect of τ ∗ and T ∗, where τ ∗ = T ∗, a turning point for the span
of investment cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗). At low levels of cTP where τ
∗ > T ∗, the span of investment
cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗) becomes asymptotic to τ ∗. At higher levels of cTP where τ
∗ < T ∗, the span
of investment cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗) becomes asymptotic to T ∗. Numerically, past the intersect
point where τ ∗ = T ∗, the span of investment cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗) decreases from about 60 years
down to a plateau of approximately 55 years. Thus, the span of investment cycle is almost
constant once the threshold τ ∗ = T ∗ is reached.
2.11 Analysis of optimal decisions on time to investment and scale of capacity
expansion
The optimal time to investment τ ∗ and optimal scale of capacity expansion K∗, or op-
timal span of investment cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗), can be explained in economic terms based on the
results shown in Figure 2.2 and the dynamics of economies of scale under linear demand
growth introduced by Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. Figure 2.3 illustrates both the optimal
scale of capacity expansion per investment cycle K∗ and the corresponding initial ratio of
capacity utilization Qτ∗/K
∗ against transport charge cTP .
59 In turn, Figure 2.4 illustrates
total, average, and marginal costs of capital expansion as a function of K in the domain of
economies of scale – where marginal cost is below average cost. The responses of K∗ and
Qτ∗/K
∗ to changes in cTP are now described. Beginning with K
∗, Figure 2.3 shows that
58 Below the lower limit of cTP , no optimized decisions on scale or time to investment can make investment
recoverable. Because private optimum value F reaches zero before cTP does, the lower limit of cTP is
always above zero.
59 Figure 2.3 shows three vertical dashed lines corresponding to specific values of transport charge cTP . Once
Figure 2.6 is introduced, they will be described and become relevant.
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transport charge cTP .
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Figure 2.4: Total, average, and marginal investment cost.
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overall optimal scale (K∗) decreases as cTP increases. At low levels of cTP , where cTP < 1.0,
such optimal scale reduction is significant. Under economies of scale, scale reduction in-
creases the average cost of investment (See Figure 2.4). Hence, the average cost of optimal
investment [I (K∗) /K∗] increases as cTP increases. Economically, this means that
Large capital expansions with low average cost are needed to sustain low levels of trans-
port charge cTP . In turn, large capital expansions require long waiting times (τ
∗) to
attain a sufficient initial revenue that offsets the interest on large investments – meeting
OC#3 or (2.33). Evidently, the longer the time to investment τ ∗ the longer the period
of congestion. Thus, low levels of transport charge are associated with large capital
expansions and longer periods of congestion, i.e., ↓ cTP →↑ K
∗ → ↑ τ ∗.
Accordingly, Figure 2.3 shows that the initial ratio of capacity utilization Qτ∗/K
∗ moves
in tandem with scale K∗. This is the reason why optimal time to investment τ ∗ increases as
cTP decreases in Figure 2.2, i.e., ↓ cTP →↑ K
∗ → ↑ τ ∗.60 Getting back to the analysis of K∗,
at higher levels of cTP , Figure 2.3 shows that optimal scale K
∗ asymptotically approaches a
plateau of approximately 22 capacity units when cTP > 1.0. Thus, once a threshold of cTP
is reached, in this case cTP ≈ 1.0, the optimum level of expansion K
∗ does not change much
with cTP . In other words, K
∗ no longer responds to changes in cTP . This response of K
∗ to
cTP is a consequence of OC#4. In words,
Past a threshold of transport charge cTP , optimal scale K
∗ reaches a level where the
effect of the rate of consumption growth on the value of investment balances the effect
of economies of scale on the average cost of the investment. Once this level is reached,
60 While my model shows that the ability to choose transport rate (cTP ) induces the “regulated” monopoly
to reduce the delay of capacity expansions (↓ τ∗), Demichelis and Tarola (2006) found that the same choice
induces the monopoly to delay capacity expansions (↑ τ∗). The reason why the behavior of the economic
agent goes in opposite direction in regards to the timing of investment in these two cases is because the
monopoly agent in Demichelis and Tarola (2006)’s model benefits from the congestion markup while the
regulated monopoly in my model does not.
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optimal scale K∗ is not significantly responsive to changes in transport charge cTP . Thus,
high levels of transport charge cTP are associated to approximately the same levels of
capital expansion and periods of congestion, i.e., ↑ cTP → K
∗
→ τ ∗.
This is the reason why the span of investment cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗) is almost constant at high
levels of cTP in Figure 2.2. In turn, this constant level is sustained thanks to the rates of








2.12 Analysis of optimal transport charge cTP chosen by the regulated entity
To model cTP as a choice for the pipeline company, cTP is introduced endogenously
through OC#5. To analyze OC#5, Figure 2.5 shows discount factor J∗ (τ ∗, T ∗, cTP ) as a
function of exogenous transport charge cTP .
61 At low levels of cTP , discount factor J
∗
approaches one. At high levels of cTP , discount factor J
∗ approaches zero. These results
are anticipated because J∗ (2.23) is a function of the optimum span of investment cycle
(τ ∗ + T ∗) and transport charge cTP . As cTP goes to zero, (τ
∗ + T ∗) trends to infinity, making
both numerator and denominator in J∗ (2.23) equal to one and, thus, J∗ trends to one.
As cTP increases, the optimal span of investment cycle becomes constant (as described in
Section 2.11) and J∗ (2.23) changes with cTP only. Thus, as cTP increases J
∗ trends to zero.
Figure 2.5 also shows the elasticity factor
εJ∗,cTP
1+εJ∗,cTP
introduced in (2.42), which is a function
of J∗ and cTP . This elasticity factor has diagonal symmetry around the vertical axis where
cTP ≈ 4 and the horizontal axis where
εJ∗,cTP
1+εJ∗,cTP
≈ 1. As shown in Figure 2.5, the values
of this elasticity factor are positive in the first quadrant formed by the two aforementioned
axes and negative in the third quadrant. Because ROA∗ must be positive, otherwise there
wouldn’t be an investment, the elasticity factor must be positive to meet OC#5, or (2.42).
Thus, optimization under unregulated rates is only viable for transport charges above a
61 Figure 2.5 shows three vertical dashed lines corresponding to specific values of transport charge cTP . Once
Figure 2.6 is introduced, they will be described and become relevant.
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specific threshold (four in this numerical example). Unregulated rates would yield, not
surprisingly, an ROA∗ greater than 1.0 (See Figure 2.5).
2.13 Analysis of optimized private value F ∗ and social value G as a function of
transport charge cTP and introduction of a regulatory policy alternative
After analyzing the solutions τ ∗ and T ∗ in the 2 × 2 sub-system of equations and the
optimal choosing of cTP , the optimized private value (F
∗) and associated social value (W ) are
now examined. They are found as functions of τ ∗, T ∗, and cTP using F
∗ (τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, cTP )
in (2.22) coupled with K∗ (τ ∗, T ∗) in (2.31) and G (τ ∗, T ∗, cTP ) in (2.36), respectively.
Figure 2.6 shows the optimized private value F ∗ and associated social value W as a function
of transport charge cTP in the domain cTP ∈ (0, 10]. At the peak of the F
∗ curve, the
optimal transport charge c∗TP for the pipeline company is identified at approximately 4.8.
This is the same result obtained when c∗TP is treated as an endogenous variable using the
3× 3 sub-system of equations comprised of (2.33), (2.34), and (2.35). Appendix E includes
the Matlab code solving τ ∗, T ∗, and cTP
∗ using the 3 × 3 sub-system of equations. On
the other hand, at the peak of the G curve, the optimal transport charge c∗∗TP for society is
identified at approximately 1.3. As a reference, both c∗TP and c
∗∗
TP are indicated in Figure 2.6
(and other figures as applicable) using dashed vertical lines. As anticipated, the optimal
transport charge for the pipeline company and the optimal transport charge for society do
not match, i.e., (c∗TP > c
∗∗
TP ). If the regulator were to set a “fair” return equal to the risk-free






. At this level, shown in
Figure 2.6, the optimized private value is zero (F ∗ = 0). Nonetheless, this regulated charge










that is lower than
that reached by the private optimal charge c∗TP [G (τ
∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) ≈ 96]. In this case, the
regulator should favor the private optimal charge c∗TP over the “fair-return” charge c
F ∗=0
TP
and let the transport charge be unregulated. It should be noted that regulating a transport
charge lower than c∗TP can exceed the social value reached by unregulated transport charge
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Figure 2.6: Private value (F ∗) and social value (G).
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c∗TP .
62 In particular, there is a transport charge c∗∗∗TP (< c
∗
TP ) that can yield an increase
in social value (relative to that realized under unregulated charge c∗TP ) greater than the
amount needed to compensate the private value reduction for charging c∗∗∗TP (relative to that
realized under unregulated charge c∗TP ). This means that regulating rate c
∗∗∗
TP can yield a
Pareto improvement by means of a transfer payment aligning the private decisions of the
regulated firm closer to the social optimum. Such a transfer payment can be cut to the
pipeline company out of the increase in social welfare generated by the new regulated charge
c∗∗∗TP . By setting the transfer payment big enough to make the pipeline company indifferent
between the choices of charging c∗TP as an unregulated rate or charging c
∗∗∗
TP as a regulated
rate, the net gain to society (after transfer payment) is made positive.
Figure 2.6 is used now to illustrate how this regulatory policy alternative comes about.
Figure 2.6 shows that as transport charge decreases from c∗TP (≈ 4.8) social value G increases
more rapidly than optimal private value F ∗ decreases. Thus, the alternative transport charge






.63 In this way, the gains in social value (∆G) > 0
would be in excess of the reduction in private value (−∆F ∗) > 0 and the net difference
[∆G− (−∆F ∗)] is maximized. In the proposed regulatory policy alternative, while regulat-
ing charge c∗∗∗TP , the regulator could sustain the private value F
∗ by offsetting its reduction
(−∆F ∗) and still keep the net difference for society. c∗∗∗TP is now found using the results of
F ∗ and G shown in Figure 2.6. First, the marginal changes in private value F ∗ and social













illustrated in Figure 2.8 is found. The transport charge cTP where this sum
62 This observation is the analog in the context of dynamic investment planning of the analytical result
found by Callen et al. (1976). As indicated in Section 2.3.2, Callen et al. (1976) found in the context of a
static Averch-Johnson framework that the optimum allowable rate of return must be less than that which
an unregulated monopoly would earn.
63 Based on the envelope theorem, the expression dF
∗
dcTP
can be found analytically as ∂F
∗
∂cTP
. On the other
hand, an analytical expression for dGdcTP cannot be found because the envelope theorem does not apply and








Figure 2.7: Change in private value F ∗ and social value G with respect to transport charge
cTP .
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Figure 2.8: Sum of marginal changes in private value F ∗ and social value G with respect to









= 0, is where the net gain for society is maximized. In this case,
the transport charge under the regulatory policy alternative would be c∗∗∗TP ≈ 2.8 and the net
gain for society over that realized by the privately optimal charge (after compensating the
pipeline company) is ∆G − (−∆F ) ≈ 24 − 8 ≈ 16. Just as c∗TP and c
∗∗
TP , the alternative
charge c∗∗∗TP is also indicated in Figure 2.6 (and other figures as applicable) using a dashed
vertical line. In Figure 2.6, the increase in social value G realized by reducing the rate from
c∗TP down to c
∗∗∗
TP is greater than the corresponding decrease in optimized private value F
∗.
As a reference, Figure 2.9 illustrates the optimal asset capacity expansions over time
for each of the key transport charges discussed, i.e., c∗TP , c
∗∗
TP , and c
∗∗∗
TP , for the first three
investment cycles. Figure 2.9 shows that the optimal capacity expansion K(∗) for all three
key transport rates is approximately 22 NG units. In turn, Figure 2.4 shows that this level
of capacity expansion K(∗) falls in the range of economies of scale in capacity. It should be
noted that this just happens to be a result of this numerical example. Diseconomies of scale
in capacity could have as well resulted from optimal choices under a different quantitative
setting – see statement following the introduction of (2.46). The next section analyzes how
transport charge cTP affects private value F
∗ and social value G via investment decisions.
2.14 Analysis of how transport charge cTP affects private value F
∗ and social
value G
Changes in transport charge cTP affect private value in four ways. First, instantaneous
revenues Rt are positively correlated with cTP (Rt ∝ cTP ) because cTP is a direct input in
Rt ≡ cTP ·Qt. Second, instantaneous revenues Rt are negatively correlated with cTP indirectly
via market equilibrium of quantity demanded Qt: ↑ cTP → ↓ Qt (cTP )→ ↓ R. The net effect
of these two opposite effects on instantaneous revenues depends on the elasticity realized
at market equilibrium. Third, increasing transport charge cTP allows the pipeline company
to decrease the optimized span of investment cycle (τ ∗ + T ∗), which in turn decreases the
optimized scale of investment (K∗ = Qτ∗+T ∗). As described in Section 2.11, reducing scale
increases the average cost of investment per unit of expanded capacity [I (K) /K]. Thus, by
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transitivity, ↑ cTP → ↑ [I (K
∗) /K∗]. This effect occurs because higher levels of transport
charge cTP can produce enough revenue to support lower levels of economies of scale, or
higher average cost of investment per unit of expanded capacity. For the pipeline company,
the benefit of a lower scale of expansion is the reduction on the levels of excess capacity
reached in every investment cycle and, thus, the extension of the period of sales T . Fourth,
waiting for demand to grow and reach a higher level that can sustain a higher level of
transport charge cTP is counterbalanced by time value. The net effect from these dynamics
on optimized value F ∗ depends on the levels of transport charge cTP with respect to all other
input parameters. These dynamics are embedded in optimization conditions OC#1 through
OC#5, introduced in Section 2.8, to achieve the optimum private value F ∗ (See Figure 2.6).
On the other hand, changes in transport charge cTP affect social welfare in two ways. As
described in Section 2.11 and illustrated in Figure 2.2, increasing cTP reduces the time of
congestion τ ∗,64 which in turn increases welfare in the investment cycle. On the other hand,
as illustrated in Figure 2.1, increasing cTP reduces quantity demanded (Qt) under market
equilibrium, which in turn decreases welfare at any given time.65 The net effect of these two
opposite forces on overall social value depends on the level of transport charge. As illustrated
in Figure 2.6, for low levels of cTP , the effect of reducing congestion time τ dominates and
social value increases. Conversely, for high levels of cTP , the effect of reducing instant welfare
dominates and social value decreases.
What this all means is that changes in transport charge (cTP ) affect social value and
private value through different paths of cause and effect and to different degrees. Not sur-
prisingly, the transport charge that is optimal to a private investor (c∗TP ) differs from that
optimal to society (c∗∗TP ). As illustrated in Figure 2.6, reducing transport charge from the
64 While my model shows that the ability to choose (increase) transport rate (cTP ) induces the “regulated”
monopoly to reduce the delay of capacity expansions (↓ τ∗), Demichelis and Tarola (2006) found that the
same choice induces the monopoly to delay capacity expansions (↑ τ∗). The reason why the behavior of
the economic agent goes in opposite direction in regards to the timing of investment in these two cases is
because the monopoly agent in Demichelis and Tarola (2006)’s model benefits from the congestion markup
while the regulated monopoly in my model does not.
65 Decreasing cPT has the opposite effect of that stated in the two sentences prior.
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private optimum (c∗TP ) increases social value G because at this level the effect of increasing
instant welfare dominates over the effect of delaying the investment. On the other hand,






increases social value G be-
cause at this level the effect of reducing the delay of investment dominates over the effect
of decreasing instant welfare. As anticipated, the return that maximizes social welfare in a
regulated market is not necessarily the same as the “fair” return expected in a truly inte-
grated competitive market. Thus, regulating a natural monopoly to achieve optimal social
efficiency is not an easy task. In fact, the current regulatory policy does address the down-
side of congestion to some extent because regulating a steady (fixed) rate removes congestion
markup out of the pipeline company incentives. Demichelis and Tarola (2006) found that
periods of congestion can be anticipated to be longer under an unregulated monopoly envi-
ronment where the firm benefits from congestion markup. Under a regulated environment,
my findings show that periods of congestion are shorter when the regulated rate is fixed but
the level itself is unregulated. In this case, however, congestion still inflicts a cost to society
that is still not properly feedback to the pipeline company. In other words, there is still a
social cost of congestion that is not internalized by the regulated private decision maker.
Such social cost may be higher when a “fair” return is required than when it is not because
when the regulated monopoly reaches an optimal private return on its own (by choosing
its own steady rate level) the social cost of congestion is mitigated. Under this private op-
timum, however, the pendulum swings too far the other way reducing instant welfare and
negatively impacting social welfare. The proposed regulatory policy alternative introduced
in Section 2.13 uses a transfer payment to induce the private decision maker to cut back on
transport charge cTP improving welfare back towards the optimum and delivering a Pareto
improvement over the unregulated rate option.
2.15 Conclusions
Even as congestion introduced by delayed investments can have enormous welfare costs
(Guthrie, 2006), this issue has not received much attention in the literature of regulated nat-
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ural gas transmission. Overall, cost-minimizing models and static models (even if they are
profit maximizing) cannot address the issue of congestion. Dynamic models that account for
scale and timing of investment, rather than long-run static models, are required to address
delayed investments inducing congestion. According to Evans and Guthrie (2012), however,
these models are rare in the literature. To endogenize congestion, it is necessary to capture
the nature of lumpy asset investments, their inherent economies of scale,66 transport demand
growth, and investment timing decisions. These features are the sources of recurring con-
gestion in lumpy asset investments and, thus, they are fundamental to the characterization
of congestion. By introducing these features in a customized asset investment model, my
research captures congestion as a result of the option to delay investment of lumpy assets
(or the real option to wait) exercised by capital investors.67
In my model, a regulated pipeline company chooses the scale K and timing τ of a natural
gas pipeline investment and subsequent expansions to maximize a return on the asset (ROA).
The regulated rate schedule consists of a single transport charge (cTP ) per unit of service
that is enforced over time, i.e., a steady single transport charge. Two specific environments
are evaluated in the model. Under the first environment, the regulated firm chooses the
level of the steady rate. Although the firm is regulated to charge a steady rate, the level of
the rate itself is unregulated. This environment is referred to as the “unregulated (steady)
rate” case. In this case, cTP is a choice variable to the profit-maximizing firm and, thus, an
endogenous result of the model. Under the second environment, the regulator chooses the
level of the steady rate. This environment is referred to as the “regulated (steady) rate”
case. In this case, cTP is exogenous to the decisions of the regulated firm and, thus, cTP is
exogenous to the model. My asset investment model is both dynamic and deterministic. The
model is dynamic to introduce timing decisions influenced by the irreversible nature of the
asset investment. The model is deterministic to better accommodate the characterization of
66According to Guthrie (2006), the existing literature on the link between regulation and investment is
largely silent on the effect of economies of scale.
67 Cairns and Davis (2007) define lumpy investment as “a capital expenditure that extinguishes the option
to invest at a later date for either economic or technical reasons.”
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a lumpy asset investment. The regulated pipeline company faces a linear demand that grows
arithmetically over time. These assumptions on demand produce repetitive investment cycles
with identical conditions that simplify the model setup. The model comprises the following
five optimization conditions (OCs).68
1. The optimum scale of expansion K∗ is big enough to cover its own investment cycle
(τ ∗ + T ∗) under conditions of excess capacity.
2. The shadow value of expansion capacity must be equal to the present value of all
recurrent marginal costs of investment.
3. At optimum start time τ ∗ , the initial instant asset revenue (c∗TP ·Qτ∗) must be equal
to the instant interest on investment [ρ · I (Qτ∗+T ∗)].
4. After accounting for time value, the value of investment opportunity delivered on aver-
age by the rate of consumption growth is equal to the marginal decrease in investment
delivered by economies of scale.
5. The return on capacity expansion that maximizes the overall value of investment op-
portunity F is a function of the elasticity of discount factor J∗ with respect to transport
charge cTP .
OC#1 was anticipated under my model formulation. OC#2 and OC#3 are results com-
monly found in the literature. OC#4 and OC#5 are unique to my customized model setup.
OC#4 captures the effects of linear demand growth and economies of scale on investment
decisions. OC#5 applies when rate cTP is a choice variable to the profit-maximizing firm
and, thus, an endogenous result of the model, i.e., the unregulated (steady) rate case. OC#5
implies that optimum levels of asset investment can occur under both economies and dis-
economies of scale in asset capacity. Based on a numerical analyses of the five optimality
68 These five optimization conditions are framed in Section 2.8.
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conditions, the following conclusions about optimal decisions on time to investment and scale
of capacity expansion in relation to the level of rate cTP were reached.
69
1. Large capital expansions with low average cost are needed to sustain low levels of
transport charge cTP . In turn, large capital expansions require long waiting times (τ
∗)
to attain a sufficient initial revenue that offsets the interest on large investments, i.e.,
meeting OC#3 or (2.33). Evidently, the longer the time to investment τ ∗ the longer
the period of congestion. Thus, low levels of transport charge are associated with large
capital expansions and longer periods of congestion, i.e., ↓ cTP →↑ K
∗ → ↑ τ ∗
2. Past a threshold of transport charge cTP , optimal scale K
∗ reaches a level where the
effect of the rate of consumption growth on the value of investment balances the effect
of economies of scale on the average cost of the investment. Once this level is reached,
optimal scale K∗ is not significantly responsive to changes in transport charge cTP .
Thus, high levels of transport charge cTP are associated to approximately the same
levels of capital expansion and periods of congestion, i.e., ↑ cTP → K
∗
→ τ ∗.
These optimal decisions made by the regulated natural monopoly on the basis of the
regulated level of transport charge cTP have an effect on the optimized private value F
∗ and
the corresponding social value G. Section 2.14 describes these effects and shows that regu-
lating lumpy asset investments in natural monopoly environments with average cost pricing
can introduce congestion as a negative externality. To address congestion, an alternative
ratemaking policy is proposed to improve economic efficiency. This policy consists of regu-
lating an alternative (steady) rate c∗∗∗TP , lower than an unregulated private optimum (steady)
rate c∗TP , that increases social value (relative to that achieved by c
∗
TP ) up to a level where
the marginal social value gain is equal to the marginal private value reduction (both margins
achieved as cTP is reduced). In addition, a transfer payment is made to the pipeline company
out of the increase in social welfare generated by the new regulated charge c∗∗∗TP to achieve a
69 These two conclusions are framed in Section 2.11.
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Pareto improvement. This transfer payment would make the pipeline company indifferent
between the choices of charging c∗TP as an unregulated rate or charging c
∗∗∗
TP as a regulated
rate. To implement my enhanced ratemaking policy, a negotiated rate schedule needs to
be designed in order to introduce the correct incentives to arrive at the right arrangement
of unregulated level of transportation charge c∗∗∗TP and transfer payment. The latter can be
presented in the form of a subsidy for asset development.
Future research can quantify the effects of the elasticity of transport demand and those
originating from economies of scale on the responses of the regulated firm upon different
levels of transportation rates cTP . A model parameterization characterizing actual pipeline
projects such as the Rockies Express Pipeline (REX) and other interstate trunklines can be
used for this purpose.
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CHAPTER 3
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON U.S. NATURAL GAS PRICES AFTER
OPEN ACCESS TO PIPELINES
This chapter provides a comprehensive methodical analysis of the structural economic
effects on U.S. natural gas prices resulting from open access to pipelines. The analysis is
motivated by the changes introduced by Order 636 (the open-access rule) and the ensuing
evolvement of the U.S. natural gas industry. To conduct the analysis, the U.S. natural gas
market structure before and after Order 636 is contrasted using models formulated as lin-
ear complementarity problems. Using my framework of analysis, I synthesize the literature
encompassing econometric and structural studies with a focus on the open-access rule. As-
suming the effects of a larger pool of suppliers dominate, the market impact on a region after
open access can be diagnosed based on observed changes in price and exchange categorization
of the region.
3.1 Introduction
The transformation of the U.S. natural gas industry achieved by the relaxation of regu-
lations, enabling market competition and allowing open access to pipelines since the early-
1990s, has been remarkable on many accounts. The effects of these regulatory changes have
continued to garner a lot of attention from industry analysts and economic researchers.
These effects, or those of any other policy, can generally be examined econometrically at
the market level or structurally at the system level. At the market level, numerous authors
have examined the degree of market integration achieved after open access using econometric
models of prices. On the other hand, at the system level, the examination of effects using
structural economic models has been scant at best and disconnected. This research aims to
fill this gap by providing a comprehensive methodical analysis of the structural economic
effects on U.S. natural gas prices resulting from open access to pipelines. For this purpose,
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this research builds market equilibrium models reflective of the natural gas market structure
before and after open access for contrast. These equilibrium models are formulated as lin-
ear complementarity problems. Using my framework of analysis, I synthesize the literature
encompassing econometric and structural studies with a focus on the open-access rule.
In this chapter, Section 3.2 begins with a recount of the regulatory steps taken by the
U.S. Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), also referred to as
the Commission, to restructure the U.S. natural gas industry. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 provide an
overview of econometric and structural analyses found to be mainstays in the literature and
also relevant for subsequent model building and analyses in this chapter. Section 3.5 describes
the market structure and economic context reflected before and after Order 636. Sections 3.6
through 3.10 build the linear complementarity models representative of the market structure
before and after open access while providing pertinent complementarity analyses. Section
3.11 identifies the direct and indirect changes introduced by Order 636 (the open-access rule)
and the structural economic effects on U.S. natural gas prices resulting from them. Section
3.12 concludes.
3.2 Restructure of the U.S. Natural Gas Industry
Generally, a series of regulatory steps set in motion by the Natural Gas Act of 1978 and
leading to Order 636 of 1992 provided the grounds for the most significant restructuring of
the U.S. natural gas industry in recent times. Each regulatory step was a logical outgrowth
of changes in both industry and regulation. The subsection that follows recounts these steps
based on a comprehensive review of the following sources: FERC (1992), FERC (2008),
Sturm (1997), and Cochrane (2017).
3.2.1 Regulatory Steps to Open Access
The base of this historical regulatory review is set in the 1970s when both production
and distribution sales were regulated. At the time, the regulatory environment reflected
the legacy of the Phillips decision of 1954, which had set a cap on production prices to
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address the substantial growth in industrial demand for gas after World War II. However,
this legacy decision resulted in interstate natural gas shortages in the 1970s. Addressing this
issue, the Natural Gas Act of 1978 removed the cap and introduced a preset pricing formula
to incentivize production. The preset formula augmented production as intended. The
exploration and development (E&P) segment benefitted from preset prices but eventually
the market became oversupplied. Consequently, preset prices reached artificial levels above
market clearing prices. In anticipation of this issue, the Natural Gas Act of 1978 had outlined
the need to restructure the distribution and sales segment through “open-access” to the
market areas. This issue was not addressed until the enactment of Order 436 and Order 500
in the mid-1980s. Order 436 of 1985 provided the blueprint to implement “open access.” In
turn, Order 500 of 1987 addressed take-or-pay cost recovery issues that remained after Order
436. In particular, Order 500 created a mechanism for pipeline companies to shift some of
their liability under long-term contracts to producers, consumers, and downstream pipelines.
Back to the main order, Order 436 allowed (but did not require) producers and end users
to enter into contracts with the pipelines to obtain capacity on transmission systems for
their own use. This change led to the development of various transportation tariff structures
by the pipelines, which identified different levels of transportation service. In particular,
firm and interruptible transmission services were created, which are still in use nowadays.
Interruptible services are consider inferior as they can be, as the name implies, interrupted
in favor of firm services when capacity constrains.70 Besides Order 500, other regulatory
adjustments were also introduced before a full rollout of “open access.” One key adjustment
was the Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, which removed all regulation of first sales of gas.
This Act removed the preset price that had been formerly set to incentivize production by
the Natural Gas Act of 1978. Thus, at the turn of the 1990s, the stage was finally ready for
the roll out of the “open access” rule. Enacted in 1992, Order 636 outlined the “unbundling”
of services provided by interstate pipelines. This meant separating transportation and sales
70 “Interruptible service allows the shipper to move a specified volume of gas within a specified time period,
but the actual timing is at the discretion of the pipeline company.” (Oliver et al., 2014)
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services back to the wellhead. Thus, if a pipeline wanted to continue to sell gas, it had
to sell it in the production region, in competition with other suppliers, and then receive
transportation on its own pipeline on the same basis as its customers. As a practical result,
pipelines generally decided to leave the sales business (Cochrane, 2017). Order 636 also
required pipelines to redesign their transportation rates so that fixed (capital) costs would
be recovered through a monthly reservation fee and variable (usage) costs would be recovered
through a fee charged on the natural gas actually transported each month (Cochrane, 2017).
Although the linchpin of Order 636 was the requirement to unbundle transportation and
storage services from their sale services, Order 636 also adopted a comprehensive capacity
release program to increase the availability of unbundled firm transportation capacity by
permitting firm shippers to release their capacity to others when not in use (FERC, 2008). In
other words, the Commission allowed market-based pricing for short-term capacity releases.
The Commission reasoned that the capacity release program would promote efficient load
management by the pipeline and its customers and would, therefore, result in the efficient
use of firm pipeline capacity throughout the year. Because the secondary market for released
capacity was not deemed competitive, the Commission imposed a ceiling on the rate that the
releasing shipper could charge for the released capacity.71 The Commission recognized that
significant benefits could be realized through removal of the price ceiling in a competitive
secondary market.72 Thus, Order 712 was enacted in 2008 to remove, on a permanent basis,
the rate ceiling on capacity release transactions of one year or less.
3.3 Econometric Analyses
Econometric analyses on the effects of the open-access rule (Order 636) generally focused
on either price levels or market integration. The latter subject got most of the attention
given the concurrent development of cointegration techniques in the econometric literature at
71 This ceiling was derived from the Commission-approved monthly maximum tariff rates, necessary for the
pipeline to recover its annual cost-of-service revenue requirement (FERC, 2008).
72 Removal of the ceiling permits more efficient capacity utilization by permitting prices to rise to market
clearing levels and by permitting those who place the highest value on the capacity to obtain it.
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the time, including the Engle-Granger two-step method (1987)73 and the Johansen method
(1988), among others. In principle, the more integrated the market is (as a result of open
access) the greater the number of cointegrated relations across market hubs.
On price level analyses, Hollas (1999) tests for the effect of the open-access policy on
customers’ gas rates. Hollas uses an econometric model that at its core related the price of
gas by customer group to gas consumption by customer group. This core specification in
and of itself controlled for any effects of declining block rate pricing. Other variables were
included to control for variations in costs of inputs, complementary and substitute fuels,
regulatory and non-regulatory issues, state characteristics, and others. Hollas uses data
available for 33 privately owned natural gas distribution utilities over the period 1975-94.
This sample provided 660 observations. Hollas finds that prices for industrial customers
fell by approximately 9.4% during the period 1992-94 (after open access) compared to the
1975-77 period (before open access steps began). Hollas also finds that the open-access
policy appeared to have lowered industrial prices relative to residential and commercial
prices. According to Hollas, residential customers did not have ready access to alternative
suppliers and bore the burden from utility loss of industrial customers. Industrial customers
would get direct connection to interstate pipelines (bypass), which resulted in higher rates
for remaining customers as there was less volume over which to spread costs.
On market integration analyses, Cuddington and Wang (2006) test for unit roots on
the price spreads of all possible pairs formed across 76 pricing locations (pairwise testing).
Based on the law of one price, paired locations were hypothesized to be integrated as long as
unit roots were not present.74 If integrated, the basis differential (locational price difference
between markets) would be stationary and reflect transportation costs. After aggregating
these results within and across regions, Cuddington and Wang conclude that a single national
market has not been completely realized. Instead, Cuddington and Wang indicate that there
73 Engle and Granger (1987) formalized the cointegrating vector approach and coined the term “conintegra-
tion.”
74 In principle, if markets are integrated then the price series at each location share the same unit root
process, which gets eliminated by the price spread (price difference).
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is a collection of markets highly or somewhat integrated in the U.S.: “The East and Central
regions form a highly integrated market, but this market is quite segmented from the more
loosely integrated Western market (Cuddington and Wang, 2006).”
In contrast to the results found by Cuddington and Wang, and other earlier results
in the literature like those of De Vany and Walls (1994), Avalos et al. (2016) find that
the Southern California and Rockies markets were integrated with the national market.
Avalos et al. test for cointegration using data from 14 market points. Avalos et al. also
examine the effects of binding pipeline constraints. According to Avalos et al., “industry
analysts and academic researches have often attributed breakdowns in market integration
and divergent prices to binding pipeline capacity between particular hubs.” This means
that the absence of cointegrated prices between particular markets can be attributed to
either a lack of arbitrage paths (market integration) or binding capacity constraints. On
binding capacity constraints, Brown and Yücel (2008) find that the U.S. natural gas market
transitioned from a system with plentiful pipeline capacity to one with tightened capacity
after the mid-1990s.75 Thus, cointegration analyses of prices alone is not sufficient to evaluate
the immediate effect of the open-access policy on market integration due to a legacy stock
of capital that was capacity binding after the open-access rule. Structural analyses are
necessary to complete the picture by detailing the market effects that can be anticipated
after open access to pipelines. Generally, structural analyses facilitate deductive reasoning
leading to insights that may not be apparent from empirical observations. On the other
hand, econometric studies are inductive in nature and, thus, limited to the validation of
known premises.
3.4 Structural Analyses
Cremer et al. (2003) build two structural frameworks for gas transportation analyses,
each addressing spatial and temporal dimensions separately. They use these frameworks
75 According to Brown and Yücel (2008), natural gas consumption was propelled by the rapid growth of its
use in electric power generation, which was driven by the regulatory changes leading to open access and
the emergence of new technology.
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to introduce Ramsey pricing to natural gas transportation services while accounting for
transport capacity constraints.76 On the spatial dimension, Cremer et al. model the optimal
spatial allocation of flows in a gas network under long-term static conditions. This model
is now briefly described as it provides some of the foundational elements of my own model
introduced in the next section. In Cremer et al.’s model, the network consists of two parallel
lines connecting one supply node (producer) and one demand node (consumer). Flow can
go between the two nodes through either one of the two unidirectional lines. The capacity
of one of the lines is capped (constrained) while the other one is not.77 Transport costs are
proportional to the flow through each line. In turn, each line has its own constant marginal
cost of transport. A cost function describes the producer’s technology. A demand function
describes the consumer’s benefit. A social planner operating the network is modeled to
determine the market equilibrium under perfect competition. The objective of the social
planner is to maximize social welfare subject to the network configuration, the network
flow balance, and the (limited) pipeline capacity. Social welfare is the sum of consumer
surplus, producer surplus, and marketer surplus minus fixed cost. The latter is the annualized
capacity cost of the capacity-capped line. The Lagrangian method solves the long-term static
formulation. The model is solved under first-best and second-best pricing policies. Under
the first-best pricing policy, the social planner maximizes social welfare with no explicit
constraints other than pipeline capacity. Under the second-best pricing policy, a lower bound
on profit (constraint) is introduced to ensure the recovery of the pipeline investment. The
solution to this second-best pricing policy yields a Ramsey surcharge,78 which addresses the
profit constraint (or implementability constraint). Cremer et al. (2003) find that efficient
transport charges must compensate for the marginal cost of transport, the shadow value of
76 Ramsey pricing is a policy rule concerning what price a monopolist should set to maximize social welfare
subject to a constraint on profit. Ramsey pricing was made famous by Boiteux’s seminal contribution to
electricity pricing, which came to be known as Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. It was later used to price access to
telecommunication infrastructure. Ramsey pricing is also applicable to optimal taxation of commodities.
77 The model introduced by Cremer et al. (2003) actually includes a third node that splits up the line that
is not capped on capacity into two segments. However, the simplified version described here suffices the
illustration of their work.
78 The Ramsey surcharge is a function of the shadow value associated with the profit constraint.
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capacity due to congestion, and the aforementioned Ramsey surcharge.79
On the temporal dimension, Cremer et al. model the optimal inter-temporal allocation
of flows in a single pipeline over a discrete number of periods of time t. Their model is
described next to provide context to the subject of secondary markets for capacity releases.
The pipeline connects one supply node (producer) and one demand node (consumer). The
pipeline has a constant transport capacity K that can be binding (or not) over time. Con-
sumer benefit is time dependent and expressed as CBt (dt), where dt is quantity demanded.
Inverse demand is the derivative of consumer benefit, or pdt (dt) = CB
′
t (dt). Price at pro-
duction node is constant and equal to ps. The short-run marginal cost of transportation
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The first two terms in (3.2) capture the net social pay-off derived from transportation
services, i.e., sum of consumer surpluses over time
∑
t [ · ] minus cost of capital C (K). Note
that (3.2) ignores time value (no discount rate) as the inter-temporal allocation covers a
short-term operational horizon and not a long-term investment horizon. The next term in
(3.2) captures the capacity constraints over time and introduces the shadow value of capacity
ηt for each time period t. The last term in (3.2) represents the lower-bound profit constraint,
requiring operational revenues to offset cost of capital, and introduces the Lagrange multiplier
λ associated to the profit constraint. The solution to (3.1) yields the social planner optimum
79 The Ramsey surcharge applies under second-best policy, i.e., ensuring the recovery of long-term pipeline
investment.
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and, thus, the efficient market equilibrium price p∗t at any time t,
p∗t = (p










where εdt is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand in period t. Under this formulation,




= C ′ (K∗) . (3.4)
In (3.4), Lagrange multiplier λ adjusts the shadow value of capacity ηt. Evidently, the
shadow value of capacity ηt is greater than zero when full capacity is reached in any period
t. To decentralize efficient price (3.3), Cremer et al. propose to sell capacity (ex-ante) over














In turn, Cremer et al. use these results to address the issue of efficient pricing on sec-
ondary markets for capacity. Based on a pricing schedule for gas transportation consisting
of secondary-market capacity charges τKt and quantity charges τ
Q
t (3.6), they propose that












= C ′ (K∗) . (3.8)
80 Although (3.4) and (2.32) are both optimality conditions driven by scale of capacity, they reflect different
formulations and planning horizons. (3.4) is the result of an intertemporal allocation of flows over a short-
term operational horizon. On the other hand, (2.32) is the result of intertemporal decisions on capital
expansions over a long-term investment horizon. While (2.32) accounts for decisions on scale and timing
of lumpy asset investments and, thus, incorporates time value, (3.4) does not. In other words, (2.32) is
the result of a long-term dynamic framework of capital investment. On the other hand, (3.4) is the result
of a short-term static framework of capital usage.
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Cremer et al. summarize this proposition addressing efficient pricing on primary and sec-
ondary markets for capacity as
“Proposition 6 : The optimal allocation can be decentralized with transportation charges
equal to the (short-run) marginal cost of transportation plus a Ramsey term (if any),
supplemented by an ex-ante sale of capacities priced at marginal cost, followed by com-
petitive secondary markets.” (Cremer et al., 2003)
The temporal framework built by Cremer et al. is particularly useful to analyze secondary
markets for natural gas transmission capacity. As a case in point, Oliver et al. (2014) build a
model for that purpose by integrating elements of the spatial and intertemporal frameworks
introduced by Cremer et al. (2003). Specifically, Oliver et al. build a structural system of
a simple two-hub, one-pipeline network to investigate the influence of pipeline congestion
on natural gas spot prices via secondary markets for transmission capacity. A brief review
of Oliver et al.’s model is now in order to provide context to the findings later introduced.
In their model, a simple pipeline connects two hubs. In turn, each hub is connected to an
end-user market by a separate pipeline. In addition, there is a storage facility at each hub.
Thus, the network comprises two hubs, three pipelines, two storage facilities, and two end-
user markets. The short-run static equilibrium model comprises the following three sets of
agents:
1. Firm-capacity contract owners who exploit the secondary market;
2. Consumers in each end-user market who purchase the gas commodity through their
adjacent hubs; and
3. Two groups of producers where each group is supplying one designated hub.
In this model, consumption is endogenous and production is exogenous. In addition,
prices at the two end-user markets are exogenous. The interaction of the three sets of agents
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determines equilibrium prices at the two hubs, secondary-market capacity values τKij for each
pipeline ij, flows xij through each pipeline ij, and the change in inventory levels by storage
facility. Although the secondary-market value of capacity τKij is a function of the shadow
value of capacity that results from intertemporal decisions, as shown in (3.5) under Cremer
et al.’s intertemporal framework, Oliver et al. introduce τKij to the static model by defining







Available capacity kaij is estimated using the expression k
a
ij = Kij − xij where Kij is total




is the modeling feature that captures
the core of the theory presented by Oliver et al. (2014). Oliver et al. extend the static
model to incorporate dynamic operational decisions. The extended model focused on the
pipeline connecting the two hubs and the storage available at the hubs only. In the extended
model, there are a total of N exogenous gas shipping requirements between the hubs. For
each shipping requirement n, the amount to be shipped is qn. Each pipeline user n can
choose a time tn to begin shipping and an amount kn of allocated firm capacity. Thus, the
span of shipment time Ln is Ln = qn/kn. If the pipeline user decided to ship during peak
times, it would pay a high firm-capacity charge τK [ka ( tn)]. This charge is a function of
available capacity ka, which is in turn a function of the start time tn of shipping. To avoid
peak times, the pipeline user can instead pay to store (park) the shipping amount qn at the
storage located either upstream or downstream of the bottleneck. Thus, the total cost of
transport TCn for a given shipment n is
TCn = τ
K [ka ( tn)] · qn + SC
up
n (ts) · qn + SC
down
n [T − (Ln + tn)] · qn, (3.9)
where SC (δ) is the unit cost of storage (up or downstream) as a function of storage time
δ, T is the planning horizon of operation, Ln is the shipment time, and tn is the start time
of shipment.81 According to Oliver et al., storage allows pipeline users to avoid shipping
when available transmission capacity is scarce and, thus, the temporary cost of congestion
81 Both notation and terms of equations re-stated from Oliver et al. (2014) have been modified to ease
presentation in this review.
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is highest. Pipeline users can instead withdraw from storage and ship once congestion eases
and capacity costs decline. Oliver et al. tested empirically these analytical predictions on a
two-hub interconnected system in the Rocky Mountain region. The econometric model was
specified as a seven-equation system, which was solved using three-stage least squares (3SLS).
The seven endogenous variables in the model included the natural logs of prices at the Opal
and Cheyenne hubs, the basis differential, aggregate scheduled volumes between the hubs and
their corresponding markets, and the net change in storage at Clay Basin. The explanatory
variables for each equation were chosen based on geographical location. Exogenous variables
included operational capacities, anchor prices at end-user markets, statewide productions and
consumptions in the Rocky Mountain Region, and others. The econometric results show that
as the pipeline between the two hubs becomes congested, the basis differential between their
spot prices widens. The results also confirm that the availability of storage mitigates the
price effects of congestion through the intertemporal substitution of transmission services.
In the operations research (OR) literature, Steven A. Gabriel has extensively modeled
the interaction of market agents in natural gas systems, among other systems, using com-
plementarity theory. Gabriel and Smeers (2006) provides a survey of models used by the
natural gas industry in North America and Europe. Of particular interest for modeling
purposes, Gabriel and Smeers (2006) and Gabriel et al. (2005a) describe the basic com-
ponents of Gabriel’s own complementarity models, which are the basis of my own model.
Gabriel’s work typically focuses on practical industry analyses based on elaborate and large
complementarity models of actual natural gas systems in North America and Europe. For
instance, Egging et al. (2008) present a detailed and comprehensive complementarity model
for computing market equilibrium in the European natural gas system. They run this model
on several case studies highlighting the model capabilities, including a simulation of a dis-
ruption of Russian supplies via Ukraine. In North America, Gabriel et al. (2005b) evaluate
the potential market power held by marketers after the introduction of the open-access rule.
By modeling marketers as Nash-Cournot players, they find that the potential for such mar-
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ket power exists based on numerical results but the effects vary by sector as well as other
conditions such as production capacity levels. Gabriel’s academic work focuses on the OR
interest of introducing novel modeling and proving the existence and uniqueness of modeling
results – see, for instance, Zhuang and Gabriel (2008). Gabriel’s contribution to the liter-
ature on algorithm development for modeling natural gas infrastructure using optimization
and equilibrium/game theory models is remarkable.
Last but not least, I now revisit an initial stream on the economics of spatial equilibrium
provided by Samuelson (1952). His work provides insights into the competitive equilibrium of
prices in interconnected markets. Samuelson begins by modeling two spatially separate mar-
kets. For this simple model, he solves market equilibrium graphically using the excess supply
from each market and the transportation costs between them. Excess supply is calculated
as the lateral difference between local supply and local demand functions. The two-locality
case provides a rich introduction to economic concepts in spatial price equilibrium. Samuel-
son then moves onto a general case of n regions. In this case, a social pay-off for every
region is defined in terms of the area under the excess-demand or excess-supply function.
The net social pay-off (NSP) for all regions is the sum of all the separate pay-offs by region
minus the total transport costs of all the shipments. By maximizing NSP, Samuelson finds
that the difference between the excess supplies of interconnected regions must be equal to
transportation costs. This result is the analog of my result on basis differential presented in
Section 3.8.6. This and other of Samuelson’s results related to my own findings are noted
throughout this chapter.
3.5 Market Structures Before and After Order 636
This section describes the market structure and economic context reflected before and
after Order 636, which are in turn used in Sections 3.7 and 3.8 to build my closed transport
access (CTA) model and open transport access (OTA) model, respectively. To describe the
market structure before Order 636 (1992), the prevailing Order 436 (1985) and Wellhead
Decontrol Act (1989) need to be analyzed first. Before Order 436 (1985), the interstate
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chain of distribution of natural gas was regulated from wellhead to market under a public
utility model (FERC, 1992). Producers would sell natural gas in the production area to
interstate pipelines at regulated “just and fare” rates. Pipelines would in turn transport
their purchased gas and their own production to the city gate for sale to local distribution
companies (LDCs) at regulated rates which recovered both the pipelines’ cost of gas and “just
and fare” cost of transmission. At the city gate, prices bundled the pipelines’ gas supply and
transmission costs. In 1985, Order 436 introduced a business option for market participants.
Order 436 allowed (but did not require) interstate pipelines to offer transportation service
on an open-access basis. In this way, LDC customers could buy gas directly from producers
and have the pipeline transport it to their city gate (Cochrane, 2017). Thus, Order 436
changed the role of pipelines from primarily merchants of natural gas in the distribution
area to both merchants of natural gas and non-discriminatory transporters of natural gas
owned by others. However, producer sales to LDCs or end users in the production area with
the pipeline providing transportation only were rare (FERC, 1992). Thus, even after Order
436, merchant and transportation roles continued to be vertically integrated by pipelines.
On the other hand, the production role was excluded from this vertical integration because
there was no incentive. According to Dahl and Matson (1998), pipeline companies were
discouraged from owning affiliated production companies as a result of the treatment of gas
acquisition costs in the structuring of rates.82
There is still one more regulation to account for before Order 636. After the Wellhead
Decontrol Act (1989), the producer market became competitive. Yet this change did not
affect the market structure because the concentrated control of the channels of distribution
still conferred to the pipeline companies an strategic advantage that allowed them to extend a
dominant position into both production and distribution segments. According to a report by
82 “Gas purchased from others was recognized at cost or the price paid. However, affiliated companies were
regulated on the same basis as the pipeline company: original cost of capital and a regulated rate of return.
Therefore, the scarcity rents arising from the difference between market price and cost of production were
unavailable to affiliated producers. Vertical integration was therefore either discouraged by regulation or
prohibited by law.” (Dahl and Matson, 1998)
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the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cited by FERC (1992), “whoever controls the channels
by which a product is marketed controls the market so far as the supply is concerned.” Thus,
even if pipeline companies were not vertically integrated upstream on a contractual basis,
they acted on a transactional basis as if they were. This is why the roles of trader and
transporter can in effect be bundled with the role of producer to reflect the market structure
before Order 636 in the CTA model. This modeling structure is favored as it simplifies the
presentation of the CTA model without affecting results.
After Order 636 (1992), LDCs and end users could more easily buy natural gas directly
from producers because the transportation service was separate from the sale of the gas com-
modity: natural gas marketers entered the industry as new entities to develop the marketing
segment. Thus, after Order 636, the former vertical integration was unbundled and the new
market structure on the supply side comprised three separate agents: producer, marketer,
and transporter. These are the same three active agents reflected in the OTA model.
3.6 Introduction to LCP Models
In Sections 3.7 and 3.8, I build two models, each capturing the market structure before
and after the open-access rule (Order 636). In the first model, before open transport access,
the roles of trader and transporter are bundled with the role of producer. This first model is
called the closed transport access (CTA) model. In the second model, after open transport
access, the roles of trader and transporter are unbundled from the role of producer. This
second model is called the open transport access (OTA) model. Both market equilibrium
models are built up as Linear Complementarity Problems (LCPs). Generally, an LCP con-
sists in finding a vector in a finite-dimensional real vector space satisfying a certain system
of linear inequalities that have associated non-negative dual variables (Cottle et al., 2009).
My models capture up to three simple active agents to allow a tractable parametric solution.
To model the mixture of active agents, each agent solves a separate optimization problem.
Thus, the LCP comprises the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of each
active agent and the market clearing conditions across all agents. My models do not address
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imperfect competition that may require a strategy solution approach (game theory). Section
3.5 described the market structure reflected by each model and its economic context.
3.7 Closed Transport Access (CTA) Model
In the CTA model, there are n regions, each with one representative producer and one
representative consumer. Each producer agent is competitive and engages in three activities:
production, trade, and transport. Both producers and consumers are price takers. Each
producer is modeled as an active agent making choices over production, trade, and transport.
Each consumer is passively modeled using a demand function. Transactions across regional
markets occur one time and without uncertainty. Thus, the model covers one period, has no
storage, and is deterministic. Before introducing the producer, one essential simplification
is in order for this model setup. The simplification consists of letting the producer exchange
only with neighboring regions, i.e., those regions connected directly to the producer’s own
region. Intermediary producers can still indirectly exchange flows across regions that are not
directly interconnected and, thus, propagate price signals throughout the network.83
3.7.1 CTA Producer
The CTA producer agent is now modeled. Each producer i chooses how much to produce





from a neighboring region j to its local region i. Thus, the choice variables
for each producer i are qi, Xij ∀j, and X̃ji ∀j 6= i. Because there are n producers, these
choice variables can be arranged in production vector q ∈ Rn+, export matrix X ∈ R
n×n
+ , and
import matrix X̃ ∈ Rn×n+ – where R
n
+ is the non-negative orthant of space R
n while Rn×n+ is
the non-negative orthant of the space of n× n real matrices.84 In this matrix-like setup, the
choice of exports for producer i is contained in row i of the export matrix85 (Xi·) while the
83 As shown later, this neighboring exchange simplification yields the same pricing and exchange flow results
throughout the network in a competitive market just as if production exchanges were allowed network
wide.
84 Under market equilibrium, half of both export and import matrices are populated by zeros and X = X̃.
85 Notation wise, for any given matrix A in this document, Ai· represents row i of matrix A, and A·i
represents column i of matrix A.
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When i = j, Xii represents local sales, i.e., producer selling locally. On the other hand, X̃ii is
not defined as it’s not applicable, i.e., the producer does not purchase natural gas locally, it






cost for producer i is a function of produced quantity qi and defined as function C
PR
i (qi).
The terms of exchange are assumed to be Freight On Board (FOB) destination86 and, thus,
the exporting producer incurs the transport costs. The transport cost for producer i to ship
out from its own region i to a neighboring region j is a function of export quantity Xij and
defined as function CTPij (Xij).
3.7.2 Prices
Before defining the objective function for the producer, four orders of pricing require
introduction: local consumer price pCi , local regional price p
R
i , exchange price P
X
ij – with i
as the origin and j as the destination of exchange, and congestion charge PXij . First, p
C
i is
the local consumer’s willingness to pay. Second, pRi is the shadow price of supplying region
i. Third, PXij is the exchange price accepted by producer i to sell the commodity (as the
exporter) to producer j (as the importer) at the place of destination j (FOB destination).
And fourth, PXij is the shadow price arising when the transport capacity constraint binds
between origin i and destination j. All these prices (dual variables) are determined as
endogenous results of the spatial price equilibrium throughout the network. In other words,
prices agreed by agents under market equilibrium are determined in the model by duality. As
shown later in the complementarity analyses, pCi and p
R
i can be equal or different depending
on the exchange nature of the region. Network-wide, the four sets of pricing are arranged in
vectors pC ∈ Rn+ and p
R ∈ Rn+ and matrices P
X ∈ Rn×n+ and P
X ∈ Rn×n+ , respectively. P
X
ij











86 The exporting agent is responsible for transporting the commodity until reaching destination.
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3.7.3 Objective Function
The objective for each producer i is to maximize profits (πi), which are equal to revenues
from local sales Xiip
C





















ij (Xij). The objective for the producer is thus expressed mathematically as
max
(





























As each producer is in a competitive environment, prices pC and PX in the collection of
all producers’ objective expressions are not functions of any of the producers’ choice variables:
producers’ actions do not influence prices.
3.7.4 Producer Constraints as Complementarities
While maximizing the objective function, the producer agent is subject to two constraints.
The first constraint is regional market clearing. Because there is no storage to withdraw from,
local plus export sales by agent must be less than production plus imports by agent. Free
disposal of excess production and exports is allowed. In complementary terms, the regional
market clearing is expressed in (3.12) as an inequality complementary to the associated
shadow value of supplying region i (pRi ) that is non-negative. The shadow value of supplying
region i is derived from increasing local production and/or imports to source local sales
87 Alternatively in (3.11), rather than imposing i 6= j in the transport cost summation, i = j can be allowed
if CTPii (Xii) is set to zero.
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⊥ pRi ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j. (3.12)
The second constraint is an export limit due to transport capacity. Neighboring sales (ex-
ports Xij) are limited by neighboring transport capacity X ij. An import limit is not intro-
duced because the exporting producer is the agent delivering the commodity and, therefore,
the one facing directly the transport capacity constraint. The transport capacity constraint
is expressed in (3.13) as an inequality complementary to an associated shadow value of





⊥ PXij ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j. (3.13)
3.7.5 Lagrangian Function
With objective function and constraints just defined, the Lagrangian function89 Li :
R
5n−1
+ → R for producer i can now be expressed as
Li
(




































All n Lagrangians Li can be stacked up as vector L ∈ R
n. The Lagrangian for producer i
(3.14) is a function of three sets of variables – all enclosed in parenthesis Li (·) and separated
by two colons. The first set includes choice variables qi, Xi·, and X̃ ·i. These amount
to 2n choice variables by producer and to a total 2n2 choice variables network-wide. The
second set includes prices (dual variables) associated with producer’s constraints, i.e., pRi
and PXi· . The third set includes prices (dual variables) associated with exchange-clearing
complementarities, i.e., pCi , P
X
i· , and P
X
·i . Together, the second and third sets amount to
















j( 6=i) X̃ji ∀i
as destination, with j 6= i. Unit vector i is not to be confused with index i, which refers to the origin or
destination of exchange.
89 Notation wise, f : D → R is the mapping of function f with domain D and range R.
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3n− 1 prices by producer and to a total 2n2 prices network-wide.
Having completed modeling the producer agent through the Lagrangian, the consumer
is introduced next.
3.7.6 Consumer














= ai − bi · p
C
i , (3.15)
where ai is the quantity consumed when local consumer i is willing to pay nothing (p
C
i = 0)





= a− b ∗ pC , (3.16)
where D : Rn+ → R
n, a ∈ Rn+, and b ∈ R
n










= bi · p
C
i . (3.17)
(3.15) can be expressed as inverse demand function (3.18) where ai
bi








3.7.7 Exchange Clearing Complementarities
After modeling both producers and consumers, two more complementarities are now
introduced to the CTA model. The first one captures exchange clearing between producers :
exports by agent i from region i to j (Xij) must be greater than or equal to reciprocal




. The bilateral exchange clearing between producers is expressed
in (3.19) as an inequality complementary to an associated shadow value of exchange PXij that
is non-negative,
0 ≤ Xij − X̃ij ⊥ P
X
ij ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j. (3.19)
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Alternatively, (3.19) can be stated in vector form as
0 ≤Xi· − X̃i· ⊥ P
X
i· ≥ 0 ∀i as origin where destination j 6= i, (3.20)
or
0 ≤X ·i − X̃ ·i ⊥ P
X
·i ≥ 0 ∀i as destination where origin j 6= i. (3.21)
The second complementarity captures exchange clearing between producer and consumer :







. Demand Di is defined in (3.15). Exchange clearing between producer
and consumer is expressed in (3.22) as an inequality complementary to an associated shadow
value of exchange pCi that is non-negative,




⊥ pCi ≥ 0 ∀ i. (3.22)





⊥ pC ≥ 0, (3.23)




is demand vector (3.16). A complemen-






: R2n → Rn for each region i is defined in (3.24)
to contain exchange clearing complementarities (3.19) and (3.22). Fi





















3.7.8 KKT Optimality Conditions
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions that ultimately go into the CTA
model are obtained from producer’s Lagrangian Li (3.14).
90. Given the convexity of the ob-
jective function and the polyhedral constraints, the KKT optimality conditions are both
necessary and sufficient to reach an optimum. To arrange the KKT optimality condi-
90 Note that producer’s complementarities (3.12) and (3.13) are included in Lagrangian Li (3.14) as con-
straints.
125
tions by producer, function vector F Pi (Li) :R → R
3n is introduced to map 3n KKT condi-
tions for each Lagrangian Li. F
P
i is defined in (3.25) as a function vector containing the
gradients of Lagrangian Li on choice and dual variables associated with producer i, i.e.,
(






. In (3.25), the first three gradients (on choice variables) are set
with a negative sign to obtain maximization conditions,
F Pi (Li) =
[





Each component of vector F Pi is defined in Table 3.1.
91 In turn, the derivatives of the
Lagrangian stated in Table 3.1 are expanded as expressions (3.28) through (3.33) in Table 3.2.
Equations (3.28) and (3.29) introduce the marginal cost of production mcPRi (qi) and the
marginal cost of transport mcTPij (Xij), respectively. Assuming a linear form, marginal cost
mcPRi (qi) can be expressed as
mcPRi (qi) = ci + di · qi. (3.26)
where ci is the reservation price for supply and di is the upward slope of supply. Assuming
a constant form, marginal cost mcTPij (Xij) can be expressed as
mcTPij (Xij) = fij. (3.27)
3.7.9 Assembling the CTA Model
The two function vectors F Pi (3.25) and F
C
i (3.24) can be stacked up to form an overall
complementary vector function FRi ∈ R









Correspondingly, the dual variables associated with the two function vectors F Pi and F
C
i can





















91 As the gradient notation introduced by (3.25) is not conventional, each gradient is described in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Components of Vector F Pi .








. . . ∂Li
∂Xij
. . . ∂Li
∂Xin
]′




. . . ∂Li
∂(X̃ji)
j 6=i













. . . ∂Li
∂(PXij )i 6=j




In turn, the overall complementary vector function (3.34) and dual-variable vector by region
(3.35) can be stacked up to form the corresponding network-wide vectors F ∈ Rn(4n) and





2 . . . F
R











2 . . . z
R






In this way, the network-wide CTA model can be expressed in complementary terms as
0 ≤ F ⊥ z ≥ 0. (3.38)
3.8 Complementarity Analyses of CTA Model
Table 3.3 summarizes the complementarities contained in the CTA model. The first five
rows show the KKT optimality conditions obtained from producer’s Lagrangian Li (3.14).
The left column shows these conditions using the gradient vector notation introduced in
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= −mcPRi (qi) + p
R
i ∀i (3.28)
where mcPRi (qi) is the marginal cost of producing the qi










ij ∀i 6= j and (3.29)
∂Li
∂Xii
= pCi − p
R
i ∀i (3.30)





= −PXji + p
R





















= X ij −Xij ∀i 6= j (3.33)
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(3.25). The right column shows the corresponding parametric complementarities obtained
after substituting the representative derivative results from Table 3.2. The last two rows
simply re-state exchange clearing conditions (3.19) and (3.22). Overall, Table 3.3 introduces
expressions (3.43) through (3.51) and re-states expressions (3.12), (3.13), (3.19), and (3.22).
3.8.1 Conditions for Local Production and Local Sales
The complementarity analyses begin with the KKT conditions for local production qi
(3.44) and local sales Xii (3.47). Complementarity (3.44) introduces conditions for local
production,




i (qi) , (3.39)
and




i (qi) . (3.40)
Conditions for local production: If there is local production (qi > 0) then the shadow
value of supplying region i (pRi ) must reach the marginal cost of local production
mcPRi (qi). Otherwise, there is no local production (qi = 0).
Complementarity (3.47) introduces conditions for local sales,











Conditions for local sales : If there are local sales (Xii > 0) then the local consumer’s will-
ingness to pay (pCi ) must reach the shadow value of supplying region i (p
R
i ). Otherwise,
there are no local sales (Xii = 0).
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Table 3.3: CTA Model Complementarities.
Complementarity Representative Parametric Complementarity
∇qiLi ≤ 0 ⊥ qi ≥ 0 ∀i (3.43)
pRi ≤ mc
PR
i (qi) ⊥ qi ≥ 0 ∀i (3.44)





ij (Xij) + P
X
ij ⊥ Xij ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j (3.46)
pCi ≤ p
R
i ⊥ Xii ≥ 0 ∀i (3.47)
∇X̃·iLi ≤ 0 ⊥ X̃ ·i ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i (3.48)
pRi ≤ P
X
ji ⊥ X̃ji ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i (3.49)
∇pRi Li ≥ 0 ⊥ p
R

















Li ≥ 0 ⊥ P
X
i· ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j (3.51) X ij ≥ Xij ⊥ P
X
ij ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j (3.13)
Exchange clearing for producer i
0 ≤ Xij − X̃ij ⊥ P
X
ij ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j (3.19)
Exchange clearing within region i




⊥ pCi ≥ 0 ∀ i (3.22)
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Together, complementarities (3.44) and (3.47) delimit the shadow value of supplying region
i (pRi ) between the local consumer price (p
C






i (qi) . (3.52)
3.8.2 Relationships Between pRi and Supply/Demand Reservation Prices
Conditions (3.39) through (3.42) introduce a set of relationships for pRi with respect to
mcPRi (qi) and p
C
i . A related set of relationships for p
R
i with respect to reservation prices ci (for
supply) and ai/bi (for demand) can be found by substituting marginal cost of production
(3.26) and inverse demand (3.18) into the aforementioned conditions. For instance, after
substituting (3.26), condition (3.39) implies pRi > ci because qi > 0. In turn, condition
(3.40) implies pRi ≤ ci otherwise qi > 0, which is a contradiction. Table 3.4 summarizes the
new set of relationships found this way for pRi .
Table 3.4: Relationships between pRi and supply/demand reservation prices.
After substituting ... Condition ... Implies ... Because ...
(3.26) (3.39) pRi > ci qi > 0
(3.26) (3.40) pRi ≤ ci qi = 0
(3.18) (3.41) pRi < ai/bi Xii > 0
(3.18) (3.42) pRi ≥ ai/bi Xii = 0
3.8.3 Regional Categorization
In Table 3.5, the new set of relationships (introduced in Table 3.4) along with conditions
(3.39) through (3.42) are arranged in both column and row headers. By superimposing the
content of these headers, Table 3.5 introduces four new sets of combined conditions – shown
in the corresponding internal cells. These sets characterize four types of regions on the basis
of exchange. Type 1 regions have both local consumption and local production, and thus have
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local product consumption.92 Type 2 regions have local production but no local consumption,
and thus they export all local production.93 Type 3 regions have local consumption but no
local production, and thus they import to satisfy all local consumption.94 Type 4 regions
have neither local production nor local consumption, and thus they are transitory exchange
ports only.95 Type 1, 2, and 3 regions may or may not be transitory exchange ports. And,
if they are, they are not exclusively transitory – unlike Type 4 regions.
Overall, Table 3.5 introduces two sets of conditions. The first set comprises conditions
(3.53), (3.55), (3.57), and (3.59). The second set comprises conditions (3.54), (3.56), (3.58),
and (3.60). Based on the first set of conditions, the region type depends on where the shadow
value of supplying region i (pRi ) falls between local consumer price (p
C





. It should be noted that pRi is the market equilibrium price,
i.e., the price observed in the market. Thus, in Type 2 (exports only) regions, market price
reflects the marginal cost of local production mcPRi (qi). In Type 3 (imports only) regions,
market price reflects the local marginal willingness to pay pCi . In Type 1 regions, market
price reflects both mcPRi (qi) and p
C
i simultaneously. In Type 4 (transitory) regions, market
price reflects the shadow value to exporting to neighboring regions while local region i is
sourced by imports.
The second set of conditions in Table 3.5 relates pRi to reservation prices ci and ai/bi
by region. In particular, the second set introduces necessary conditions for Type 1 regions
and Type 4 regions based on the relationship between reservation prices. Thus, a necessary
condition for a region to be Type 1 is
ci < ai/bi. (3.61)
92 Type 1 regions are net importers (for local consumption) when Xii ≥ qi and net exporters when Xii < qi.
Local product consumption is complete if Xii ≥ qi and partial if Xii < qi. In the former case (Xii ≥ qi),
imports supplement local production for local consumption and source exports (if any) entirely. In the
latter case (Xii < qi), imports (if any) supplement local production for exports (transitory exchange).
93 In Type 2 regions, imports (if any) supplement exports beyond local production (transitory exchange).
94 In Type 3 regions, additional imports (beyond local consumption, if any) source exports entirely (transitory
exchange).
95 In Type 4 regions, any imports coming into the region go straight out as exports.
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Table 3.5: Four Types of Regions On the Basis of Local Exchange.
Defining the states
of local production









implies pRi > ci.
No local production





implies pRi ≤ ci.
Existing local
consumption















i < ai/bi (3.54)
Type 3 :






< mcPRi (qi) (3.55)
pRi ≤ ci ∧ p
R
i < ai/bi (3.56)
No local
consumption





implies pRi ≥ ai/bi.
Type 2 :








pRi > ci ∧ p
R










i ≤ ci (3.60)
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Similarly, a necessary condition for a region to be Type 4 is
ci > ai/bi. (3.62)
Assuming no changes in local supply and local demand in regions of interest, Type 1 regions
and Type 4 regions cannot become one another (even as market equilibrium price pRi changes)
because their own necessary conditions do not overlap. On the other hand, Type 1 regions
and Type 4 regions can become Type 2 regions or Type 3 regions in response to changes in
market equilibrium price pRi .
3.8.4 Conditions for Excess Local Supply
The next complementarity analyzed is the exchange clearing within region i (3.22) – See











← pCi > 0. (3.64)














. In this case, if local willingness to pay reaches
reservation price
[
pCi = ai/bi (> 0)
]



























, the linear form of demand (3.15)
can be substituted to obtain





Next, the complementarities of exports Xij and imports X̃ji for region i are analyzed.
Complementarity (3.46) introduces conditions for exports:
















ij (Xij) + P
X
ij . (3.67)
Exchange pricing (origin): If there are exports (Xij > 0) then the price of exports P
X
ij
is equal to the price of origin pRi , plus the marginal cost of transport mc
TP
ij (Xij), plus
congestion charge PXij . Price P
X
ij reflects conventional netback pricing.
Complementarity (3.49) introduces conditions for imports:




ji ∀j 6= i, (3.68)
and




ji ∀j 6= i. (3.69)




then the price of imports








. Note that the price of
imports PXji reflects the terms of FOB destination.
3.8.6 Basis Differential




ij , i.e., swap indices i and
j in condition (3.68). Substituting this result in (3.46) produces a new complementarity in











ij (Xij) + P
X
ij ⊥ Xij ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j. (3.70)
96 Equation [4] in Samuelson (1952) is the analog of (3.70) expressed in terms of excess supply.
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ij (Xij) + P
X
ij . (3.71)






is equal to the marginal cost
of transport mcTPij (Xij) plus congestion charge P
X
ij – assuming there is a matched exchange.
3.8.7 Summary of Analyses












ij (Xij) + P
X
ij .
Table 3.5 identifies four types of regions on the basis of local exchange. Because Order
636 has jurisdiction over interstate pipelines, regions have the geographic scale of a state. For
practical purposes, the conditions in Table 3.5 can be interpreted as the bounding definition
of the groups identified. For instance, an arbitrary threshold between Type 1 and 2 regions
can be set using a ratio of exports over local production between 50 and 100%. To illustrate,
let the threshold be 50%. If the ratio is below 50% then most of the local production goes
to local consumption and the region is considered Type 1. On the other hand, if the ratio
is above 50% then most of the local production goes to exports and the region is considered
Type 2. Under this threshold, Wyoming would be classified as a Type 2 region because most
of its local production is exported. Analogous thresholds can be defined for other transitions
between categories. Prior to the development of the Marcellus and Utica basins in 2010, the
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East coast region would be classified as a Type 3 region because most of its local consumption
is supplied by imports. In turn, California and Colorado can be classified as Type 1 regions
because these states have significant local product consumption. Under pure interpretation,
transitory ports would be non-existent in the continental U.S. because the development of a
market hub is conditional to significant economic activity.
In Table 3.5, the set of conditions comprised by (3.54), (3.56), (3.58), and (3.60) relates
pRi to reservation prices ci and ai/bi by region. Based on these relationships, a necessary
condition for a region to be Type 1 is (3.61)
ci < ai/bi.
Similarly, a necessary condition for a region to be Type 4 is (3.62)
ci ≥ ai/bi.
Assuming no changes in local supply and local demand in regions of interest, Type 1 regions
and Type 4 regions cannot become one another (even as market equilibrium price pRi changes)
because their own necessary conditions do not overlap. On the other hand, Type 1 regions
and Type 4 regions can become Type 2 regions or Type 3 regions in response to changes in
market equilibrium price pRi .
In Table 3.5, (3.53) and (3.57) show that pRi = mc
PR
i (qi) for Type 1 and Type 2 regions.






ij (Xij) + P
X
ij i
′s type ∈ {1, 2}. (3.72)
On the other hand, (3.53) and (3.55) show that pRi = p
C
i for Type 1 and Type 3 regions.








′s type ∈ {1, 3}. (3.73)
97 While my model captures a generic natural gas network, efficient transport charges in my model also
include the marginal cost of transport and the shadow value of capacity found by Cremer et al. (2003)
using a simple two-parallel-pipeline system. The Ramsey surcharge found by Cremer et al. (2003) is not
a result in my model because I do not evaluate second-best pricing policies.
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(3.73) is known as netback pricing. In regions with local consumption, i.e., Type 1 or 3,
exchange clearing within region i implies that local sales Xii can be estimated using (3.65)
Xii = ai − bi · p
C
i .
Regions without local consumption, i.e., Type 2 or 4, have no local sales (Xii = 0). Last,
the shadow value of transport capacity from region i to j (PXij ) is greater than zero (P
X
ij > 0)
when transport capacity is reachedX ij = Xij – See complementarity (3.13) in Table 3.3. The
shadow value of transport capacity is also known as the price of congestion. The magnitude
of all unknowns in the system can be solved from (3.38). To link the market impacts of
Order 636, the CTA model must be contrasted against the Open Transport Access (OTA)
model that is developed in the next section.
3.9 Open Transport Access (OTA) Model
The OTA model builds from the foundation of the CTA model. In addition to regional
producers and consumers, the OTA model introduces two new agents: one network-wide
benevolent trader (a.k.a. marketer) and one network-wide benevolent transporter (a.k.a.
pipeline company).98 These agents unbundle trade and transport services from production.
In the OTA model, the trader is the central agent of exchange. In contrast, in the CTA
model, the producer is a decentralized agent of exchange.99
The OTA model uses most of the terms and concepts introduced in the CTA model.
Terms with different definitions across models, such as those of X, X̃, and PX , are given
in Table 3.6. Most of the expressions in the OTA model are simply updates of those in the
CTA model. The OTA producer is described next.
98 Although the trader and transporter are each single agents in their own activities, they act competitively
or as a benevolent social planner would.
99 There are three fundamental differences between my model and Samuelson (1952)’s. First, there are no
regional intermediaries in Samuelson’s model setup. A region in Samuelson’s model is either an importer,
an exporter, or balanced (no imports or exports). Second, Samuelson models a social planner alone
while I model decentralized producers in my CTA model. I also model three separate active agents,
namely, producer, trader, and transporter in my OTA model. And third, my model addresses capacity
constraints while Samuelson does not. All features incorporated in my model were necessary to evaluate
comprehensively the effects of open access.
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Table 3.6: Common terms used by the CTA and OTA models with Distinct Interpretations.
Common
Terms
CTA Model OTA Model
Found in
Common Eq.’s














Price of exchange agreed
between producers
Price of shipping agreed
by trader and transporter
(3.19)
3.9.1 OTA Producer
The new objective for unbundled OTA producer i is to maximize profits πPRi . That is,
max
qi
πPRi (qi) , (3.74)
where
πPRi (qi) = p
PR
i qi − C
PR
i (qi) . (3.75)
In (3.75), the new term pPRi is simply the exchange price agreed upon by producer and
trader. Network-wide, in vector form, pPR ∈ Rn+. Unlike the producer in the CTA model,
the producer in the OTA model does not face any constraints. The descriptions of trader and
transporter that follows are more extended as they are new agents that require additional
introduction.
3.9.2 OTA Trader
To profit from exchange, the OTA trader purchases output q̃i from any producer i at
price pPRi and sells an amount Xii to any consumer i at price p
C
i . The trader can contract
with the pipeline company to ship an amount Xij from any given region i to any neighboring
region j at a shipping rate P TPij . Thus, the objective for the trader is to maximize profits
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πTD (X, q̃) , (3.76)
where












P TPij Xij. (3.77)
The trader (rather than the producer) now faces the regional market clearing constraint,
which is defined in (3.78) by simply re-introducing (3.12) with a couple of different terms;













⊥ pRi ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j. (3.78)
The regional market clearing implies that the trader can export from any region i to other
adjacent regions as much as (Xi·)
′







plus purchased local output q̃i offsets it. As the exchange occurs simultaneously network-
wide, the trader can effectively ship product from any region i to other regions that are not
necessarily adjacent.
3.9.3 OTA Transporter
For every neighboring exchange between regions i and j, the OTA transporter chooses
an amount X̃ij to contract with the trader to receive revenues P
TP





on the (i, j) link (or pipeline). Thus, the objective for the trans-








100 It should be noted that while the matrix terms X and X̃ continue to be used in the OTA model, their
definitions are different from those introduced by the CTA model as shown in Table 3.6. Nonetheless,
under market equilibrium, X = X̃ for both models. Also, under market equilibrium, half of matrices X






















The transporter (rather than the producer) faces the transport capacity constraint,101




X ij − X̃ij
)
⊥ PXij ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j. (3.81)
3.9.4 Lagrangian Functions
With objective function and constraints just defined, the Lagrangian function for pro-
ducers LPRi : R
2
+ → R, trader L
TD : R2n
2+3n
+ → R, and transporter L
TP : R
3(n2−n)
+ → R are







= pPRi qi − C
PR
i (qi) ; (3.82)
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3.9.5 Exchange Clearing Complementarities
Three more complementarity expressions are now introduced to the OTA model. The
first one captures exchange clearing between trader and producer: the output qi by producer
i must be greater than or equal to the reciprocal purchase of output q̃i by the trader. The
101 My model incorporates capacity constraints similar to those found in Cremer et al. (2003)’s spatial
framework. The main difference is that my model can assign these capacity constraints to different
network agents.
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exchange clearing between trader and producer is expressed as an inequality complementary
to an associated shadow value of exchange pPRi ,
0 ≤ qi − q̃i ⊥ p
PR
i ≥ 0 ∀ i. (3.85)
The second complementarity captures exchange clearing between trader and consumers:







. The complementarity expressions for exchange clearing between trader
and consumer in the OTA model are the same as those introduced between producer and
consumer in the CTA model, i.e., (3.22) and (3.23). Nonetheless, the definition of the term
Xii is different in the two models. While Xii is local sales by the producer in the CTA
model, the same term is local sales by the trader in the OTA model. Table 3.6 summarizes
the distinct interpretation of this and other common terms under the CTA and OTA models.
The third complementarity captures exchange clearing between trader and transporter:
the contracted shipping amount with the pipeline company X̃ij must be greater than or
equal to the amount exchanged by the trader Xij. The complementarity expression for
bilateral exchange clearing between trader and transporter in the OTA model is the same
as that introduced for exchange clearing between producers in the CTA model, i.e., (3.19).
Nonetheless, the definitions of terms Xij, X̃ij, and P
X
ij are different in the two models as
shown in Table 3.6.
3.9.6 KKT Optimality Conditions
In the OTA model, the KKT optimality conditions are arranged in a similar structure as
that used in the CTA model. The function vector F Pi (Li) :R→ R
3n for the producer from

























:R→ R2n−2, for trader



























The gradient of each Lagrangian included in function vectors F PRi , F
TD
i , and F
TP
i follow
the same definition of those introduced in Table 3.1. In turn, the individual derivatives within










: R2n+2+ → R
n+1 for each region i is defined to contain the



















i , and F
C2
i can be stacked up to form an overall
complementary vector function FR2i ∈ R












Correspondingly, the dual variables associated with the four function vectors can be
























The complementary vector function and dual variables for all regions can be stacked up
one more time to form the corresponding network-wide vectors F 2 ∈ R
n(4n+2) and z2 ∈
R
n(4n+2). In this way, the network-wide OTA model can be expressed as
0 ≤ F 2 ⊥ z2 ≥ 0. (3.101)
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 summarize the complementarities contained in the OTA model. Table 3.8
introduces expressions (3.106) through (3.118). Table 3.9 introduces expressions (3.119)
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j ∀i 6= j (3.91)
∂LTD
∂Xji




i ∀j 6= i (3.92)
∂LTD
∂Xii













− PXij ∀i 6= j (3.94)
∂LTP
∂X̃ji



























= X ij − X̃ij ∀i 6= j (3.97)
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through (3.121), re-states expressions (3.13), (3.47), (3.22), and (3.19) initially found under
the CTA model, and re-introduces (3.12) as (3.78) after a swap of variables, i.e., q̃i and X ·i
in (3.78) replace qi and X̃ ·i in (3.12).
3.10 Complementarity Analyses of OTA Model
In this section, the complementarities of the OTA model introduced in Table 3.8 and
Table 3.9 are analyzed. Starting with (3.118) and (3.19), if clearing prices between producer


















and complementarity (3.116) implies






+ PXij . (3.103)
Substituting (3.102) in (3.107) produces the form of complementarity (3.107) that follows,
pRi ≤ mc
PR
i (qi) ⊥ qi ≥ 0 ∀i. (3.104)









+ PXij ⊥ Xij ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j. (3.105)
Complementarities (3.104) and (3.105) in the OTA model are similar to complementarities
(3.44) and (3.70) in the CTA model. Table 3.10 summarizes these two pairs of alike comple-
mentarities. Given the symmetry of matrix X anticipated in the OTA model under matched
exchanges, indices i and j can be swapped in complementarities (3.113) and (3.117) to obtain
the same results shown in Table 3.10.
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Table 3.8: OTA Model Complementarities (First Part).
Complementarity Representative Parametric Complementarity
∇qiL
PR




i (qi) ⊥ qi ≥ 0 ∀i (3.107)
∇q̃iL




i ⊥ q̃i ≥ 0 ∀i (3.109)
∇Xi·L
TD ≤ 0 ⊥ Xi· ≥ 0 ∀i (3.110)
∇X·iL










ji ⊥ Xji ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i (3.113)
∇X̃i·L
TP ≤ 0 ⊥ X̃i· ≥ 0 ∀i ∧ j 6= i (3.114)
∇X̃·iL
TP ≤ 0 ⊥ X̃ ·i ≥ 0 ∀i ∧ j 6= i (3.115)






+ PXij ⊥ X̃ij ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i (3.116)






+ PXji ⊥ X̃ji ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i (3.117)
Exchange clearing between
trader and producer
0 ≤ qi − q̃i ⊥ p
PR
i ≥ 0 ∀ i (3.118)
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⊥ pRi ≥ 0 ∀i





Li ≥ 0 ⊥ P
X
i· ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j (3.120) X ij ≥ X̃ij ⊥ P
X
ij ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j
In the CTA model, Xij replaces X̃ij above.
(3.13)*
∇XiiL











≤ Xii ⊥ p
C
i ≥ 0 ∀ i (3.22)
Exchange clearing between
trader and transporter
Xij ≤ X̃ij ⊥ P
X
ij ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j
* X̃ij and P
X




Table 3.10: Additional Pairs of Alike Complementarities in CTA and OTA Models.
OTA Eq. CTA Eq. Complementarity
(3.104) (3.44) pRi ≤ mc
PR







∗ + PXij ⊥ Xij ≥ 0 ∀i 6= j
* Xij in the CTA model is replaced by
X̃ij under the OTA model.
The right-end columns of Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 summarize the complementarities
of both CTA and OTA models. Because both models yield alike complementarities, the
complementarity analyses of the competitive CTA model in Section 3.8.7 also apply to the
competitive OTA model. Thus, under the competitive OTA model, regional prices pRi are de-













– just as they are under the CTA model. The four region types characterized in Table 3.5,
initially introduced under the CTA model, also apply to the OTA model. The equivalency
of the CTA and OTA complementarities show that the simplification introduced in the CTA
model, namely neighboring exchange between producers, does allow a price-signal propa-
gation throughout the network equivalent to that obtained when production exchanges are
executed network wide by a benevolent marketer as implied by the OTA model. This result
is the analog of Adam Smith’s invisible hand moving commodities throughout an exchange
network.102 The equivalency of the CTA and OTA models recedes when the competitive
environment is removed.
102 Without formal proof, Samuelson (1952) anticipated this result intuitively based on pricing mechanisms
and his “faith” on Adam Smith’s principle.
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3.11 Changes Introduced by Order 636 and Structural Effects on Natural Gas
Market Prices
Using the CTA and OTA models, this section analyzes specific changes to the economic
structure of the U.S. natural gas market introduced by the open-access rule (Order 636).
These changes are identified as follows.
1. Removal of Potential Monopoly on Exchange: Before Order 636, pipelines had a po-
tential monopoly on commodity exchange. After Order 636, the potential monopoly
on exchange was removed.
2. Larger Pool of Suppliers With Access to Transport : After Order 636, the pool of sup-
pliers with access to transportation services increased as intended by the open-access
rule.
3. Shift to Independent Pipelines as Developers of Midstream Infrastructure: After Order
636, transportation services were unbundled and ownership and operation of pipelines
were shifted from gas-merchant pipelines to independent pipeline companies.
4. Changes in Pipeline Capacity Utilization: After Order 636, the new market equilib-
rium would alter commodity exchanges and, thus, change pipeline capacity utilization
throughout the network.
5. Market Size Increase: After Order 636, the transmission network would increase in
reach and size, and so would the market.
It should be noted that the first three changes listed above were introduced directly by
Order 636. On the other hand, the last two changes were consequences of the first three.
Thus, the last two changes are considered indirect changes. The structural effects on natural
gas market prices caused by the aforementioned changes are characterized as part of the
analyses.
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3.11.1 Removal of Potential Monopoly On Exchange
Before Order 636, gas-merchant transporters owned and operated pipelines and they
could choose the amount of commodity exchange between markets (Xij). This state can




to objective function πi (3.11) and in turn to Lagrangian Li (3.14). When the
modified Lagrangian is differentiated with respect to Xij, the term P
X
ij in complementarity





MRXij (Xij) = P
X
ij (Xij) +Xij · P
X
ij
′ (Xij) . (3.122)
This replacement cascades down to expressions (3.66) and (3.71). Thus, after replacing
PXij with MR
X
ij (3.122), price of exports P
X





ij (Xij) + P
X
ij −Xij · P
X
ij
′ (Xij) , (3.123)





ij (Xij) + P
X
ij −Xij · P
X
ij
′ (Xij) . (3.124)
Because PXij
′ (Xij) is negative, the last term in (3.123) and (3.124) is in fact adding to the
right hand side. The last term is referred to as potential monopoly markup. Potentially,
monopoly markup could increase both the price of exchange and the basis differential.
Before Order 636, potential monopoly markup was not realized because pipeline sales were
regulated to recover both the pipeline’s cost of gas and “just and fare” cost of transmission.
After Order 636, potential monopoly markup was removed as the exchange function was
passed to marketers who without control of pipelines would be competitive. On the basis
of removing the potential monopoly on exchange alone, shifting from regulated sales prices
(before Order 636) to regulated transport rates (after Order 636) had no apparent effects on
prices. Other regulatory steps leading to open access before Order 636 could have introduced
some effects on prices though. Specifically, before the Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, prices
at the wellhead were inflated due to the preset pricing formula. After the Act, prices at the
150
wellhead would have decreased down to the market clearing levels before open access.
3.11.2 Larger Pool of Suppliers With Access to Transport
A larger pool of suppliers with access to transportation services in any region i would
drop the marginal cost of production in region i: ↓ mcPRi (qi). This market price drop would
spread out based on the relationships of regional price pRi and marginal cost of production
mcPRi (qi) shown in Table 3.5 and the definition of basis differential in (3.70). (3.53) and
(3.57) show that regional price pRi will drop with marginal cost of production mc
PR
i (qi) in
Type 1 and 2 regions because pRi = mc
PR
i (qi). If the increase in supply is sufficient, Type
2 regions can even become Type 1 regions. Similarly, (3.55) and (3.59) show that if the
increase in supply is sufficient then Type 4 regions can become Type 2 regions and Type
3 regions can become Type 1 regions. This switch would peg the regional price to a lower
marginal cost of production: pRi = mc
PR
i (qi). In turn, any local drop would be spread out
throughout the network via the basis differential (3.71). Based on economic reasoning and
a simple numerical example (without formal mathematical proof), Samuelson (1952) drew
the following conclusion that applies verbatim to the effect of a larger pool of suppliers.103
“An increase in excess-supply at region i must have a downward effect on every single
price, or at worst leave it unchanged. The downward effect on other prices cannot exceed
the downward effect on its own price: for all regions that stay continuously connected
by direct or indirect trade with region i, the changes in pj must exactly equal the drop
in pi; but any regions that at any time remain disconnected from region i the change
in p’s will be less than the drop in pi. And so long as we assume “normal” positive
sloping excess-supply curves everywhere, we can confidently assert that an increase of
excess-supply in region i must decrease algebraic exports everywhere else, or at worst
leave some of them unchanged.” (Samuelson, 1952)
103 Samuelson’s notation is slightly changed to adopt the notation of this document. As a reference, in his
conclusion, excess supply is the lateral difference between local supply and local demand functions.
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According to my model, exporting regions (Type 1 and 2) where the pool of supply
increases after open access would experience higher local production ↑ qi and lower local
prices ↓ pRi . Exporting regions (Type 1 and 2) where the pool of supply does not change
after open access would experience lower local production ↓ qi and lower local prices ↓ p
R
i as
their exports get substituted from those of regions with a cheaper supply. Based on Table 3.5,
if the drop in market price is sufficient, Type 2 regions (exporting all local production) can
change to either Type 1 (local product consumption) or Type 4 (transitory port) regions. In
turn, the latter two types can change to Type 3 regions (importing all local consumption).
Changes in basis differentials are undetermined all throughout the network as exporting
and importing regions can swap one another. These swaps in production areas are indeed
happening but not just as a result of open access alone.
Since the start of the shale oil revolution in the mid-2000s, technological innovations
in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling combined forces to unlock vast oil and gas
resources that were not economically available before in the U.S. In the natural gas market
space, the development of the Marcellus and Utica basins in 2010 was a particular game
changer. Prior to this development, a major header had been envisioned in the early 2000s
to connect major supply basins in the Rocky Mountain and Appalachian regions to consumer
markets in the northeast. This header, known as the Rockies Express Pipeline (REX), is one
of the largest pipelines in the U.S. REX spans over approximately 1,700 miles, comprises 36-
and 42-inch diameter lines (Tallgrass-Energy, 2017), and connects the Opal hub (WY) and
Clarington hub (OH). When REX came about in the mid-2000s, it initially helped Rocky
producers to relieve a glut of supply. However, the completion of REX was about to be
blindsided by the shale oil revolution that was just beginning. As shale gas production
increased, natural gas prices across the U.S. were depressed in the late-2000s. Prices in the
Rocky and Appalachian basins declined along with production. With lower production, REX
capacity to deliver to the northeast markets was suddenly under utilized. On the other hand,
the development of Marcellus and Utica basins in 2010 created an excess supply in the region
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that eventually justified reverse-flow in REX to deliver natural gas from the northeast basins
to the west market. Currently, a series of projects is still underway to transform REX into
a bi-directional natural gas header system. The REX story highlights the risk introduced
by natural gas resource discovery in midstream economics. Oliver (2015) presents a parallel
story addressing the need for transmission capacity from the Marcellus basin to the Gulf
Coast, connecting Dominion South hub (PA) and Henry Hub (LA).
3.11.3 Shift to Independent Pipelines as Developers of Midstream Infrastruc-
ture
By unbundling trading and transport services from pipeline sales, the potential shadow




would shift from the gas-merchant
pipeline (before Order 636) to the independent pipeline (after Order 636) as shown by the












and the price of transport received by the independent pipeline P TPij (3.116) after Order 636











The potential congestion markup, however, is muted under both regulatory environ-
ments. Before Order 636, sales prices of gas-merchant pipelines were regulated and, thus,
the gas-merchant pipeline would not receive the potential congestion markup. After Order
636, the independent pipeline would continue to operate under rate of return (ROR) regu-
lation on transport services and would not receive the potential congestion markup either.
It should be noted that, after Order 636, the congestion markup would materialize in the
secondary market for short-term capacity releases. However, this markup signal still does
not feedback the pipeline company who is the provider of primary capacity. As stated by
Avalos et al. (2016), ‘this mutes a valuable signal for long-run pipeline investments.’ This is
a complex dynamic issue where regulation disrupts the economic allocation of transport ca-
pacity by muting the signaling function of market-determined prices. To mitigate this issue,
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the following regulatory ratemaking approaches proposed in Chapter 2 are recommended.
1. Relaxing the ROR: A charge rate c∗TP for firm primary capacity is regulated to be fixed
over time while the pipeline company chooses its fixed level (magnitude).
2. Transfer payment option: Alternatively, to improve economic efficiency, the regulator
chooses a fixed level c∗∗∗TP that is lower than the unregulated private optimum fixed rate
c∗TP . The chosen level would increase social value (relative to that achieved by c
∗
TP ) up
to a level where the marginal social value gain is equal to the marginal private value
reduction (both margins achieved as cTP is reduced). In addition, a transfer payment
is made to the pipeline company out of the increase in social welfare generated by the
new regulated charge c∗∗∗TP to achieve a Pareto improvement. This transfer payment
would make the pipeline company indifferent between the choices of charging c∗TP as
an unregulated rate or charging c∗∗∗TP as a regulated rate.
According to Oliver et al. (2014), after the enactment of Order 712, “the only remaining
barrier to a fully competitive structure is price control in the primary market.” This barrier
can be mitigated by the ratemaking approaches proposed in Chapter 2 – restated above.
3.11.4 Changes in Pipeline Capacity Utilization
After Order 636, a larger pool of suppliers with access to transport would alter the
volume of commodity exchanges and, thus, alter pipeline capacity utilization throughout the





. This effect alone would drop the basis differentials and market
prices in importing regions. On the other hand, if capacity utilization reaches full capacity
after Order 636 then a congestion markup is introduced. This effect alone would raise basis
differentials and market prices in importing regions.
Because pipelines would have been sized for the regulatory environment before Order 636,
the same pipelines would be undersized for open access operations after Order 636 (requir-
ing larger sizes). Thus, the introduction of congestion markups by undersized pipelines after
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Order 636 could have been anticipated to be the rule rather than the exception. Brown and
Yücel (2008) found evidence for this anticipated result. Brown and Yücel (2008) found that
the U.S. natural gas market transitioned from a system with plentiful pipeline capacity to
one with tightened capacity after the mid-1990s.104 Thus, the legacy of the existing pipeline
network was limiting the physical means for arbitrage between the regional markets, particu-
larly, during peak loads. Brown and Yücel (2008) indicated that an assessment of the market
conditions following shortly after the market restructuring should be considered preliminary.
Time is needed to reshape the capital stock under the new regulatory environment. In the
mean time, temporary congestion markups can be anticipated to offset (to some extent) the
reduction of the marginal costs of production indicated in Section 3.11.2.
3.11.5 Market Size Increase
After Order 636, the transmission network would increase in reach and size, and so
would the market. As indicated in Section 3.11.4, pipeline capacities can be expected to
increases in size over time under the new regulatory environment. In addition, the network
increases in reach as new pipelines connect new or growing markets after open access. This
growth in interconnectivity is measured by the cointegration analyses introduced in Section
3.3. However, cointegration analyses are limited because they break when pipeline capacity
binds.
The net effect on market prices due to all the changes introduced by Order 636 is undeter-
mined under this methodical analysis. The dynamics of these changes are commingled and
the net effect depends on which effect dominates over others. Nonetheless, the presumption
is that market prices will drop overall after Order 636. Hollas (1999) validated the overall
expectation at the aggregate level. Hollas found that prices for industrial customers fell by
approximately 9.4% during the period 1992-94 (after open access) compared to the 1975-77
104 According to Brown and Yücel (2008), natural gas consumption was propelled by the rapid growth of its
use in electric power generation, which was driven by the regulatory changes related to open access and
the emergence of new technology.
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period (before open access steps began).105 For an accurate assessment, numerical analyses
need to be carried out on a regional basis by building CTA and OTA models tailored to the
anticipated effects described in this section. Alternatively, detailed econometric analyses of
prices throughout the U.S. gas network can be carried out while accounting for the changes
anticipated in this section. It should be noted that isolating open access effects would be far
more challenging after the start of the shale oil revolution in the mid-2000s.
Assuming the effects of a larger pool of suppliers with access to transport dominates
overall, regional qualitative assessments can be developed based on both observed changes
in price and in regional category106 (or regional transition). To facilitate these assessments,
Table 3.11 explains the price changes by regional transition caused by open access. In
Table 3.11, regional transitions are mapped from the row header indicating the regional
category before open access to the column header indicating the regional category after
open access. Cells on the diagonal of the table correspond to regions that did not change
category after open access – prices could still change in these regions. Thus, the market
impact on a region after open access (but before the shale oil revolution) can be diagnosed
based on observed changes in price and in regional category using Table 3.11. For instance,
a region where price increases after open access while still remaining Type 1 can be said
to have been impacted by local producers having greater access to external under supplied
markets.
105 It should be noted that Hollas (1999) also indicated that residential customers did not appear to have
benefitted initially from FERC’s restructuring of the gas pipeline industry as their prices actually in-
creased. According to Hollas, residential customers did not have ready access to alternative suppliers and
bore the burden from utility loss of industrial customers. Industrial customers would get direct connection
to interstate pipelines (bypass), which resulted in higher rates for remaining customers as there was less
volume over which to spread costs.
106 Table 3.5 shows and describes the four regional categories 1 through 4.
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Exports all local produc-
tion
To Type 3:





↑ Price increases due to
greater access from local pro-
ducers to external under sup-
plied markets.
↓ Price decreases due to
greater access from external
cheaper producers to local
under supplied market.
↑ Price goes up above the lo-
cal reservation price of de-
mand (ai/bi) due to greater
access from local producers
to external under supplied
markets.
↓ Price goes down below the
local reservation price of sup-
ply ci due to greater access
from external cheaper pro-
ducers to local under sup-
plied markets.
Transition cannot be due to
open access.
From Type 2
↓ Price goes down below the
local reservation price of de-
mand (ai/bi) due to greater
access from external cheaper
producers to local under sup-
plied market.
↑ Price increases due to
greater access from local pro-
ducers to external under sup-
plied markets.
↓ Price decreases due to
greater access from external
cheaper producers to external
under supplied market.
See transitions:
• from Type 2 to Type 1 and
• from Type 1 to Type 3.
Same as transition
from Type 1 to Type 3.
From Type 3
↑ Price goes up above the lo-
cal reservation price of sup-
ply ci due to greater access
from local producers to exter-
nal under supplied markets.
See transitions:
• from Type 3 to Type 1 and
• from Type 1 to Type 2.
↑ Price increases due to
greater access from external
cheaper producers to external
under supplied markets.
↓ Price decreases due to
greater access from external
cheaper producers to local
under supplied market.
Same as transition
from Type 1 to Type 2.
From Type 4 Transition cannot be due to
open access.
Same as transition
from Type 3 to Type 1.
Same as transition
from Type 2 to Type 1.
Price changes are due to the
shift in market equilibrium
realized by neighboring mar-
kets after open access.
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3.12 Conclusions
In this chapter, I provided a comprehensive methodical analysis of the structural economic
effects on U.S. natural gas prices resulting from open access to pipelines. These effects come
off systematically from the analyses of identified changes introduced by Order 636 (the open-
access rule). To conduct the analysis, the U.S. natural gas market structure before and after
Order 636 was contrasted using models formulated as linear complementarity problems.
In my analysis, I synthesized the literature encompassing econometric and structural
studies with a focus on the open-access rule. In the econometric literature, Avalos et al.
(2016) stated that cointegration tests fail to indicate market integration after open access
when congestion is present in the pipelines. This statement is validated by the congestion
markup identified in basis differential expression (3.71). According to Avalos et al. (2016),
cointegration test failure in the presence of congestion is presumably the reason why studies
conducted using data immediately after open access, such as those conducted by Cuddington
and Wang (2006) and De Vany and Walls (1994), did not find as much market integration
as studies conducted thereafter. In my analysis, I showed that this failure was anticipated
because the stock of midstream capital before Order 636 was not designed to meet the larger
volumes of exchange realized after open access to pipelines. Validating this premise, Brown
and Yücel (2008) found that the U.S. natural gas market transitioned from a system with
plentiful pipeline capacity to one with tightened capacity after the mid-1990s.
In the structural-economic literature, Oliver et al. (2014) validated empirically that as
a pipeline between two hubs becomes congested the basis differential between their spot
prices widens. He also confirmed empirically that the availability of storage mitigates the
price effects of congestion through the intertemporal substitution of transmission services.
Overall, the examination of open access effects using structural models was found to be scant
and disconnected. This was one of the motivations behind the development of this chapter.
The net effect on market prices due to all the changes introduced by Order 636 is un-
determined under my analysis. The dynamics of these changes are commingled and the net
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effect depends on which effect dominates over others. Nonetheless, the presumption is that
market prices will drop overall after Order 636. For some regions, the drop in market prices
may not be significant until the stock of midstream assets increases to meet the requirements
of the open-access market structure. For an accurate assessment, numerical analyses need
to be carried out on a regional basis by building CTA and OTA models tailored to the an-
ticipated effects. Assuming the effects of a larger pool of suppliers with access to transport
dominates overall, qualitative assessments about the market impact on a region after open
access (but before the shale oil revolution) can be made based on observed changes in price
and in regional category using Table 3.11. For instance, a region where price increases after
open access while still remaining Type 1 can be said to have been impacted by local produc-
ers having greater access to external under supplied markets. The effects of Order 636 can
be listed using the qualitative assessments of the market impacts on different regions after
open access. Future research can validate these qualitative assessments empirically using
econometric models of structural breaks in prices and exchanges in regions of interest.
Incidentally, in the development of this chapter, two unproven statements found in
Samuelson (1952) were formally validated. The first one is that decentralized competi-
tive agents (producers) in a network would get to the same market equilibrium exchanges
and prices that a benevolent social planner (trader) would. This statement is the analog of
Adam Smith’s invisible hand moving commodities throughout an exchange network. This
statement was proven in Section 3.10 given the equivalency of complementarities produced
by the CTA and OTA models under perfect competition. The second statement is about
the effects of an increase in excess-supply in any given region of a network of interconnected
regions. Samuelson (1952) drew these effects, which are framed in Section 3.11.2, based on
economic reasoning and a simple numerical example. In Section 3.11.2, the same statement
was derived using the relationships summarized in Table 3.5, which resulted from formal
complementarity analyses of a generic model.
159
REFERENCES CITED
Abel, A. B. and Eberly, J. C. (1995). Optimal Investment with Costly Reversibility. NBER
Working Paper Series, 5091:51.
Aivazian, V. A. and Callen, J. L. (1981). Capacity Expansion in the U.S. Natural-Gas
Pipeline Industry, chapter 6, pages 145–159. Academic Press, New York, NY, first edition.
Aivazian, V. A., Callen, J. L., Luke-Chan, M., and Mountain, D. C. (1987). Economies
of Scale Versus Technological Change in The Natural Gas Transmission Industry. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(3):556–561.
Anderson, S. T., Kellog, R., and Salant, S. W. (2014). Hotelling Under Pressure. NBER
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 20280(JULY).
Avalos, R., Fitzgerald, T., and Rucker, R. R. (2016). Measuring the Effects of Natural
Gas Pipeline Constraints on Regional Pricing and Market Integration. Energy Economics,
60:217 – 231.
Averch, H. and Johnson, L. L. (1962). Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint.
The American Economic Review, 52(5):1052–1069.
Boogert, A. and De Jong, C. (2008). Gas Storage Valuation Using a Monte Carlo Method.
The Journal of Derivatives, Spring 2008:81–98.
Brennan, M. J. and Schwartz, E. S. (1985). Evaluating Natural Resource Investments.
Journal of Business, 58(2):135–157.
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APPENDIX A
INTEGRALS OF SEASONALITY FACTOR St
This appendix solves the following six integrals related to seasonality factor St (1.2).
They are common results referenced in Appendices B and C.
∫ T
0
St dt = T (A.1)
∫ T
0














sin bt dt = 0 (A.3)
∫ T
0
S2t dt = T (1 + a
2/2) (A.6)










(1− a · sin bt) dt = T +
a
b
(cos bT − 1) .
Because bT = 2π, cos bT = cos 2π = 1 and
∫ T
0
St dt = T +
a
b









St dt = 1,
∫ T
0
St dt = T. (A.1)
Based on the previous result,
∫ T
0
1− St dt = 0. (A.2)
Because 1− St = a · sin bt, a
∫ T
0
sin bt dt = 0 and
∫ T
0
sin bt dt = 0. (A.3)
Finding S2t ,
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S2t = (1− a · sin bt)
2 = 1− 2a · sin bt+ a2 · sin2bt.




[1− cos (2bt)] .















(sin 2bT − sin 0)
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The end result of this integral is
∫ T
0









NON-BINDING STORAGE CAPACITY OPERATIONS
This appendix formulates the optimal control problem for the non-binding storage ca-
pacity operation, under monopoly in Section B.1 and perfect competition in Section B.2.
Both sections build up from the concepts and terminology introduced in Sections 1.4 and
1.5. They also use common results introduced in Appendix A. The monopoly model is setup
under fixed terminal point and free terminal conditions in Sections B.1.1 and B.1.2, respec-
tively. The shadow values of inventory under these two terminal conditions are contrasted
and the differences are explained in Section B.1.3. The explanation is based on how the
role of the agent is expanded by switching from fixed terminal point to free terminal condi-
tion. Once the role distinction is made, the free terminal condition is dropped and the fixed
terminal point continues to be the terminal condition of choice for the remaining models –
starting with the perfect-competition model in Section B.2.
B.1 Under Monopoly
The monopoly model is now assembled. The goal of the monopoly storage operator is to
maximize the operating income (π) generated by the purchase and sale of natural gas over
the course of planning horizon (T ). Using (1.7), the goal of the monopolist can be expressed







dt. Price Pt (1.5) is dependent on quantity demanded Q
D
t (1.4),
which in turn is dependent on Q0 and u. The storer influences prices alone by choosing u
because the storer is a monopolist in this setup. Over time, u changes inventory level N
according to the expression Ṅ = u. The optimal control problem for the monopoly storage
operator is formulated in (B.1), with ut as the control variable and Nt as the state variable.




−u · Pt (Q0 − u) dt s.t. Ṅ = u and N (0) = 0 (B.1)
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= Pt (Q0 − u) = A · St − B · (Q0 − u)
The optimal control problem is initially solved by stating the Hamiltonian first, deriving
the first order condition (FOC), solving for the optimum choice variable u∗, and checking
the second order condition (SOC) as follows.
H = −u · [A · St − B · (Q0 − u)] + λu (B.2)
∂H
∂u
= −A · St +B · (Q0 − 2u
















= −2B < 0, SOC checks for maximum. The motion and costate equations





= 0, respectively. The latter implies that λ∗t = λ
∗ (constant).
Because the state variable Nt is not present in the Hamiltonian, there is no inventory ef-
fect, which makes the shadow value of inventory (lambda) constant. The shadow value of
inventory is also known in the literature as convenience yield.
B.1.1 Fixed Terminal Point
Under fixed terminal point, inventory is set to zero at the end of the planning horizon
[N∗ (T ) = 0] to be consistent with a sequence of cycles where each begins and ends with
zero inventory, i.e., inventory is not carried over from one cycle to the next. Terminal
condition N∗ (T ) = 0 implies
∫ T
0
u∗t dt = 0. Lambda star (λ





















= 0. Solving for λ∗,
λ∗ = P0 (Q0) (B.5)
where
P0 (Q0) = A− BQ0. (B.6)
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P0 (Q0) is referred to as the neutral price, which is the initial price reached before any seasonal
fluctuation begins. The shadow value of inventory (Lambda star) in (B.5) is constant over
time and equal to P0 (Q0). However, (B.5) conflicts with an anticipated value of zero for
the optimized shadow value of inventory under certainty. This discrepancy is explained
when the results under the fixed terminal point and free terminal condition are contrasted







∗ (B.4), u∗ = 1
2
(


















· (sin bt) . (B.8)
The interior solution found for optimal operational flow u∗ above checks the intuition that












→ St > 1 and u
∗ < 0
)
. However, not so intu-
itively, u∗ is a fraction (sin bt) of a constant aA/2B that is not dependent on supply flow
Q0. It turns out that optimal operational flow u
∗ depends on demand only (represented by
parameters A and B and degree of seasonality a) because demand is the driver of changes in
market equilibrium over time – in this particular model setup. These changes are the source
of revenue for storage operation. Constant aA/2B is referred to, from hereon, as the base





Substituting u∗ (B.8) and Qb (B.9) in Q
D
t (1.4), quantity demanded under optimal
monopoly operation QD∗t is





· (sin bt) = Q0 −Qb · (sin bt) . (B.10)
This means that quantity demanded QD∗t fluctuates around Q0 by an amount that goes up
to Qb, i.e., Q
D∗
t ∈ [Q0±Qb]. Optimal inventory N
∗









Qb · (sin bt) dt = Qb
∫ t
0
(sin bt) dt =
Qb
b








Inventory reaches a maximum when t = T/2. Thus, the minimum non-binding storage





























(1− cos bt) (B.12)
As anticipated, an increase (decrease) in seasonal variation (a) increases (decreases) the
minimum non-binding storage capacity (SC∗ ∝ a). Ratio A/B is the maximum flow that
could possibly be demanded when demand is in neutral position. Ratio A/B is a linear
demand metric. Not surprisingly, an increase (decrease) in ratio A/B also increases (de-





. In other words, a higher
(lower) reservation price increases (decreases) the minimum non-binding storage capacity.
Conversely, a less (more) elastic demand increases (decreases) the minimum non-binding
storage capacity.
B.1.1.1 Bounds for Interior Solution
Bounds on Q0 are now addressed because not imposing them from the start can lead to
unfeasible outcomes. u∗ as is could generate negative consumptions or negative prices. To
keep u∗ away from unfeasible outcomes, limits for Q0 are found next to ensure consumption
is positive at any time
(
QD∗t ≥ 0 ∀t
)
. The related bounding condition is QD∗t = Q0 − u
∗ ≥
0 → Q0 ≥ u
∗ ∀t. Substituting u∗ (B.8) and Qb (B.9), Q0 ≥ Qb · (sin bt) ∀t. Because
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Limits for Q0 are found next to ensure price is positive at any time (P
∗
t ≥ 0 ∀t). Based on
Pt (1.5), market equilibrium price over time is P
∗
t = A · St − B · Q
D∗
t ≥ 0 ∀t. Substituting
QD∗t = Q0 − u

































∀t. Adding terms, A
2B
[St + 1] ≥ Q0 ∀t. Because mint St = 1− a, the upper bound for Q0
ensuring positive prices over time is A
2B
(2− a) ≥ Q0. The upper bound for Q0 expressed in







Besides upper bound (B.14), an absolute upper bound for Q0 can be found from the following
absolute bounding condition: the overall volume suppliedQoT should not exceed the absolute






is the maximum flow































. Thus, the absolute maximum for Q0 is A/B.
This result checks with upper bound (B.14) when a = 0, which implies Qb = 0. Because
a ≥ 0, upper bound (B.14) always binds before the absolute maximum does. In conclusion,






(2− a). The same
bounds expressed in terms of Qb are







The bounds for Q0 (B.15) can be observed graphically along the x-axis in Figure 1.2.
Within the bounds of Q0, the operational flow for storage u
∗ is independent of supply flow
Q0. However, convenience yield is not. Under the fixed terminal condition, convenience
yield is apparently dependent on Q0: λ
∗ = A− BQ0. As indicated before, this discrepancy
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is explained when the results under the fixed terminal point and free terminal condition are
contrasted in Section B.1.3.
B.1.1.2 Price, Profit, and Welfare
Market equilibrium price, profit, and welfare are now found. First, market equilibrium
price is defined as P ∗t = Pt [Q0 − u








erating Pt(·) using (1.1) and substituting St (1.2), P
∗








Multiplying factors and brackets, P ∗t = A − aA · sin bt − B · Q0 + aA/2 · (sin bt). Adding
terms and substituting P0 (Q0) from (B.6),
P ∗t = P0 (Q0)−
aA
2
(sin bt) . (B.16)
Substituting Qb (B.9), P
∗
t = P0 (Q0)− BQb (sin bt). Substituting u
∗ (B.8),
P ∗t = P0 (Q0)− Bu
∗. (B.17)
(B.16) shows that P ∗t fluctuates around neutral price P0 (Q0) by an amount that can go
up to aA/2, i.e., Pt ∈ [P0 (Q0)±
aA
2
]. After substituting St (1.2) in Pt(Q0) (1.12), the market
equilibrium price when there is no storage can be expressed as
Pt (Q0) = P0(Q0)− aA (sin bt) . (B.18)
Comparing the market equilibrium price when there is no storage (B.18) against (B.16)
shows that introducing monopoly storage operations to the market reduces price fluctuation
by a half. Second, optimal profit π∗ is found as the integral π∗ =
∫ T
0
−u∗ · P ∗t dt. Substituting
u∗t (B.8) and P
∗
t (B.17) in π
∗ leads to π∗ =
∫ T
0
−Qb · (sin bt) · [P0 (Q0)− BQb (sin bt)] dt. Inte-







Substituting (A.3) and (A.4), or
∫ T
0
(sin bt) dt = 0 and
∫ T
0








(B.19) shows that π∗ is not dependent on Q0. This result checks because neither price
deviations nor storage flows, which are the basis for operating income, change with Q0.
Consequently, the storage operator is indifferent to the amount of supply flow Q0 – as long
as it is within the bounds of an interior solution – because the optimal profit achieved is
independent of Q0. On the other hand, the storage operator is not indifferent to Q0 when
it comes down to the amount of initial inventory N (0) which is valued at a shadow value of
P0(Q0). Third, welfare under monopoly storage operation (WM) is found by integrating Wt


























[Q0 −Qb · (sin bt)] · {A · St + A · St − B · [Q0 −Qb · (sin bt)]} dt.







[Q0 −Qb · (sin bt)] · {2A · (1− a · sin bt)− B · [Q0 −Qb · (sin bt)]} dt







[Q0 −Qb · (sin bt)] · {2A− 2aA · sin bt− BQ0 +BQb · (sin bt)} dt.







[Q0 −Qb · (sin bt)] · {(2A− BQ0) + (BQb − 2aA) · sin bt} dt.







[Q0 −Qb · (sin bt)] · {(2A− BQ0)− 3B ·Qb · sin bt} dt.
Multiplying the two factors above, while eliminating those terms containing (sin bt) as
they yield a zero integral
∫ T
0








[Q0 (2A− BQ0)] + 3B ·Q
2
b · (sin bt)
2 dt.
Integrating it and substituting (A.3), or
∫ T
0























BT ·Q2b . (B.20)
In the next section, the free terminal condition is evaluated by letting the level of inventory
be free at the end of the planning horizon. The model results under the free terminal
condition are then contrasted with those under the fixed terminal point. This contrast will
help explain why convenience yield is greater than zero under the fixed terminal point while
the anticipated result is zero.
B.1.2 Free Terminal Condition
The free terminal condition (FTC) uses the transversality condition λ∗ (T ) = 0. Because
λ∗t (= λ
∗) is still constant, lambda star under the FTC is equal to zero (λ∗FTCt = 0). After















































+Qb · (sin bt) . (B.22)
Given that the absolute maximum value of Q0 is
A
B
, the first term in u∗FTC is always negative.











is withdrawn over time. Substituting this new term, the optimal storage flow is
u∗FTC = u∗ −QW0 . (B.24)
This result shows that the storage operator, under the FTC, effectively becomes also a
producer with access to infinite resource from inventory – supplementing inelastic supply Q0.
In fact, QW0 (B.23) is the optimal flow for the storage operator to “produce.” If Q0 = 0, there
would be no other producers and the storage operator effectively becomes also a monopoly















is the production anticipated for a monopoly producer, where marginal
revenue is equal to zero (MR = 0). Under the FTC, the initial inventory needed such











B.1.2.1 Bounds for Interior Solution











= Q0 − u
∗FTC ≥ 0 →
Q0 ≥ u








+ Qb · (sin bt)
∀t. Because maxt sin bt = 1, the lower bound for Q0 ensuring positive consumption over
time is












By substituting Qb (B.9), expression (B.25) becomes Q0 ≥ (a− 1)
A
B
. Because a ∈ [0, 1],
A(a−1)
B

















around the middle point betweenQ0 and A/B by an amountQb. Limits forQ0 are found next
to ensure price is positive at any time
(
P ∗FTCt ≥ 0 ∀t
)
under the FTC. Market equilibrium




≥ 0 ∀t. Substituting Q0−u
∗FTC and u∗FTC

















∀t. Rearranging terms, A
B
St ≥ Q0 ∀t. Because mint St = 1−a, the upper bound for
Q0 ensuring positive prices over time under the FTC is (1− a)
A
B
≥ Q0. In conclusion, the
bounds for Q0 achieving an interior solution for u
∗FTC are − (1− a) A
B








(1− a) . (B.26)
B.1.2.2 Price and Profit
Market equilibrium price and profit are now found. First, market equilibrium price is











Operating Pt(·) using (1.1), P
∗FTC
t = Pt (Q0 − u
∗)− BQW0 . Substituting (B.17),





Second, optimal profit π∗FTC is found as the integral π∗FTC =
∫ T
0
−u∗FTC · P ∗FTCt dt. Sub-
stituting P ∗FTCt (B.27), P
∗
t (B.17), and u














Multiplying the two factors above, while eliminating those terms containing (sin bt) as
they yield a zero integral
∫ T
0
































Relative to the fixed terminal point where π∗ =
BQ2b
2







· QW0 T . This amount captures the revenues generated by






over the course of every
cycle.
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B.1.3 Summary of Interior Solution for Monopoly Storage Operation
Table B.1 recaps the solutions to non-binding storage capacity operations by the mo-
nopolist under fixed-terminal point (FTP) and free terminal condition (FTC). The results
in Table B.1 show that by switching from FTP to FTC the role of the storage operator is
relaxed and expanded to one of a producer fringed to a dominant supply Q0. For instance,




is simply the same as that under
the FTP (u∗) expanded by the term QW0 . Once the fringed producer role is satisfied, the
shadow value of inventory (λ∗) drops from P0 (Q0) down to zero. Given this logic, lambda
star under the FTP is not capturing the shadow value of inventory but rather the shadow
value of the agent becoming also a fringed producer. More precisely, the shadow value of
inventory under the FTP arises from the restriction that inventories cannot be below zero.
This implies that the effective shadow value of inventory is in fact zero.
Because the results under the FTP reflect the role of the agent as a storage operator
only while those under the FTC do not, the use of the FTP is continued in this document.
Nonetheless, the results of lambda star under the FTP should be interpreted as the shadow
value of the resource if the agent were a producer (user cost) but not as the shadow value of
inventory, or convenience yield – which must be equal to zero in this deterministic setting.
The shadow value of inventory can be greater than zero when either storage capacity is
binding or there is uncertainty over future supply.
B.2 Under Perfect Competition
This section formulates the optimal control problem for the non-binding storage capacity
operation under perfect competition. Unlike Section B.1, the solution is evaluated under fixed
terminal point only. The goal of the social storage operator is to maximize social welfare
(W ). The expression for welfare at any instant (Wt) is shown in (1.9). By integrating Wt,




The optimal control problem for the social storage operator is formulated in (B.28), with ut
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Table B.1: Market equlibrium solutions to non-binding storage capacity operations by the





Fixed Terminal Point Free Terminal Condition
Q0 bounds for
interior solution













Storage flow u∗ = Qb · (sin bt)



















Price P ∗t = P0 (Q0)− B · u








































·QW0 T + π
∗
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A · St · (Q0 − u)−
B
2
· (Q0 − u)
2
]
dt s.t. Ṅ = u, N (0) = 0, N (T ) = 0 (B.28)
As described in Section B.1, the steps to solve the optimal control problem begin by stat-
ing the Hamiltonian first, deriving the first order condition (FOC), solving for the optimum
choice variable u∗∗, and checking the second order condition (SOC).107
H =
[
A · St · (Q0 − u)−
B
2






= −A · St +B · (Q0 − u
∗∗) + λ∗∗ = 0 (B.30)
u∗∗ =
(











= −B < 0, SOC checks for maximum. Motion and costate equations are the






= 0, respectively. The latter implies λ∗∗t = λ
∗∗ (constant). As in Section
B.1.1, terminal condition N∗∗ (T ) = 0 implies
∫ T
0
u∗∗t dt = 0. Lambda double-star (λ
∗∗) can











dt = 0. Integrating








= 0. Solving for λ∗∗,
λ∗∗ = P0 (Q0) = A− BQ0 (B.32)





























· (sin bt) = 2 ·Qb · (sin bt) (B.33)
Comparing (B.33) and (B.8) shows that optimal storage flow for the social operator
doubles its monopoly counterpart, i.e., u∗∗ = 2u∗. Noting this fact and the similar FOCs
107 A double star is used as superscript for the variables of the social operator results to distinguish them
from those of the monopoly case.
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in (B.3) and (B.30), the optimized results for quantity demanded QD∗∗t , inventory N
∗∗
t , and
minimum non-binding storage capacity SC∗∗ can be found by simply substituting u∗ with
u∗∗ = 2u∗ in the corresponding procedures presented under the monopoly environment.108
The end results of these substitutions are presented below.
QD∗∗t = Q0 − u
∗∗ (B.34)







(1− cos bt) (B.36)
B.2.1 Price, Profit, and Welfare
Market equilibrium price, profit, and welfare are now found. First, market equilibrium
price is P ∗∗t = Pt [Q0 − u
∗∗] = Pt [Q0 − 2 ·Qb · (sin bt)]. Substituting St (1.2) and u
∗∗ (B.33),
P ∗∗t = A · [1− a · sin bt]−B ·
[





. Multiplying factors and brackets, P ∗∗t =
A− aA · sin bt− B ·Q0 + aA · (sin bt). Adding terms and substituting P0 (Q0) from (B.6),
P ∗∗t = P0 (Q0) . (B.37)
The result of P ∗∗t shows that the social storage operator eliminates any price fluctuation,
leaving prices constant and equal to neutral price P0 (Q0). This is consistent with the
intuition that a social planner would arbitrage any price difference away through storage
operations. Accordingly, the profit for the social storage operator (πS) can be expected to
be null. It should be noted that the social storage operator optimizes welfare and not profit.
Second, the social operator profit is formulated as πS =
∫ T
0
−u∗∗ · P ∗∗t dt. Substituting
u∗∗ (B.31) and P ∗∗t (B.37), πS =
∫ T
0
−2 · (sin bt) ·Qb · P0 (Q0) dt. Taking constant terms out,
πS = −2 ·Qb · P0 (Q0)
∫ T
0
(sin bt) dt. Using the result from (A.3), πS = 0 as anticipated.
108 The optimal quantity demanded and minimum non-binding storage capacity found under monopoly can








Third, welfare under perfectly competitive storage operation (W ∗∗s ) can be found by























· (Q0 − 2 · (sin bt) ·Qb)
2dt.
Multiplying the two factors in the first term and squaring the second term above, while
eliminating those terms containing (sin bt) as they yield a zero integral
∫ T
0













Q20 + 4 · (sin bt)
2 ·Q2bdt.
Integrating it and substituting (A.4), or
∫ T
0
(sin bt)2dt = T/2,















+BT ·Q2b . (B.38)
B.2.2 Bounds for Interior Solution
Bounds on Q0 are now found to keep u
∗∗ away from generating unfeasible outcomes. To
ensure quantity consumed is positive at any time
(
QD∗∗t ≥ 0 ∀t
)
, the required condition is
QD∗∗t = Q0 − u
∗∗ ≥ 0 → Q0 ≥ u





· (sin bt ) ∀t.









To ensure price is positive at any time (P ∗∗t ≥ 0 ∀t), the required upper bound for Q0 is




In conclusion, the limits of Q0 achieving an interior solution for u
∗∗ are




Section 1.6 summarizes the main results from this appendix.
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APPENDIX C
BINDING STORAGE CAPACITY OPERATIONS
This appendix formulates the optimal control problem for the binding storage capacity
operation, under perfect competition in Section C.1 and monopoly in Section C.2. Both
sections build up from the concepts and terminology introduced in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, and
Appendix B. They also use common results introduced in Appendix A.
C.1 Under Perfect Competition
This section formulates the optimal control problem for the binding storage capacity




and lower (N ≥ 0) storage capacity
constraints are introduced. Each constraint is complementary to shadow values θUt and θ
L
t ,
respectively. The constrained problem setup for the social planner adds these constraints to





A · St · (Q0 − u)−
B
2
· (Q0 − u)
2
]
dt s.t. Ṅ = u, N (0) = 0, N (T ) = 0 (C.1)
Upper constraint : N ≤ N ⊥ θUt ≥ 0
Lower constraint : −N ≤ 0 ⊥ θLt ≥ 0
Both constraints apply throughout the planning period [0, T ]. Given the minimum non-
binding storage capacity for the social planner SC∗∗ (B.35), the nominal storage capacity





. Defining normalized storage capacity for the social
planner as
NSC∗∗ ≡ N/SC∗∗, (C.2)
storage capacity is binding when NSC∗∗ < 1. Generally, constraints in optimal control
theory require the use of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. As state variables, and
no control variables, are present in the constraints, the constrained problem can be simply
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treated by augmenting the Hamiltonian into a Lagrangian function and operating on it
as before (Chiang, 1992). Thus, the solution begins by stating the Hamiltonian (H) first,
augmenting it into a Lagrangian (L), and deriving its first order condition (FOC).
H =
[
A · St · (Q0 − u)−
B
2
· (Q0 − u)
2
]
+ λ · u (C.3)




































Deriving λ̇∗∗ from (C.6),









= −B < 0, the Second Order Condition (SOC) effectively checks













= θU∗∗t − θ
L∗∗
t . (C.8)





= θU∗∗t − θ
L∗∗
t (C.9)
Table C.1 shows the sets of values adopted by θU∗∗t , θ
L∗∗
t , and N
∗∗ as a result of the KKT con-
ditions introduced by the upper and lower storage capacity constraints (USCC and LSCC).
In Table C.2, these sets (or optimality conditions) are re-stated in the column and row head-
ers and superposed in the four interior cells – identified with roman numerals (i) through
(iv). Superposing produces the results described in the four cells. In turn, the review of these
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Table C.1: KKT conditions for storage capacity constraints.
KKT condition by Constraint (Row) and
Binding Status (Column)
Not Binding Binding
Upper Storage Capacity Constraint (USCC)





Lower Storage Capacity Constraint (LSCC)





results leads to the identification of four stages (A through D) over the planning horizon. In
Table C.2, the bottom line describes these four stages in terms of whether changes in price
(Ṗ ∗∗) and inventory (Ṅ∗∗) over time are positive, negative, or zero. In the four interior cells,
Ṅ∗∗ is used to determine whether storage flow (u∗∗) is positive, negative, or zero and whether
its change over time (u̇∗∗) is equal to zero or not. Table C.3 summarizes these results as an
initial characterization by stage. Based on Table C.3, stage A must follow stage D to build
up inventory from zero (N∗∗ = 0). Once inventory reaches capacity N at the back end of
stage A, inventory remains constant at this level during stage B. Stage C follows stage B to
bring inventory back down to zero (N∗∗ = 0). Thus, the sequence of stages is A, B, C, D,
and back to A. Time delimiters τ1 through τ4 are introduced accordingly in Table C.3. Each
stage is labeled using a unique feature: stage of injection (A), stage of binding capacity (B),
stage of withdrawal (C), and stage of stockout (D). Table C.3 is now used as a blueprint to
solve optimized choice variable u∗∗t , state variable N
∗∗
t , endogenous result P
∗∗
t , and shadow






t are solved first. To begin, Ṗ can be found as the time
derivative of inverse demand function (1.5) as follows.












Table C.2: Superposed KKT conditions and accompanying results.
(C.9) applies for all
superposed conds.
Ṗ ∗∗ = θU∗∗t − θ
L∗∗
t
















LSCC is not binding.




(i) None binding → Stages A and C
(




0 < N∗∗ < N
)
AsN∗∗ changes, Ṅ∗∗ = 0→ u∗∗ = 0.
Substituting
(




in (C.9), Ṗ ∗∗ = 0. Price is constant.






→ Ṅ∗∗ = 0→ u∗∗ = 0
→ u̇∗∗ = 0
By (C.9), Ṗ ∗∗ = θU∗∗t > 0.
LSCC is binding.




(iii) LSCC binds only → Stage D
⇒ (N∗∗ = 0) < N
→ Ṅ∗∗ = 0→ u∗∗ = 0→ u̇∗∗ = 0
By (C.9), Ṗ ∗∗ = −θL∗∗t < 0.
(iv) Both binding





ously because N > 0.
(i) In this set of results, inventory increases or decreases while price is constant.
Stages A and C capture these conditions. In both stages, price is constant
(












(ii) Stage B: Increasing price
(
Ṗ ∗∗ > 0
)





(iii) Stage D: Decreasing price
(
Ṗ ∗∗ < 0
)
and constant stockout (N∗∗ = 0).
(iv) There is no feasible stage when N > 0.
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Table C.3: Initial characterization by planning stage under perfect competition.
Stage t Ṗ ∗∗ u∗∗ u̇∗∗ N∗∗ Ṅ∗∗





B – Binding τ2 ≤ t ≤ τ3 θ
U∗∗
t (> 0) 0 0 N 0





D – Stockout τ4 ≤ t ≤ τ1 −θ
L∗∗
t (< 0) 0 0 0 0
dP
dt
= Bu̇− aAbcos bt
Ṗ = −aAb · cos bt+Bu̇ (C.10)
In stages B and D, because u̇∗∗ = 0 (Table C.3) and based on (C.10), Ṗ ∗∗ is reduced to
Ṗ ∗∗ = Ṗ (Q0) (C.11)
where
Ṗ (Q0) = −aAb · cos bt. (C.12)
Combining this result with those tabulated for Ṗ ∗∗ in Table C.3 (stages B and D), both θU∗∗t
and −θL∗∗t become equal to the rate of price change that would be realized if there were no
storage operation, Ṗ (Q0). These results for Ṗ











0 Stages A and C
(
θU∗∗t = Ṗ (Q0) = −aAb · cos bt
)
> 0 Stage B (Binding capacity)
(
−θL∗∗t = Ṗ (Q0) = −aAb · cos bt
)
< 0 Stage D (No inventory)
(C.13)
Because the term aAb > 0, stage B condition
(
θU∗∗t = −aAb cos bt
)
> 0 can be met when
cos bt < 0. This occurs when π
2
< bt < 3
2
π. Given that b = 2π
T
, the widest range possible for
stage B is 1
4
T < tB <
3
4
T with midpoint T/2. Analogously, the widest range for stage D is
3
4
T < tD < T and 0 < tD <
1
4
T . Stage D is bisected by the start of the defined demand cycle
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(t = 0). On the other hand, the widest ranges for stages A and C can be obtained when
the ranges for stages B and D are reduced down to their midpoints.109 Thus, the widest





< tC < T , correspondingly. Table C.4
summarizes the widest ranges by stage, which occur by pairs – widest stages A and C in the
first column and widest stages B and D in the second column. The first stage pair (A and
C) is fully extended when storage capacity is not binding as both injection and withdrawal
stages (A and C) are fully developed. On the other hand, the second stage pair (B and D)
is fully extended when there is no storage operation as both injection and withdrawal stages
are fully removed.
Table C.4: Widest stage range.
Stage
Widest ranges
of stages A and C
Widest ranges
of stages B and D
A – Injection
0 < tA <
T
2
Implies 0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤
T
2
Reduced to midpoint 1
4
T
B – Binding Reduced to midpoint T/2
1
4













< tC < T
Implies T
2
≤ τ3 ≤ τ4 ≤ T
Reduced to midpoint 3
4
T
D – Stockout Reduced to midpoint T
First half 3
4
T < tD < T and






T ≤ τ4 ≤ τ1 ≤ T and




109 It is shown later that pairs of time delimeters (τi, τi+1) for all stages are symmetric around their
midpoints.
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In Table C.4, the widest range for stage A implies that its two time delimiters, τ1 and
τ2, are bound by the first half of the operation horizon as 0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤
T
2
. Table C.4 shows
analogous results for the other pairs of time delimiters under stages B, C, and D. In turn,
superposing the pair bounds introduced in Table C.4 lead to the widest ranges of individual
time delimiters shown in Table C.5. These results show that each time delimiter τi falls
within the ith quarter of the planning horizon. In turn, the product bτi falls within the i
th
phase quadrant. Based on this quadrant, Table C.5 shows whether the sine and cosine of bτi
is non-negative (≥ 0) or non-positive (≤ 0). These results are used later.






τ1 0 ≤ τ1 ≤
1
4




sin bτ1 ≥ 0




T ≤ τ2 ≤
3
4
T → 2nd Quarter π
2
≤ bτ2 ≤ π → 2
nd Quad.
sin bτ2 ≥ 0







T → 3rd Quarter π ≤ bτ3 ≤
3
2
π → 3rd Quad.
sin bτ3 ≤ 0




T ≤ τ4 ≤ T → 4
th Quarter 3
2
π ≤ bτ4 ≤ 2π → 4
th Quad.
sin bτ4 ≤ 0
cos bτ4 ≥ 0
Price P ∗∗ can be found by integrating Ṗ ∗∗ (C.13). Price P ∗∗ is constant P I under stage
A and constant PW under stage C. Subscripts I and W stand for injection and withdrawal,
respectively. In stages B and D, because u = 0 (See Table C.3), quantity demanded is equal
to quantity supplied
(
QDt = Q0 − u = Q0
)




= Pt (Q0) where
Pt (Q0) = A · St − B ·Q0, (C.14)
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which is in fact the price that would be realized if there were no storage operation. These















P I Stage A (Injection)
PW Stage C (Withdrawal)
Pt (Q0) Stages B and D
(C.15)





= P as shown in (C.16).
u∗∗ = Q0 +
P − A · St
B
(C.16)
where P = P I for stage A and P = PW for stage C. u
∗∗ can be expressed as a function of
Pt (Q0) by substituting Q0 with BQ0/B in (C.16) first and then substituting (C.14).
u∗∗ =






P − Pt (Q0)
]
. (C.17)



















P I − Pt (Q0)
]




PW − Pt (Q0)
]
< 0 Stage C (Withdrawal)
(C.18)
These results show that storage flow u∗∗ changes over time as much as needed to bring
the price of no storage operation Pt (Q0) up or down to the flat price P of the corresponding
stage. Because there is no inventory (N = 0) at the start of stage A, inventory N∗∗A is simply





u∗∗A (s)ds. In stage C, inventory N
∗∗
C
can be found by deducting the accumulation of withdrawal flow u∗∗C from binding inventory
capacity N as N∗∗C (t) = N +
∫ t
τ3




























u∗∗A (s)ds Stage A (Injection)




u∗∗C (s) Stage C (Withdrawal)















P − Ps (Q0)
]
ds. Integrating the right hand side (RHS),
∫ t
τi






















Ssds− (t− τi) ·Q0.
















(cos bt− cos bτi) .
















(cos bt− cos bτ i )
]
+ (t− τi) ·Q0.
After rearranging, function f captures the integral result as
∫ t
τi






















(cos bt− cos bτi ) i = 1, 3, (C.21)
and P = P I for stage A and P = PW for stage C, and τi ≤ t ≤ τi+1.
By combining the results from (C.15), (C.18), (C.19), (C.20), and (C.13), Table C.6
summarizes the market equilibrium solutions by stage under perfect competition expressed
in terms of price P ∗∗, storage flow u∗∗, inventory level N∗∗, and shadow prices of the upper
and lower limits of inventory, θU∗∗t and θ
L∗∗





Table C.6: Binding operation solutions by stage under perfect competition.
Variable Stage A Stage B Stage C Stage D
t τ1 < t < τ2 τ2 ≤ t ≤ τ3 τ3 < t < τ4
τ4 ≤ t ≤ T
0 ≤ t ≤ τ1




P I − Pt (Q0)
]
> 0 0 1
B
[





τ1, t, P I
)





θU∗∗t 0 Ṗ (Q0) ≥ 0 0 0
θL∗∗t 0 0 0 −Ṗ (Q0) ≥ 0
are defined in (C.14), (C.12), and (C.21), respectively. Table C.6 contains six unknowns
(
τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, P I , and PW
)
which can be solved using the six conditions now introduced.
The continuity of u between stages, implied by the continuity of state variable N , defines
the following first four conditions.
u∗∗ (τi) = 0 ∀ i ∈ [1, 4] (C.22)
Substituting (C.22) in (C.17),
Pτi (Q0) = P (C.23)
where P = P I for i = 1, 2 and P = PW for i = 3, 4. Based on (1.1) and (1.2),
Pτi (Q0) = A · Sτi − B ·Q0 (C.24)
where
Sτi = (1− a · sin bτi ) ∀ i ∈ [1, 4]. (C.25)
















Because P = P I at time τi for i = 1, 2 and P = PW at time τi for i = 3, 4, (C.26) entails
sin bτ1 = sin bτ2 (C.27)
and
sin bτ3 = sin bτ4. (C.28)
As shown in Table C.5, τ1 and τ2 are bound by the first half of the planning horizon as






. Adding condition (C.27) to these bounds implies that τ1 and τ2 are
symmetric around midpoint T
4









. Rearranging, the sum of delimiters
for stage A is




Based on (C.28), an analogous result can be found for stage C whereby








is expressed as f (τi, t).
f (τi, t) = (t− τi)
(
Qo +









(cos bt − cos bτi )
After rearranging terms, the following final expression for f (τi, t) is defined.
f (τi, t) ≡ −
aA
bB
[b (t− τi) (sin bτi ) + (cos bt − cos bτi )] . (C.31)
The relationship between storage flow u∗∗ and inventory N∗∗ defines the two remaining
conditions (out of six total). First, inventory N∗∗ builds up from zero at time τ1 up to N at
time τ2. This inventory buildup condition,
∫ τ2
τ1
u∗∗t dt = N , can be stated using (C.20) as
f
(














Combining (C.32) and (C.33), f
(



















(cos bτ2 − cos bτ1 ) (C.34)












(cos bτ4 − cos bτ3 )
As shown in Table C.5, cos bτi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 4 and cos bτi ≤ 0 for i = 2, 3. Using
trigonometric identity cos bτi = ±
√
1− (sin bτi )
2, cos bτi can be expressed as
cos bτi = +
√
1− (sin bτi )
2 ≥ 0 for i = 1, 4 (C.35)
and
cos bτi = −
√
1− (sin bτi )
2 ≤ 0 for i = 2, 3. (C.36)
Given sine identities (C.27) and (C.28), cosine differences in (C.34) can be expressed as
(cos bτ2 − cos bτ1 ) = −2
√
1− (sin bτ1 )
2 (= −2 cos bτ1 ) ≤ 0 (C.37)
and
(cos bτ4 − cos bτ3 ) = 2
√
1− (sin bτ4 )
2 (= 2 cos bτ4 ) ≥ 0 (C.38)



































1− (sin bτ4 )
2
)
To meet equality (C.39), the square root terms on both sides must be equal and, hence,110
sin bτ1 = −sin bτ4. (C.40)
110 In Table C.5, sin bτ1 ≥ 0 and sin bτ4 ≤ 0. Accordingly, a negative sign is introduced in (C.40).
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Combining this result with (C.27) and (C.28) yields
sin bτ1 = sin bτ2 = −sin bτ3 = −sin bτ4. (C.41)
Because both pairs, (τ1, τ2) and (τ3, τ4), are equidistant to their corresponding midpoints,
(C.41) implies that the lengths of stages A and C are equal, or
(τ2 − τ1) = (τ4 − τ3) . (C.42)



















By substituting neutral price P0 (Q0) from (B.6) – restated below as (C.43) –
P0 (Q0) = A− B ·Q0 (C.43)
the following relationship between PW and P I is found.
PW − P0 (Q0) = P0 (Q0)− P I (C.44)
(C.44) shows that the difference between neutral price P0 (Q0) and injection price P I is
equal to the difference between withdrawal price PW and neutral price P0 (Q0). In other
words, injection price P I and withdrawal price PW are symmetric around neutral price
P0 (Q0). In addition, because both pairs, (τ1, τ2) and (τ3, τ4), are equidistant to their
corresponding midpoints and have the same lengths, pairs (τ2, τ3) and (τ4, τ1) must also be
equidistant to their midpoints and have the same lengths, or
(τ3 − τ2) = (T − τ4 + τ1) . (C.45)
The relationships of the four time delimiters (τi, i ∈ [1, 4]) introduced so far, in (C.29),
(C.30), and (C.42), lead to the following system of three equations and four unknowns.
τ1 + τ2 =
T
2




(τ2 − τ1) = (τ4 − τ3)
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Note that (C.45) is not included in the system of three equations because it is a combi-
nation of (C.29) and (C.30). To solve the system of equations, a new condition to solve for
τ1 can be found by substituting (B.35) in (C.31) and in turn this result in (C.32). Thus, τ1
can be solved iteratively from
g (τ1) = NSC
∗∗ (C.46)
where NSC∗∗ (C.2) is the normalized storage capacity under perfect competition and







Alternatively, a rating table of τ1 andNSC





. Based on (C.47), NSC∗∗ = 1 when τ1 = 0 and NSC
∗∗ = 0 when τ1 = T/4. Thus,
the NSC∗∗ range would be NSC∗∗ ∈ [0, 1]. After solving τ1 from (C.46), the remaining five
unknowns
(
τ2, τ3, τ4, P I , and PW
)









τ4 = T − τ1 (C.50)
P I [= Pτ1 (Q0)] = A (1− a sin bτ1 )− B ·Q0 (C.51)
and
PW = 2P0 (Q0)− P I (C.52)
where P0 (Q0) = A − B · Q0 is defined in (C.43). Section 1.7 recaps and re-assembles the
main results from this section.
C.1.1 Shadow prices
The shadow prices of the upper and lower limits of inventory, θU∗∗t and θ
L∗∗
t , shown in









s ∀ s ∈ [0, τ1] .
In words, θU∗∗t(s) in stage B is equal to θ
L∗∗
t′(s) in stage D when relative stage time s is the same
for both stages. This means that the shadow price attained in stage B by increasing the
upper limit of inventory by one unit is equivalent to the shadow price attained in stage
D by decreasing the lower limit of inventory by one unit. However, inventory limits are




can certainly be increased the lower
limit (zero) cannot be decreased. Thus, while θL∗∗t is mathematically consistent (with its
counterpart θU∗∗t ), θ
L∗∗
t is not physically viable. Accordingly, θ
L∗∗
t is not addressed as a
formal result.
C.1.2 Marginal Benefit of Storage Capacity
The marginal benefit of storage capacity (MBSC∗∗) for the social planner at a given nom-
inal storage capacity N can be found either as the integral
∫ τ3
τ2
θU∗∗t dt or the price difference











Ṗ (Q0) dt = PW − P I (C.53)
Alternatively, MBSC∗∗ can be expressed as a function of τ1 by substituting PW (C.52)
in (C.53) first and then substituting P0 (Q0) (C.43) and P I (C.51) in the result as follows.
MBSC∗∗ = 2
[
P0 (Q0)− P I
]
= 2 (A− BQ0 − [A (1− a · sin bτ1 )− B ·Q0])
MBSC∗∗ (τ1) = 2aA · sin bτ1 (C.54)
C.2 Under Monopoly
This section formulates the optimal control problem for the binding storage capacity oper-
ation under monopoly. To avoid duplicating results, this section builds up from the results of
Section C.1 as applicable. Analogous to the perfect competition case, the constrained prob-
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and lower (N≥0) storage capacity
constraints, each complementary to shadow values θUt and θ
L
t , respectively. The constrained
problem setup for the monopolist adds these constraints to (B.1) as shown in (C.55). The




−u · Pt (Q0 − u) dt s.t. Ṅ = u and N (0) = 0 N (T ) = 0 (C.55)
Upper constraint : N ≤ N ⊥ θUt ≥ 0
Lower constraint : −N ≤ 0 ⊥ θLt ≥ 0
Both constraints apply throughout the planning period [0, T ]. Given the minimum non-






. Defining normalized storage capacity for the monopolist as
NSC∗ = N/SC∗, (C.56)
storage capacity is binding when NSC∗ < 1. Analogous to the social planner case, the
constrained problem for the monopolist is simply addressed by augmenting the Hamiltonian
into a Lagrangian function and operating on it (Chiang, 1992). Thus, the solution begins
by stating the Hamiltonian (H) first, augmenting it into a Lagrangian (L), and deriving its
first order condition (FOC).
H = −u · [A · St − B · (Q0 − u)] + λu (C.57)












= −A · St +B · (Q0 − 2u





from (1.1), the FOC becomes
∂L
∂u
= −P ∗t (Q0 − 2u
∗) + λ∗t = 0. (C.59)
Solving for λ∗t and substituting Q
D∗










Deriving λ̇∗ from (C.60),









= −B < 0, the Second Order Condition (SOC) effectively checks













= θU∗t − θ
L∗
t . (C.62)




Ṗ ∗ +Bu̇∗ = θU∗t − θ
L∗
t (C.63)
The KKT conditions introduced by upper and lower storage capacity constraints (USCC and
LSCC) lead to the same sets of values introduced in Table C.1 now corresponding to θU∗t ,
θL∗t , and N
∗. Superposing these KKT results also lead to the identification of four stages
over the planning horizon (A through D) as introduced in Table C.2. However, because
(C.61) is different from (C.7), condition λ̇∗ = 0 in stages A and C lead to different results
for the change in price Ṗ ∗. In stages A and C, unlike the constant price
(
Ṗ ∗∗ = 0
)
obtained
under perfect competition, price changes under monopoly are negatively proportional to the
rate of storage flow change
(
Ṗ ∗ = −Bu̇∗
)
, i.e., while one increases the other decreases. The
initial characterization by stage under monopoly is summarized in Table C.7 111.
Just like under perfect competition, the initial characterization by planning stage shown
in Table C.7 is now used as a blueprint to solve optimized choice variable u∗t , state variable
N∗t , endogenous result P
∗









solved first. In stages A and C, as indicated before, while Ṗ ∗∗ = 0 under perfect competition,
111 Note how Ṗ ∗ in stages A and C
(
Ṗ ∗ = −Bu̇∗
)
differs from the counterpart result
(





Table C.7: Initial characterization by planning stage under monopoly.
Stage t Ṗ ∗ u∗ u̇∗ N∗ Ṅ∗





B – Binding τ2 ≤ t ≤ τ3 θ
U∗∗
t (> 0) 0 0 N 0





D – Stockout τ4 ≤ t ≤ τ1 −θ
L∗∗
t (< 0) 0 0 0 0















−Bu̇∗ Stages A and C
(
θU∗t = −aAb · cos bt
)
> 0 Stage B (Binding Inventory)
(
−θL∗t = −aAb · cos bt
)
< 0 Stage D (No Inventory)
(C.64)
The sequence of stages under monopoly is the same as that argued under perfect com-
petition: stage A, B, C, D and back to A. In addition, the widest ranges of stages and
time delimiters introduced in Table C.4 and Table C.5 apply under monopoly as well. For
stages A and C, Ṗ (C.10) – applicable under monopoly as well – can be combined with the
corresponding results in Table C.7 to obtain the following relationship.
(
Ṗ ∗ = −aAb cos bt +Bu̇∗
)
= −Bu̇∗ (C.65)
u̇∗ and u∗ can now be solved for stages A and C using (C.65). Placing u̇∗ terms on one
side, −aAb cos bt = −2Bu̇∗. Solving for u̇∗, u̇∗ = aAb
2B







cos bt dt = aA
2B
sin bt + C1. Integration coefficient C1 can be removed















(sin bt − sin bτ3 ) where t ∈ [τ3, τ4]. The results for storage flow u























(sin bt− sin bτ3) < 0 Stage C (Withdrawal)
(C.66)
Analogous to the perfect competition case, u∗ can be expressed as a function of price
realized under no storage operation Pt (Q0) by substituting (C.14). Adding and subtracting
B ·Q0 to u
∗ (C.66), u∗ = 1
2B
(aAsin bt − aAsin bτi )+B ·Q0−B ·Q0. Adding and subtracting
A, u∗ = 1
2B




[Pτi (Q0)− Pt (Q0)] . (C.67)















0 Stages B and D
1
2B
[Pτ1 (Q0)− Pt (Q0)] Stage A (Injection)
1
2B
[Pτ3 (Q0)− Pt (Q0)] Stage C (Withdrawal)
(C.68)
Comparing (C.18) and (C.68), optimized storage flow under monopoly is half of its coun-
terpart under perfect competition in stages A and C, i.e., u∗ = u∗∗/2. Storage flow u∗ (C.68)
is now used to find price P ∗. In stage A, price is defined using (1.5) as
P ∗A = Pt (Q0 − u
∗









[Pτ1 (Q0)− Pt (Q0)]
)
.




[Pτ1 (Q0) + Pt (Q0)] . (C.69)




[Pτ3 (Q0) + Pt (Q0)] . (C.70)
201
Because u∗ = 0 in stages B and D, see (C.68), quantity demanded is equal to supply
(
QDt = Q0 − u = Q0
)






















[Pτ1 (Q0) + Pt (Q0)] Stage A
1
2
[Pτ3 (Q0) + Pt (Q0)] Stage C
Pt (Q0) Stages B and D
(C.71)
The definition of inventory N∗ by stage under monopoly is similar to that introduced

























u∗A (s)ds Stage A (Injection)




u∗C (s) Stage C (Withdrawal)
0 Stage D (No Inventory)
(C.72)
In contrast to (C.20), as u∗ = u∗∗/2, integral
∫ t
τi






f (τi, t) . (C.73)
Because SC∗ = 1
2
SC∗∗, (C.73) implies that (C.46) applies analogously under monopoly as
g (τ1) = NSC
∗ (C.74)
where NSC∗ and g (τ1) are defined by (C.56) and (C.47), respectively. The continuity of u
between stages (C.22) also applies analogously under monopoly as
u∗ (τi) = 0 ∀ i ∈ [1, 4]. (C.75)
(C.74) and (C.75) imply that the resulting time delimiters, τi ∀i ∈ [1, 4], under monopoly
would be the same as those under perfect competition when NSC∗∗ = NSC∗. Thus, the four
time delimiters under monopoly can be solved using the same procedure introduced under
perfect competition by simply replacing NSC∗∗ with NSC∗. By combining the results from
(C.71), (C.68), (C.72), (C.73), and (C.64), Table C.8 summarizes the market equilibrium
solutions by stage under monopoly expressed in terms of price P ∗, storage flow u∗, inventory
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level N∗, and shadow prices of the upper and lower limits of inventory, θU∗t and θ
L∗
t . In Ta-
ble C.8, Pt (Q0), Ṗ (Q0), and f (τi, t) are defined in (C.14), (C.12), and (C.31), respectively.
Analogous to (C.44), the following two results apply under monopoly.
Table C.8: Binding operation solutions by stage under monopoly.
Variable Stage A Stage B Stage C Stage D
t τ1 < t < τ2 τ2 ≤ t ≤ τ3 τ3 < t < τ4
τ4 ≤ t ≤ T
0 ≤ t ≤ τ1
P ∗





[Pτ1 (Q0) + Pt (Q0)]
Pt (Q0)









[Pτ1 (Q0)− Pt (Q0)] 0
1
2B
[Pτ3 (Q0)− Pt (Q0)] 0
N∗ 1
2
f (τ1, t) N N +
1
2
f (τ3, t) 0
θU∗t 0 Ṗ (Q0) ≥ 0 0 0
θL∗t 0 0 0 −Ṗ (Q0) ≥ 0
Pτ1 (Q0)− P0 (Q0) = P0 (Q0)− Pτ3 (Q0) (C.76)
Pτ1 (Q0)− Pτ1+s (Q0) = Pτ3+s (Q0)− Pτ3 (Q0) ∀s ∈ [0, (τ4 − τ3)] (C.77)
The shadow value θL∗t under monopoly is considered a mathematical artifice, just as it was
under perfect competition in Section C.1.1. Analogous to (C.53), the marginal benefit of
storage capacity (MBSC∗) under monopoly at a given nominal storage capacity N can be
found as either the integral
∫ τ3
τ2











Ṗ (Q0) dt = Pτ3 (Q0)− Pτ2 (Q0) (C.78)
Analogous to (C.54), MBSC∗ can be expressed as a function of τ1 as
MBSC∗ (τ1) = 2aA · sin bτ1 . (C.79)
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Based on (C.46) and (C.74), τ1 (NSC
∗) = τ1 (NSC
∗∗) when NSC∗ = NSC∗∗. This implies
MBSC∗ (τ1 (NSC)) =MBSC
∗∗ (τ1 (NSC)) . (C.80)
In words, the marginal benefit of storage capacity (MBSC) as a function of normalized
storage capacity (NSC) is the same in magnitude under perfect competition and monopoly.
Their interpretations are different though. MBSC∗∗ is the welfare added by storage oper-
ations under perfect competition. On the other hand, MBSC∗ is the profit generated by




REGULATED LUMPY ASSET INVESTMENT MODEL
This appendix includes the mathematical details of building the asset investment model.
It starts by solving the market-equilibrium price and quantity demanded of the partial equi-
librium model underlying the asset investment model. It then derives expressions for discount
factor J and asset revenues V . Derivatives of these expressions with respect to τ, T, and
cTP are found as they are needed by the Lagrangian method used to develop the model. The
asset investment model is formulated as a constrained optimization problem that is solved
using the Lagrangian method. The objective function to be maximized is the present value
of all recurrent profits per investment cycle. Welfare generated over time by the asset invest-
ment of an individual investment cycle is also calculated. Both results are used in Chapter
2 as input to calculate private value and social value, respectively.
D.1 Partial Equilibrium Over Time
Figure D.1 illustrates the underlying partial equilibrium model for natural gas transport.
Demand for natural gas transport has the linear form
Pt = At − B ·Qt (D.1)
where Pt is the price of transport, At is the reservation price, B is the constant downward
slope of demand, and Qt is the quantity demanded of transport. Reservation price At changes
overtime by a constant amount A as
At = A · t, (D.2)
shifting demand in an upward/rightward direction. The supply of natural gas transport has
two sections. The first section is perfectly elastic stretching until full capacity is reached
(Qτ+T = K). The second section is perfectly inelastic when full capacity is reached. Along
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Figure D.1: Asset investment model dynamics.
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the perfectly elastic section of supply, market equilibrium price (Pt) is constant and equal
to the regulated transport charge (cTP ), or
Pt = cTP ∀ t ∈ [τ, τ + T ] (D.3)
while market equilibrium quantity demanded Qt grows linearly over time (∀ t ∈ [τ, τ + T ])
as demand shifts. Qt ∀ t ∈ [τ, τ + T ] is found next. Under excess capacity, (D.3) can be
substituted in (D.1) to obtain
cTP = At − B ·Qt. (D.4)
At the start of every investment cycle (t = 0), reservation price initiates at cTP and increases
over time by a constant amount A. Thus, At for every cycle can be expressed as
At = cTP + A · t. (D.5)
Substituting (D.5) in (D.4),
cTP = (cTP + A · t)− B ·Qt.




· t ∀ t ∈ [τ, τ + T ] . (D.6)
Along the perfectly inelastic section of supply, the market clears under congestion. In this
case, market equilibrium quantity demanded is limited by capacity and
Qt = K ∀ t ∈ [τ + T, ∞]. (D.7)
while market equilibrium price increases linearly over time as demand increases and
Pt = cTP + A · (t− τ + T ) ∀ t ∈ [τ + T, ∞]. (D.8)
Because the price received by the pipeline company is limited to cTP (by regulation), the
marketer receives the remaining congestion premium A · (t− τ + T ). Table D.1 summa-
rizes the market equilibrium price and market equilibrium quantity demanded by stage of
investment cycle.
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Table D.1: Partial equilibrium price and quantity demanded by stage of investment cycle.
Cycle stage Time frame Price*
Quantity
demanded
Waiting to invest 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
Not applicable as
there is no new
capacity expansion.
Not applicable as
there is no new
capacity expansion.






t ≥ τ + T
Pt =




* Under congestion, because the price received by the pipeline company is limited to
cTP (by regulation), the marketer receives the congestion premium A · (t− τ + T ).
D.2 Discount Factor J
To spread the present value of profits per investment cycle (π) over the span of a cycle






Over time, annuity (A) is in fact permanent because it is re-introduced by every recurrent
investment cycle. The present value of this permanent annuity (A) at the start of the very
first cycle (taci) can be found by dividing (D.9) by the perpetuity continuous-discount factor








Last, the present value at absolute time zero (ta0) is found by multiplying (D.10) by e
−ρ·taci .







Absolute time of cycle initiation taci is found from reservation price Ataci next. Based on (D.2),
reservation price Ataci is
Ataci = A · t
a
ci. (D.12)










By substituting (D.14) in (D.11), discount factor J as a function of τ, T, and cTP is






Discount factor J is always positive as τ , T , and cTP must be positive.
D.2.1 Derivatives of Discount Factor J








found in this section. These derivatives are later used to develop the model. First, J (D.15)
is restated as the product,































































eρ(τ+T ) − 1
(< 0) . (D.18)






















· J (< 0) . (D.19)
D.3 Asset Revenues
An expression for asset revenues (V ) can be found by adding the discounted asset revenues
from the two stages of the asset capacity utilization cycle, i.e., excess capacity and full
capacity. Asset revenues under excess capacity (VEC) are estimated as
VEC (τ, T, cTP ) =
∫ τ+T
τ
e−ρt · (cTP ·Qt) dt. (D.20)
Asset revenues after full capacity is reached (VFC) are estimated as
VFC (τ, T, cTP ) =
∫ ∞
τ+T
e−ρt · (cTP ·Qτ+T ) dt. (D.21)
Correspondingly, total asset revenues (V ) are the sum of (D.20) and (D.21), or
V (τ, T, cTP ) = VEC + VFC . (D.22)
Because the model is deterministic, a risk-free continuous-discount rate ρ is used. In VEC
(D.20) and VFC (D.21), asset revenues generated over time are captured by the term in
parenthesis (cTP ·Qt), which is simply the product of regulated transport charge cTP and
quantity demanded Qt. Thus, VEC (D.20) is simply the discounted value of the stream of
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revenues generated over the period of operation where t ∈ [τ, τ + T ]. As a terminal value,
VFC (D.21) is the discounted value of an endless stream of revenues that is constant and
equal to the revenues realized at full capacity (cTP ·Qτ+T ). Parametric forms for VEC , VFC ,







e−ρt · t dt.
























[ρ (τ + T ) + 1]
}
.
After re-arranging terms, VEC as a function of τ , T , and cTP is







(ρτ + 1)− e−ρT [ρ (τ + T ) + 1]
}
. (D.23)
Continuing with VFC , (D.21) is re-stated by factoring constants out as




Integrating the indefinite form,













After substituting (D.6), VFC as a function of τ , T , and cTP is







(τ + T ) . (D.24)
Last, a parametric form for total asset revenues V is found by substituting VEC (D.23) and









(ρτ + 1)− e−ρT [ρ (τ + T ) + 1]
}






(τ + T )
Factoring out common terms,







(ρτ + 1)− e−ρT [ρ (τ + T ) + 1] + e−ρT · ρ (τ + T )
}
.
After adding terms, the present value of asset revenues (V ) at the start time of the investment
cycle is







(ρτ + 1)− e−ρT
]
. (D.25)
D.3.1 Derivatives of Asset Revenues



















































































e−ρT − e−ρT + ρτ
]
.




















D.4 Asset Investment Model




F (τ, T,K, cTP ) s.t. Qτ+T ≤ K (D.31)
where F is the value generated from all recurrent capital expansions,
F (τ, T,K, cTP ) = J (τ, T, cTP ) · π (τ, T, cTP ) , (D.32)
π are the profits in every investment cycle,
π = V (τ, T, cTP )− I (K) e
−ρτ , (D.33)




(τ + T ) . (D.34)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is
L (τ, T,K, cTP ) = J (τ, T, cTP ) ·
[
V (τ, T, cTP )− e








(τ + T )
}
.
Table D.2 shows the complementarities of the Lagrangian (D.35) and the associated system
of equations. The derivatives of discount factor J and asset revenues V with respect to
τ, T, and cTP derived in Sections D.2.1 and D.3.1 are now substituted in the system of
equations shown in Table D.2 to obtain a new system of equations. It should be noted
that (D.38)112 and (D.40) remain the same in the new system of equations. Beginning with
(D.36), substituting π (D.33) and ∂J
∂τ
(D.17) in (D.36) and factoring J out yields
112 At the optimum level, (D.38) shows that the shadow value of capacity must be equal to the value of all
recurrent marginal costs of investment.
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Table D.2: Private investor model complementarities.
Complementarity Assuming τ > 0, T > 0, K > 0, cTP > 0, and γ > 0
∂L
∂τ
≤ 0 ⊥ τ ≥ 0
∂J
∂τ












≤ 0 ⊥ T ≥ 0
∂J
∂T















≤ 0 ⊥ cTP ≥ 0
∂J
∂cTP











eρ(τ+T ) − 1
·
[
















eρ(τ+T ) − 1
·
[
V − e−ρτ · I (K)
]


























eρ(τ+T ) − 1
− 1
)







































out on the RHS, substituting (D.38) in the form γ
J
= e−ρτ · I ′ (K), and substi-









eρ(τ+T ) − 1
)
[















eρ(τ+T ) − 1
)
[








− I ′ (K)
)
. (D.41)
After substituting π (D.33), the first optimization condition derived from the system of

















− I ′ (K∗)
)
. (D.42)
In (D.42), the left hand side is the present value at the time of cycle initiation of all discrete
profits recurring every cycle. The right hand side is the present value at the time of cycle
initiation of the difference between the present value of a continuous stream of transport
charge cTP minus the marginal cost of capital, all multiplied by the discounted rate of
demand growth. Next, (D.36) is subtracted from (D.37) to obtain the base for the second
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= ρ · e−ρτ · I (Qτ+T ) (D.43)
Substituting (D.29) in (D.43),
e−ρτ · cTP ·
A
B
· τ = ρ · e−ρτ · I (Qτ+T ) .
After cancelling e−ρτ out and substituting Qτ =
A
B
· τ , the second expression in the new
system of equations is
c∗TP ·Qτ∗ = ρ · I (Qτ∗+T ∗) . (D.44)
To maximize the value of the investment opportunity, (D.44) indicates that at optimum start
time τ ∗ the initial instant asset revenue (c∗TP ·Qτ∗) must be equal to the instant interest on
investment [ρ · I (Qτ∗+T ∗)]. Another interpretation of this result is that the optimum start
time τ ∗ (when it is worth investing) occurs when the present value of an endless stream that





(D.30), and π (D.33) are substituted in (D.39) to obtain the base for the












After cancelling J out, factoring V out, and re-arranging terms, the third expression of the






V ∗ = e−ρτ
∗
· I (K∗) . (D.46)
Using the results from equations (D.38), (D.40), (D.42), (D.44) and (D.46), Table D.3 re-
introduces the system of five equations in five unknowns (τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, c∗TP , and γ
∗) from
Table 2. This new system of equations shows the specific parametric form of the asset
investment model under linear demand growth. In Table D.3, each equation is the result of
the Lagrangian’s first-order condition (FOCs) with respect to each of the variables shown
in the first column. It should be noted that the optimum level of capacity K∗ (D.40) is
216
an explicit function of τ ∗ and T ∗. In turn, the corresponding shadow value of capacity γ∗
(D.38) is an explicit function of the remaining four unknowns (τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, c∗TP ). Thus, as
a solution procedure, the sub-system of three equations in three unknowns (τ ∗, T ∗, c∗TP )
comprised by equations (D.44), (D.42), and (D.46) can be solved first. Subsequently, the
results (τ ∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) from the 3 × 3 system can be used to solve K
∗ (D.40) first and γ∗
(D.38) second.
Table D.3: Asset investment model as a system of five equations and five unknowns.
FOC
w.r.t.
Result of Lagrangian’s FOC Equation





(τ ∗ + T ∗)
]
(D.40)
K γ∗ (τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, c∗TP ) = J (τ
∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) · e
−ρτ∗ · I ′ (K∗) (D.38)



























V ∗ = e−ρτ
∗
· I (K∗) (D.46)
In Table D.3, the terms π∗, Qτ∗ , and J are defined by the expressions found after substi-
tuting the four optimized choice variables (τ ∗, T ∗, c∗TP , K
∗) in (D.33), (D.6), and (D.15),
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respectively. The specific forms of I (K∗) and I ′ (K∗) are defined in Chapter 2. c∗TP is en-
dogenous in the 5 × 5 system of equations shown in Table D.3. In this case, the pipeline
company gets to choose the optimum cTP as a natural monopoly. To analyze the regulated
monopoly case, cTP is treated exogenously by simply removing (D.46) out of the 5×5 system
of equations – because (D.46) is the FOC with respect to cTP and (D.46) is not substituted
in any of the other conditions. This reduces the 5 × 5 system to a 4 × 4 system where
the unknowns are τ ∗, T ∗, K∗, and γ∗. Because there is no explicit solution for unknowns
τ ∗, T ∗, and c∗TP , a numerical example is illustrated in Chapter 2 to help visualize the implicit
solutions.
D.5 Welfare
Just like asset revenues in Section D.3, an expression for welfare (W ) can be found by
adding the discounted welfare from the two stages of the asset capacity utilization cycle, i.e.,

























Correspondingly, total welfare (W ) is the sum of (D.47) and (D.48), or
W (τ, T, cTP ) = WEC +WFC . (D.49)
InWEC (D.47) andWFC (D.48), welfare generated over time (Qt · P
avg
t ) is equal to the prod-
uct of quantity demanded Qt and the average price P
avg
t enclosed by the welfare trapezoid
(See Figure D.1). Welfare after full capacity is reached is estimated in the form of a terminal
value. The result is simply the present value of an endless stream of welfare that grows
over time. Parametric forms for WEC , WFC , and W are found next. Beginning with WEC ,
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.
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[ρ (τ + T ) + 1] .
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(τ + T )
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[ρ (τ + T ) + 1]
]
. (D.51)
Last, a parametric form for total welfare W is found by substituting WEC (D.50) and WFC
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MATLAB CODE FOR ASSET INVESTMENT MODEL
This appendix includes the lines of Matlab code used to solve the asset investment model.
When cTP is endogenous, the model solves the sub-system of three equations in three un-
knowns (τ ∗, T ∗, c∗TP ) comprised by equations (2.33), (2.34), and (2.35). When cTP is ex-
ogenous, the model solves the sub-system of two equations in two unknowns (τ ∗ and T ∗)
comprised by equations (2.33) and (2.34). In this appendix, these two sub-systems are re-
ferred to as the 3 × 3 and 2 × 2 systems of equations, respectively. Section E.1 shows the
two Matlab (“fsolve”) command lines used to solve the two systems of equations. Section
E.2 shows the two Matlab functions representing the two systems of equations. Section
E.3 shows the Matlab functions that individually capture some of the mathematical terms
included in the two systems of equations.
E.1 Matlab Command Lines
Command line used to solve the 3× 3 system of equations:
s o l u t i o n=f s o l v e (@3x3system , [ 1 10 1 ] )
Command line used to solve the 2× 2 system of equations:
s o l u t i o n=f s o l v e (@2x2system , [ 1 1 0 ] )
The following parameters must be created before using the “fsolve” command: A, B, a, b,
c, d, rho, and cTP (when exogenous). Once they are created, they can be populated with
the numerical values of interest.
E.2 Matlab Functions Used to Solve Systems of Equations
The following Matlab functions represent the 3× 3 and 2× 2 systems of equations.
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E.2.1 3× 3 System of Equations
function z = 3x3system (x )
% Asset inves tment model f o r p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r wi th t h r ee endogenous




Tau = abs ( x (1 ) ) ;
T = abs ( x (2 ) ) ;
cTP= abs ( x (3 ) ) ;
P = exp( rho ∗(Tau+T) ) ;
H = P / (P − 1) ;
The following lines correspond to model equations (2.33), (2.34), and (2.35), respectively.
z (1 )=cTP∗Qt(Tau)−rho∗ I (Qt(Tau+T) ) ;
z (2 )= rho∗H∗Pro f i t (Tau ,T, cTP)−exp(−rho∗Tau) ∗(A/B) ∗(cTP/rho−Im(Qt(Tau+T)
) ) ;
z (3 )=(1−A/( rho∗cTP) ) ∗V(Tau ,T, cTP)− exp(−rho∗Tau) ∗ I (Qt(Tau+T) ) ;
end
E.2.2 2× 2 System of Equations
function z = 2x2system (x )
% Asset inves tment model f o r p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r wi th two endogenous




Tau = abs ( x (1 ) ) ;
T = abs ( x (2 ) ) ;
% The va lue o f cTP can change as cTP i s exogenous .
cTP= 1 . 0 ;
P = exp( rho ∗(Tau+T) ) ;
H = P / (P − 1) ;
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The following lines correspond to model equations (2.33) and (2.34), respectively.
z (1 )=cTP∗Qt(Tau)−rho∗ I (Qt(Tau+T) ) ;
z (2 )= rho∗H∗Pro f i t (Tau ,T, cTP)−exp(−rho∗Tau) ∗(A/B) ∗(cTP/rho−Im(Qt(Tau+T)
) ) ;
end
E.3 Matlab functions for some of the terms in the systems of equations
Market equilibrium quantity demanded Qt, eq. (2.20) :
function Qt = Qt( t )
global A;
global B;
Qt = (A/B) ∗ t ;
end
Cost of capital investment I (K), eq. (2.29) :
function I = I (K)
a = 0 . 00085 ;
b = −0.05;
c = 1 ;
d = 30 ;
I = a∗Kˆ3+b∗Kˆ2+c∗K+d ;
end
Marginal cost of capital investment I ′ (K), eq. (2.30) :
function Im = Im(K)
a = 0 . 00085 ;
b = −0.05;
c = 1 ;
d = 30 ;
Im = 3∗a∗Kˆ2+2∗b∗K+c ;
end
Present value of asset revenues per investment cycle, at the start of the cycle V (τ, T, cTP ),
eq. (2.28) :





V=exp(−rho∗Tau) ∗(cTP/( rho ˆ2) ) ∗(A/B) ∗ ( ( rho∗Tau+1)−exp(−rho∗T) ) ;
end
Profit per investment cycle π, eq. (2.24) :
function Pro f i t = Pr o f i t (Tau ,T, cTP)
global rho ;
P r o f i t = V(Tau ,T, cTP)−exp(−rho∗Tau) ∗ I (Qt(Tau+T) ) ;
end
Welfare per investment cycle W (τ, T, cTP ), eq. (2.37) :




UW =(A/B) ∗exp(−rho∗Tau) /( rho ˆ2) ∗(cTP∗ ( ( rho∗Tau+1)−exp(−rho∗T) ∗( rho ∗(Tau
+T)+1) )+(A/(2∗ rho ) ) ∗ ( ( ( rho∗Tau+1)ˆ2+1)−exp(−rho∗T) ∗ ( ( rho ∗(Tau+T)+1)
ˆ2+1) ) ) ;
TW =exp(−rho ∗(Tau+T) ) ∗(A/B) ∗(Tau+T) ∗ ( (cTP/rho )+(A/(2∗ rho ˆ2) ) ∗( rho ∗(Tau+
T)+1) ) ;
W = UW + TW;
end
224
